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International Conference on Security of Information and Networks (SIN)

Privacy preserving two-server Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol

Durbadal Chattaraj, Monalisa Sarma, Debasis Samanta

Published Oct 13, 2017• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

For a secure communication over an insecure channel the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (DHKEP) is treated as the de facto standard. However, it suffers form server-side compromisation, identity compromisation, man-in-the-middle, replay attacks, etc. Also, there are single point of vulnerability (SOV), single point of failure (SOF) and user privacy preservation issues. This work proposes an identity-based two-server DHKEP to address the aforesaid issues and alleviating the attacks. To preserve user identity from outside intruders, a k-anonymity based identity hiding principle has been adopted. Further, to ensure efficient utilization of channel bandwidth, the proposed scheme employs elliptic curve cryptography. The security analysis substantiate that our scheme is provably secure and successfully addressed the above-mentioned issues. The performance study contemplates that the overhead of the protocol is reasonable and comparable with other schemes.

DOI
10.1145/3136825.3136871

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For a secure communication over an insecure channel the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (DHKEP) is treated as the de facto standard. However, it suffers form server-side compromisation, identity compromisation, man-in-the-middle, replay attacks, etc. Also, there are single point of vulnerability (SOV), single point of failure (SOF) and user privacy preservation issues. This work proposes an identity-based two-server DHKEP to address the aforesaid issues and alleviating the attacks. To preserve user identity from outside intruders, a k-anonymity based identity hiding principle has been adopted. Further, to ensure efficient utilization of channel bandwidth, the proposed scheme employs elliptic curve cryptography. The security analysis substantiate that our scheme is provably secure and successfully addressed the above-mentioned issues. The performance study contemplates that the overhead of the protocol is reasonable and comparable with other schemes.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol provides the opportunity to arrive at a common secret key by exchanging texts over insecure medium without meeting in advance. Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is limited to the exchange of key only. Due to lack of authentication of entities, this protocol is vulnerable towards man-in-middle attack and impersonation attack. To eliminate the man-in-middle attack, Nanli[9] presented a research paper on Diffie-Hellma key exchange protocol. It is observed that Nanli‟s protocol, still suffers with impersonation attack. To deal with this vulnerability, an improved key exchange approach based on third party authentication scheme is proposed in this paper.
With the advancement in Internet-based technologies, network applications are no longer just limited to one-to-one communication; instead, it has become a publicly accessible resource. Regardless of this growth, such applications bring specific challenges concerning authentication, integrity, and privacy. Cryptography stands as an ideal solution to overcome these issues through an interactive method of secure communication called Key Exchange. Key exchange protocols allow two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret transmitted over a public channel without revealing any information to an eavesdropper. This thesis contributes to the design and analysis of the variants of key exchange protocols along with their applications. As per the security requirements, the proposed schemes are either designed in an interactive model or a non-interactive model. Each scheme undergoes a series of formal and informal security analysis. The formal analysis provides simulation result using cryptographic models. Whereas, an informal analysis showcases the theoretical proves on known attacks where an adversary controls the network. The performance analysis maps the protocol’s efficiency based on the computation cost and communication size. The first contribution introduces an interactive two-party authenticated key exchange protocol. We begin by investigating the security flaws in an existing system such as, lack of user anonymity, trace attack, clogging attack, and failure to resist replay attack. Then proposed an authenticated self-certified key exchange protocol that overcomes the addressed issues. Also, it eliminates the requirements of a trusted certificate authority to authorize the entities. The scheme achieves anonymity during session execution, mutual authentication and enables session key agreement.Based on the ideology, an application is designed, forsecure communication between ad-hoc nodes in a mobile ad-hoc network. The second contribution contributes to the design of an Identity-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol that overcomes the incapability of managing huge peer-to-peer communication and high computation cost faced by two-party authenticated key exchange protocols. The proposed scheme preserves user privacy by enabling the property of anonymity and ensures non-repudiation. Based on the ideology, an application is designed to establish a secure session key between two users with the help of a trusted server for an electronic payment system. The third contribution proposes an interactive pairing-free certificateless authenticated group key agreement scheme suitable for a resource constrained mobile network. The scheme allows any user to join or leave the group dynamically. The key agreement protocol devised in this scheme ensures un-deniability property by incorporating the signcryption, and unsigncryption algorithm. The final contribution presents a non-interactive Identity-based deniable authentication protocol that allows an intended receiver to identify the origin of a given message without being able to prove sender’s identity to a third party.
Key-exchange, in particular Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE), is among the core cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring network security. For key-exchange over the Internet, both security and privacy are desired. In this paper, we develop a family of privacy-preserving authenticated DHKE protocols named deniable Internet key-exchange (DIKE), both in the traditional PKI setting and in the identity-based setting. The newly developed DIKE protocols are of conceptual clarity and practical (online) efficiency. They provide useful privacy protection to both protocol participants, and add novelty and new value to the IKE standard. To the best of our knowledge, our protocols are the first provably secure DHKE protocols that additionally enjoy all the following privacy protection advantages: 1) forward deniability, actually concurrent non-malleable statistical zero-knowledge, for both protocol participants simultaneously; 2) the session transcript and session-key can be generated merely from DH-exponents (together with some public values), which thus cannot be traced to the pair of protocol participants; and 3) exchanged messages do not bear peer's identity, and do not explicitly bear player role information.
The necessity of a secure key exchange protocol arises from the critical need to establish encrypted communication over an untrusted network. Over time, a multitude of key exchange mechanisms have been developed to counteract adversarial threats. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (DHKE) is one of the most widely used protocols for symmetric key sharing. However, this protocol exhibits certain inherent limitations that attackers may exploit. It lacks authentication mechanism and is susceptible to Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks and quantum attacks. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, we have designed a hybrid key exchange protocol combining DHKE with Learning With Errors (LWE), a lattice-based post-quantum primitive. This proposed protocol provides authentication via a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) together with CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital signature, resilience against MITM attacks, and robustness against classical and quantum threats. We have done a security analysis using the Dolev-Yao threat model, extended to quantum-equipped attackers, and showed that the protocol achieves mutual authentication, session key secrecy, and forward secrecy under the hardness of LWE and DHKE. Lastly, we provided detailed parameter recommendations based on NIST standards and shed light on side-channel attacks.
We propose two public-key schemes to achieve deniable authentication for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). Authentication in security had is the essential factor in the key establishment over Internet. The Deniable Internet key exchange protocol gives more value to the IKE standard. Our schemes can in some situations be more efficient than existing IKE protocols as well as having stronger deniability properties. Key-exchange, in particular Diffie–Hellman key exchange (DHKE), is among the core cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring network security. For key-exchange over the Internet, both security and privacy are desired. In this paper, we develop a family of privacy-preserving authenticated DHKE protocols named deniable Internet key-exchange (DIKE), both in the traditional PKI setting and in the identity-based setting. The newly developed DIKE protocols are of conceptual clarity and practical (online) efficiency. They provide useful privacy protection to both protocol participants, and add novelty and new value to the IKE standard.
The authentication key exchange protocol enables communication participants to authenticate each other and agree on the session key over an insecure public network. Recently, a three-party authentication key exchange protocol based on Elliptic curve cryptograph is proposed. In this paper, we improve the three-party encrypted key exchange protocol by bilinear maps. The proposed threeparty authentication key exchange protocol is provable secure under Computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, the novel protocol is more efficient.