Abstract The conspicuous similarities between interpretive strategies in classical statistical mechanics and in quantum mechanics may be grounded on their employment of common implementations of probability. The objective probabilities which represent the underlying stochasticity of these theories can be naturally associated with three of their common formal features: initial conditions, dynamics, and observables. Various well-known interpretations of the two theories line up with particular choices among these three ways of implementing probability. This perspective has significant application to debates on primitive ontology and to the quantum measurement problem.
Abstract The conspicuous similarities between interpretive strategies in classical statistical mechanics and in quantum mechanics may be grounded on their employment of common implementations of probability. The objective probabilities which represent the underlying stochasticity of these theories can be naturally associated with three of their common formal features: initial conditions, dynamics, and observables. Various well-known interpretations of the two theories line up with particular choices among these three ways of implementing probability. This perspective has significant application to debates on primitive ontology and to the quantum measurement problem.
In this paper I propose an interpretation of classical statistical mechanics that centers on taking seriously the idea that probability measures represent complete states of statistical mechanical systems. I show how this leads naturally to the idea that the stochasticity of statistical mechanics is associated directly with the observables of the theory rather than with the microstates (as traditional accounts would have it). The usual assumption that microstates are representationally significant in the theory is therefore dispensable, a consequence which suggests interesting possibilities for developing non-equilibrium statistical mechanics and investigating inter-theoretic answers to the foundational questions of statistical mechanics.
In this chapter, we consider the way quantum theory represents deterministic, statistical, and probabilistic aspects of Nature. After a discussion in Section 3.1 of uncertainty in general, we discuss in Sections 3.2-3.4 several formal notions of classical probability, their relation to the probability concept used in applied statistics, and their dependence on the description used. Section 3.5 briefly discusses various examples, where probabilistic features emerge from fully deterministic situations-a theme to be taken up in much more detail in Chapter 11. Section 3.6 then shows how the statistical aspects of the quantum formalism naturally follow from the weak law of large numbers. The notions of c-probability in the classical case and of q-probability in the quantum case are formally defined in Section 3.7. Historically, the concept of classical probability (including its use in stochastic processes) was given an undisputed formal mathematical foundation in 1933 in terms of the measure-theoretic setting of Kolmogorov [164]. Apart from this traditional axiomatic foundation of classical probability theory, there is a less well-known equivalent axiomatic treatment by Whittle [302] in terms of expectations. Here probabilities appear as the expectations of statements, {0, 1}-valued random variables. von Plato [240] discusses the history of the concept of probability. Krüger et al. [169] discuss the history of probability in the various fields of application. Sklar [275] discusses the philosophical problems of the probability concept, with an emphasis on statistical mechanics.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.
Since the early twentieth century, quantum mechanics has sought an interpretation that offers a consistent worldview. In the course of that, many proposals were advanced, but all of them introduce, at some point, interpretation elements (semantics) that find no correlate in the formalism (syntactics). This distance from semantics and syntactics is one of the major reasons for finding so abstruse and diverse interpretations of the formalism. To overcome this issue, we propose an alternative stochastic interpretation, based exclusively on the formal structure of the Schrödinger equation, without resorting to external assumptions such as the collapse of the wave function or the role of the observer. We present four (mathematically equivalent) mathematical derivations of the Schrödinger equation based on four constructs: characteristic function, Boltzmann entropy, Central Limit Theorem (CLT), and Langevin equation. All of them resort to axioms already interpreted and offer complementary perspectives to the quantum formalism. The results show the possibility of deriving the Schrödinger equation from well-defined probabilistic principles and that the wave function represents a probability amplitude in the configuration space, with dispersions linked to the CLT. It is concluded that quantum mechanics has a stochastic support, originating from the separation between particle and field subsystems, allowing an objective description of quantum behavior as a mean-field theory, analogous, but not equal, to Brownian motion, without the need for arbitrary ontological entities.
This doctoral thesis in mathematics consists of three articles that explore the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics and quantization from a novel perspective. The thesis adopts a probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics, which views the archetypical quantum experiments of Bell- and double-slit- type as violating the principle of non-contextuality, i.e., the assertion that all events and observables are always representable on one single Kolmogorovian probability space, rather than the principles of realism or locality. This probabilistic interpretation posits that quantum mechanics constitutes a probability theory that adheres to the principle of contextuality, and that quantum events explicitly occur at the level of measurement, rather than the level of that which is measured, as these are traditionally interpreted. The thesis establishes a natural connection between the probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics, specifically Born’s rule, and the frequentist interpretation of probability. The major conceptual step in establishing this connection is to re-identify quantum observables instead as unitary representations of groups, whose irreducible sub-representations correspond to the observable’s different possible outcomes, rather than primarily as self- adjoint operators. Furthermore, the thesis reformulates classical statistical mechanics in the formalism of quantum mechanics, known as the Koopman-von Neumann formulation, to demonstrate that classical statistical mechanics also adheres to the principle of contextuality. This finding is significant because it raises questions about the existence of a hidden-variable model of classical statistical mechanics of the kind as examined in Bell’s theorem, where this presumed hidden-variable model traditionally has been seen as that which distinguishes "classical" from "quantum" probability.A novel reformulation of quantization is proposed considering it rather in terms of the representation theory of Hamiltonian flows and their associated inherent symmetry group of symplectomorphisms. Contrary to the traditional view of quantization, this formulation can be regarded as compatible with the probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics and offers a new perspective on the quantization of gravity.
I review the role of probability in contemporary physics and the origin of probabilistic time asymmetry, beginning with the pre-quantum case (both stochastic mechanics and classical statistical mechanics) but concentrating on quantum theory. I argue that quantum mechanics radically changes the pre-quantum situation and that the philosophical nature of objective probability in physics, and of probabilistic asymmetry in time, is dependent on the correct resolution of the quantum measurement problem.