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Philosophy and Cosmology

The Structure of Reality, or Where to Find the Final Theory?

Panov Alexander

Published Jan 1, 2017• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The main objective of the present article is the methodological analysis of the structures of physical theories that could apply to the theory of quantum gravitation or the unifi ed theory of all interactions (other terms are the “Final Theory” or “the Theory of Everything”, TOE). In the fi rst step of this discussion, it is shown that, unlike widely believed, quantum theory, in principle, allows representation by local classical hidden variables. The possibility of such representation is proved by the possibility of an exhaustive simulation of quantum systems by means of a local and classical device — the computer equipment plays a role of the local classical hidden variables. Details regarding the realization of such a representation are discussed using the example of an actual computer program simulating a correlation experiment using Eeinstein-Podolsky-Rozen pairs. This example explicitly violates the theorems of impossibility for hidden classical variables in quantum theory. The fact that these theorems ignore the possibility for a situation, which, in this article, is characterized as the splitting of the layers of reality, is the reason that a possible violation of the theorem of impossibility for hidden variables exists. There are two such layers in the computer example — a reality layer where computer equipment exists, and a layer for simulated quantum reality. The analysis of this example results in a general idea about the layers of reality, which are the main subject of the subsequent discussion. The computer example plays a role of the existence theorem. It follows that, in principle, a fundamental local and classical structure may exist behind physical quantum reality. However, such a “local realism” leads to the idea that an immense “space container” exists for classical objects of such a layer of reality. The problem is overcome if the fundamental ontology is classical, but nonlocal. Then, a space container for it is not required. It is shown that such a classical, but nonlocal, structure is very similar to a formal mathematical system. It leads to a thought that the ideal mathematical system can be a fundamental ontology of the TOE, or it is reminiscent of something beyond mathematics — a nonreducible pseudomathematical structure. In this regard, the analysis of the nature of mathematics is given. It is shown that mathematics are not only a result of the imagination of people, but that mathematical forms and all mathematics holistically exist objectively. Moreover, the statement about the objective existence of mathematical forms has an empirical status based on Popper’s criterion of falsifi ability. It transfers a question of objectivity for mathematics from the fi eld of philosophy to the fi eld of empirical science. Then, a connection on the bases of mathematics and physics is established — namely, with the existence of the classical sector of quantum theory and with a causal structure of space-time. In this sense, the existing mathematics are not only objective, but they also possess physics. That is, mathematics, in a sense, is a thing but it is not a thought, and this quality can be considered as an objective layer of reality that can be a substrate of the physical world. In the fi nal part of this paper, several modern directions in the quantum gravity theory or TOE (string theory, loop quantum gravity, and causal sets) are considered regarding, as far as these theories are concerned, the formation of an abstract mathematical substratum. It is shown that the tendency to develop a of structure like an abstract mathematical substratum defi nitely exists. This means that a TOE can be not just a physical theory, but rather an abstract mathematical structure

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•Jan 18, 2026•0 citations
The main objective of the present article is the methodological analysis of the structures of physical theories that could apply to the theory of quantum gravitation or the unifi ed theory of all interactions (other terms are the “Final Theory” or “the Theory of Everything”, TOE). In the fi rst step of this discussion, it is shown that, unlike widely believed, quantum theory, in principle, allows representation by local classical hidden variables. The possibility of such representation is proved by the possibility of an exhaustive simulation of quantum systems by means of a local and classical device — the computer equipment plays a role of the local classical hidden variables. Details regarding the realization of such a representation are discussed using the example of an actual computer program simulating a correlation experiment using Eeinstein-Podolsky-Rozen pairs. This example explicitly violates the theorems of impossibility for hidden classical variables in quantum theory. The fact that these theorems ignore the possibility for a situation, which, in this article, is characterized as the splitting of the layers of reality, is the reason that a possible violation of the theorem of impossibility for hidden variables exists. There are two such layers in the computer example — a reality layer where computer equipment exists, and a layer for simulated quantum reality. The analysis of this example results in a general idea about the layers of reality, which are the main subject of the subsequent discussion. The computer example plays a role of the existence theorem. It follows that, in principle, a fundamental local and classical structure may exist behind physical quantum reality. However, such a “local realism” leads to the idea that an immense “space container” exists for classical objects of such a layer of reality. The problem is overcome if the fundamental ontology is classical, but nonlocal. Then, a space container for it is not required. It is shown that such a classical, but nonlocal, structure is very similar to a formal mathematical system. It leads to a thought that the ideal mathematical system can be a fundamental ontology of the TOE, or it is reminiscent of something beyond mathematics — a nonreducible pseudomathematical