Quantum Mechanics as a Semantic Problem

Claudio Garola

Jac Ladyman, Sue French

Diederik Aerts, Christian DE RONDE, Héctor Freytes +1 more

Lawrence William Lonney

Claudio Garola, Sandro Sozzo

The old Bohr–Einstein debate about the completeness of quantum mechanics (QM) was held on an ontological ground. The completeness problem becomes more tractable, however, if it is preliminarily discussed from a semantic viewpoint. Indeed every physical theory adopts, explicitly or not, a truth theory for its observative language, in terms of which the notions of semantic objectivity and semantic completeness of the physical theory can be introduced and inquired. In particular, standard QM adopts a verificationist theory of truth that implies its semantic nonobjectivity; moreover, we show in this paper that standard QM is semantically complete, which matches Bohr’s thesis. On the other hand, one of the authors has provided a Semantic Realism (or SR) interpretation of QM that adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence for the observative language of QM (which was previously mantained to be impossible); according to this interpretation QM is semantically objective, yet incomplete, which matches EPR’s thesis. Thus, standard QM and the SR interpretation of QM come to opposite conclusions. These can be reconciled within an integrationist perspective that interpretes non–Tarskian theories of truth as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth.

T.O.

This paper clarifies a recurrent structural confusion in advanced computation: the tendency to equate Quantum Mechanical (QM) computation and Cognitional Mechanics (CM) solely because both employ non-commutative structures. While the mathematical resemblance is real, the two frameworks operate at fundamentally different ontological layers and therefore govern distinct domains. Quantum computation represents extreme peak performance. Its advantage appears only after a problem has been fully formalized within a closed mathematical system, such as a fixed Hilbert space with well-defined operators and observables. Algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s demonstrate that, under these conditions, QM can invalidate classical hardness assumptions or achieve dramatic speedups. However, QM neither generates nor reinterprets problems; it presupposes that all semantic uncertainty has already been resolved. Cognitional Mechanics governs the peripheral domain in which problems are formed, redefined, and semantically stabilized. CM models intelligence as a system of non-commutative semantic operations acting on meaning states within an open and evolving semantic manifold. Its non-commutativity is semantic rather than physical: the order of interpretive operations determines which meaning stabilizes, and this process is intrinsically irreversible. Through the example of RSA cryptanalysis, this paper shows that QM and CM are not competing frameworks. QM dominates isolated computational peaks, while CM governs the surrounding periphery that makes such peaks identifiable as problems at all. Recognizing this structural division is necessary to avoid category errors that conflate physical computational power with intelligence itself.