Progress in post-quantum theory

Yi-Kai Liu, Dustin Moody

We review the current status of efforts to develop and deploy post-quantum cryptography on the Internet. Then we suggest specific ways in which quantum technologies might be used to enhance cybersecurity in the near future and beyond. We focus on two goals: protecting the secret keys that are used in classical cryptography, and ensuring the trustworthiness of quantum computations. These goals may soon be within reach, thanks to recent progress in both theory and experiment. This progress includes interactive protocols for testing quantumness as well as for performing uncloneable cryptographic computations; and experimental demonstrations of device-independent random number generators, device-independent quantum key distribution, quantum memories, and analog quantum simulators.

Ted Bastin

Brian A. LaMacchia, Matt Campagna, William Gropp

The development of quantum computing threatens the security of our currently widely deployed cryptographic algorithms. While signicant progress has been made in developing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards to protect against future quantum computing threats, the U.S. government's estimated $7.1 billion transition cost for non-National Security Systems alone, coupled with an aggressive 2035 deadline, will require sustained funding, research, and international coordination to successfully upgrade existing cryptographic systems.

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Thomas Görnitz, Holger Lyre

Olaf Krueger, Reinhard F. Werner

This article is a snap-shot of a web site, which has been collecting open problems in quantum information for several years, and documenting the progress made on these problems. By posting it we make the complete collection available in one printout. We also hope to draw more attention to this project, inviting every researcher in the field to raise to the challenges, but also to suggest new problems.

Ion I. Cotǎescu