Oxford University Press eBooks

Pragmatist Quantum Realism

Richard Healey

Published Feb 27, 2020• 20 citations

Abstract

Realism comes in many varieties, in science and elsewhere. Van Fraassen’s influential formulation took scientific realism to include the view that science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like. So understood, a quantum realist takes quantum theory to aim at correctly representing the world: many would add that its success justifies believing this representation is more or less correct. But quantum realism has been understood both more narrowly and more broadly. A pragmatist considers use prior to representation and this has prompted some to dub pragmatist views anti-realist, including the view of quantum theory that the author has been developing recently. But whether a pragmatist view of quantum theory should be labeled anti-realist depends not only on its ingredients but also on how that label should be applied. Pragmatism offers a healthy diet of quantum realism.

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198814979.003.0007

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