structure. In this regard, the analysis of the nature of mathematics is given. It is shown that mathematics are not only a result of the imagination of people, but that mathematical forms and all mathematics holistically exist objectively. Moreover, the statement about the objective existence of mathematical forms has an empirical status based on Popper’s criterion of falsifi ability. It transfers a question of objectivity for mathematics from the fi eld of philosophy to the fi eld of empirical science. Then, a connection on the bases of mathematics and physics is established — namely, with the existence of the classical sector of quantum theory and with a causal structure of space-time. In this sense, the existing mathematics are not only objective, but they also possess physics. That is, mathematics, in a sense, is a thing but it is not a thought, and this quality can be considered as an objective layer of reality that can be a substrate of the physical world. In the fi nal part of this paper, several modern directions in the quantum gravity theory or TOE (string theory, loop quantum gravity, and causal sets) are considered regarding, as far as these theories are concerned, the formation of an abstract mathematical substratum. It is shown that the tendency to develop a of structure like an abstract mathematical substratum defi nitely exists. This means that a TOE can be not just a physical theory, but rather an abstract mathematical structure
The philosophical tradition has long sought an ineffable substratum of physical reality—something more fundamental than the world of appearances, prior to experience, the ground of all that is. Plato reached for it with his theory of forms. The attempt was genuine but the logic was inverted: mind was installed as the source of the fundamental, and the physical world was rendered derivative. This paper argues that quantum mechanics, read without presupposition and without the interpretive additions of the Copenhagen tradition, delivers precisely what the philosophical tradition was seeking—but with the arrow pointing in the opposite direction. The possibility space of quantum mechanics—the Hilbert space structure of the universal wave function, evolving unitarily under the Schrödinger equation, holistic in its composition, non-local in its correlations, geometric in its dynamics—is the genuine ineffable substratum: more fundamental than the classical world of appearances, prior to experience, the ground of all physical dispositions. Mind is not the source of this reality. It is the instrument through which this reality generates the appearance of a classical world. The modal ontology presented here holds that physical reality has a fundamentally modal structure. The microcosm is a universe of structured possibilities. The classical world is its emergent surface. Eigenvalues are its currency of contact with experience. The Schrödinger equation is the law of its rotation. Born rule probabilities are structurally grounded propensities—objective dispositional properties of the possibility structure, uniquely characterized by Gleason’s theorem as the only consistent probability measure on Hilbert space. The holism and non-locality enforced by the tensor product structure of composite systems are genuine structural features of physical reality, confirmed by Bell’s theorem and experiment. The Copenhagen tradition’s interpretive apparatus—collapse postulate, classical observer, Heisenberg cut, instrumentalism—is set aside, and the formalism is allowed to speak for itself. What it says is stranger, more precise, and more beautiful than two and a half millennia of philosophical tradition imagined. It has been saying it all along.
A case study of quantum mechanics is investigated in the framework of the philosophical opposition “mathematical model – reality”. All classical science obeys the postulate about the fundamental difference of model and reality, and thus distinguishing epistemology from ontology fundamentally. The theorems about the absence of hidden variables in quantum mechanics imply for it to be “complete” (versus Einstein’s opinion). That consistent completeness (unlike arithmetic to set theory in the foundations of mathematics in Gödel’s opinion) can be interpreted furthermore as the coincidence of model and reality. The paper discusses the option and fact of that coincidence it its base: the fundamental postulate formulated by Niels Bohr about what quantum mechanics studies (unlike all classical science). Quantum mechanics involves and develops further both identification and disjunctive distinction of the global space of the apparatus and the local space of the investigated quantum entity as complementary to each other. This results into the analogical complementarity of model and reality in quantum mechanics. The apparatus turns out to be both absolutely “transparent” and identically coinciding simultaneously with the reflected quantum reality. Thus, the coincidence of model and reality is postulated as necessary condition for cognition in quantum mechanics by Bohr’s postulate and further, embodied in its formalism of the separable complex Hilbert space, in turn, implying the theorems of the absence of hidden variables (or the equivalent to them “conservation of energy conservation” in quantum mechanics). What the apparatus and measured entity exchange cannot be energy (for the different exponents of energy), but quantum information (as a certain, unambiguously determined wave function) therefore a generalized law of conservation, from which the conservation of energy conservation is a corollary. Particularly, the local and global space (rigorously justified in the Standard model) share the complementarity isomorphic to that of model and reality in the foundation of quantum mechanics. On that background, one can think of the troubles of “quantum gravity” as fundamental, direct corollaries from the postulates of quantum mechanics. Gravity can be defined only as a relation or by a pair of non-orthogonal separable complex Hilbert space attachable whether to two “parts” or to a whole and its parts. On the contrary, all the three fundamental interactions in the Standard model are “flat” and only “properties”: they need only a single separable complex Hilbert space to be defined.
