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International Journal of Quantum Information

Measurement-device-independent semiquantum key distribution

Jinjun He, Qin Li, Chunhui Wu, Wai Hong Chan, Shengyu Zhang

Published Feb 2, 2018• 30 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) allows two parties to share a common string when one of them is quantum and the other has rather limited quantum capability. Almost all existing SQKD protocols have been proved to be robust in theory, namely that if an eavesdropper tries to gain information, he will inevitably induce some detectable errors. However, ideal devices do not exist in reality and their imperfection may result in side-channel attacks, which can be used by an adversary to get some information on the secret key string. In this paper, we design a measurement-device-independent SQKD protocol for the first time, which can remove the threat of all detector side-channel attacks and show that it is also robust. In addition, we discuss the possible use of the proposed protocol in real-world applications and in QKD networks.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749918500120

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Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) allows two parties to share a common string when one of them is quantum and the other has rather limited quantum capability. Almost all existing SQKD protocols have been proved to be robust in theory, namely that if an eavesdropper tries to gain information, he will inevitably induce some detectable errors. However, ideal devices do not exist in reality and their imperfection may result in side-channel attacks, which can be used by an adversary to get some information on the secret key string. In this paper, we design a measurement-device-independent SQKD protocol for the first time, which can remove the threat of all detector side-channel attacks and show that it is also robust. In addition, we discuss the possible use of the proposed protocol in real-world applications and in QKD networks.
Semiquantum key distribution protocols are designed to allow two parties to establish a shared secret key, secure against an all-powerful adversary, even when one of the users is restricted to measuring and preparing quantum states in one single basis. While interesting from a theoretical standpoint, these protocols have the disadvantage that a two-way quantum communication channel is necessary which generally limits their theoretical efficiency and noise tolerance. In this paper, we construct a semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol which actually takes advantage of this necessary two-way channel, and, after performing an information theoretic security analysis against collective attacks, we show it is able to tolerate a channel noise level higher than any prior SQKD protocol to date. We also compare the noise tolerance of our protocol to other two-way fully quantum protocols, along with BB84 with classical advantage distillation. We also comment on some practical issues involving semiquantum key distribution (in particular, concerning the potential complexity in physical implementation of our protocol as compared with other standard QKD protocols). Finally, we develop techniques that can be applied to the security analysis of other (S)QKD protocols reliant on a two-way quantum communication channel.
The security of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is fundamentally constrained by vulnerabilities of single-photon detectors. Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) was proposed to remove this limitation by allowing all measurements to be performed by a completely untrusted party, under the assumption that the measurement node can be treated as adversarial but does not compromise the security guarantees of the protocol. Here we show that this assumption is insufficient under realistic adversarial control of the measurement device. We present an attack in which an adversary exploits active control of the measurement node (Charlie) to obtain significant information about the secret key. The attack enables recovery of up to 70\% of the sifted key while introducing only 5.6\% quantum bit error rate. Unlike previously reported attacks targeting specific implementations of MDI-QKD, our results demonstrate a limitation of the standard security model underlying the protocol. These findings indicate that additional constraints on the measurement-device independence assumption, or refined security analyses incorporating stronger adversarial capabilities, are required to ensure the security of MDI-QKD in realistic scenarios.
Although some ideal quantum key distribution protocols have been proved to be secure, there have been some demonstrations that practical quantum key distribution implementations were hacked due to some real-life imperfections. Among these attacks, detector side channel attacks may be the most serious. Recently, a measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol [ Phys. Rev. Lett. 108 (2012) 130503 ] was proposed and all detector side channel attacks are removed in this scheme. Here a new security proof based on quantum information theory is given. The eavesdropper's information of the sifted key bits is bounded. Then with this bound, the final secure key bit rate can be obtained.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two quantum parties to generate a secret shared key. Semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, such as ``QKD with classical Bob'' and ``QKD with classical Alice'' (that have both been proven robust), achieve this goal even if one of the parties is classical. However, existing SQKD protocols are not experimentally feasible with current technology. Here we suggest a protocol, ``Classical Alice with a controllable mirror,'' that can be experimentally implemented with current technology (using four-level systems instead of qubits), and we prove it to be robust.