When metaphysicians pay attention to theories in fundamental physics, they are usually interested in their implications for fundamental metaphysics: they want to know what the theories imply or suggest concerning the ultimate structure of reality. This essay, by contrast, is concerned with the “derivative metaphysics” of quantum mechanics. I will be considering a certain hypothesis about the fundamental structure of reality, which I will call H. I am interested in H because it strikes me as embodying the most obvious, flat-footed way to read an account of the fundamental structure of reality off the mathematical apparatus of elementary quantum mechanics. But I won’t be defending this claim here, or trying to argue that the members of H are more plausible than other accounts of the fundamental structure of reality inspired by quantum mechanics. Instead, my question is: if H were true, could there be (non-fundamentally speaking, of course) such ordinary objects as plants, planets and people? More specifically: could there be such ordinary objects as ourselves and the things we are familiar with, having more or less the ordinary properties we take them to have? And more generally: given that the fundamental structure of a possible world is such as to make H true, what is its correct description in ordinary terms? Of course, I care about these questions in part because I want to explore the extent to which we might have good reason to believe H, or something akin to it. But even if H turned out to be consistent with our ordinary knowledge about the world of ordinary objects, it would obviously take a lot more work to show that it has any serious claim on our credence. At a minimum, one would have to say something about how likely we should regard our evidence as being, given H; one would want to make some sort of survey of alternative hypotheses; and one would want to take into account our specialised scientific knowledge as well as our ordinary knowledge, including the facts that make trouble for elementary quantum mechanics and force us to look beyond it to quantum field theory and ultimately towards some kind of theory of quantum gravity.
Quantum Mechanics has taught us a lesson that goes well beyond a set of new physical laws. It has provided us with genuine “theorems of epistemology”. We now know that there are situations when the observation of the world cannot be considered as the mere reading of a reality pre-existing the observation, whereas there are circumstances where the knowledge of the whole do not corresponds to the knowledge of the parts (holism). We know that there are incompatible properties that are complementary. We know that there exist properties of the whole that are incompatible with any property of each part. The notion of “object” defined in terms of its “properties ” is in contrast with its mereologic connotation according to which objects can be composed to form new objects. The particle ontology as localizable unity is in contrast with the Malament theorem in quantum field theory. To the above add the fact that the two more general fundamental theories in physics – the quantum theory of fields and the general relativity of Einstein – are logically incompatible. In order to reconcile the logical coherence of the observations with their theoretical explanation we need a radical change of paradigm. The solution here proposed is to abandon the vision of the world as a “mechanism” and to substitute it with that of “algorithm”. This is the paradigm of the “universe as a huge computer” that have been latent within the community since Richard Feynman, and nowadays is resurrecting in physics, showing its full theoretical power. In the new algorithmic vision the “mechanics” becomes an emergent phenomenology. Without the need of physical primitive, the new “informational” program allows us to found physics on solid axiomatic grounds. The quantum theory of abstract systems along with the free quantum field theory are derived from information-theoretic axioms. The axioms of quantum theory all have an epistemological connotation, and pertain the possibility of falsifying the propositions of the theory. They reconnect holism with reductionism, probabilism and falsifiability, substituting the notion of “object” with that of “system” and of “event”, and logically implying the theorem of quantum theory without the need of using the abstract Hilbert-spaces toolkit. The free quantum field theory (Weyl, Dirac e Maxwell) is obtained by adding axioms of minimization of algorithmic complexity. The informational framework well separates the notions of “experiment”and “theory”: the theory connects input with output, the experiment being identified with the collection of input, output, and objective intermediate events. The objective reality (experiment) is made of “icons” with which we interact: the theory is the underlying algorithm. The paradigm describes the tapestry of reality as pure software, “software”. “Software without hardware”: the dematerialization of physics. “Reality without realism” means pure logical coherentism.
The aim of the article is to analyze the ontological foundations of quantum mechanics and the relationship of various interpretations of quantum mechanics with the question of truth in scientific knowledge. The theoretical material (various interpretations of quantum mechanics) was analyzed. The research methods were analysis, comparative-historical and institutional approaches. On the basis of the study, it can be concluded that physicists are only able to predict the probabilities of physical phenomena or processes, without any knowledge of the structure of entity in itself. The study helps to complement the theoretical picture of the ontology of quantum mechanics and to get an idea about the development prospects of the methodology of physical sciences. We should not ascribe properties that are unobservable in experience to the entity because science can truly interpret only the representation of entity in itself in experience and the ways of dealing with it, not future events or possible states of the entity. Otherwise, science “slides” down to the level of dialectical (rhetorical) exercises based not on true premises, but on generally accepted or “authoritative” biases, which gives room to extreme forms of relativism and takes natural scientists away from studying nature to inventing empirically unsupported hypotheses. When, in accordance with the Cartesian ontology, the scientist assumes that the entity is as the “subject” observes it (that is, the “reflection” of the entity in consciousness is identified with entity in itself), this assumption leads the scientist to attempts to “scientifically” describe the future events or the possible states of the entity. The criterion for the truth of a scientific theory put forward by Einstein in his dispute with Bohr remains a fundamentally unattainable ideal. Cognition of nature is probabilistically and fundamentally incomplete since a person can consciously comprehend natural phenomena only within the framework of their representation in the existing being. The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics is due to the impossibility of knowing things as they exist by themselves, that is, as they exist outside of representation in the mind of the observer. This does not mean that physical entities did not exist before their knowledge: they existed potentially, but were not valid for the observer, that is, conscious. Quantum physics is as incomplete as any other physical theory when compared with an unattainable ideal, but this fact does not negate its truth for modern scientists since quantum theory is based on the results of verified experiments.
This work offers a foundational, ontological re-examination of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the violation of Bell inequalities. It argues that the apparent "nonlocality" in quantum mechanics stems not from a physical mechanism of interaction, but from an inadequate ontological premise shared by classical reasoning and many interpretations of quantum theory. Core Thesis: The paradox arises from the implicit assumption that measurement outcomes in entangled systems represent independent, local facts that pre-exist or can be defined separately. The work rejects this premise. Instead, it proposes that entangled states describe indivisible ontological structures, where correlated outcomes are not separate entities to be coordinated, but inseparable aspects of a single whole. Key Conceptual Innovations: The JED Postulate (Ontological Simultaneity): The cornerstone of the framework. It posits a global constraint on the co-realization of facts: for an entangled state, individual outcomes cannot exist as autonomous facts. They can only be realized as elements of an admissible pair (e.g., {Alice+, Bob-} or {Alice-, Bob+}). This is not a temporal or causal constraint, but a structural condition for existence. Formalism of Frames and Admissibility Relations: The ontology is formalized using "frames" (sets of co-existing facts) and an "admissibility relation" R, which encodes the structure of an entangled state (e.g., for a singlet: R = {(+, -), (-, +)}). The JED postulate ensures that a frame containing one element of a related pair must contain its counterpart. The "Broken Mirror" Metaphor: A central heuristic. Entanglement is likened to a mirror broken into two complementary halves. The halves do not "communicate" to match; their perfect fit is a consequence of their common origin in a single act of breaking. Asking "which half appeared first?" or "how does one half know about the other?" is ontologically meaningless—there is no process that produces only one isolated half. Resolution of the EPR Paradox: The paradox dissolves because its first step—treating Alice's local outcome as an independent fact—is invalid within the JED ontology. There is no independent fact for locality to protect, hence no contradiction between correlations and relativistic locality. Interpretation of Bell's Theorem: The work reframes Bell's theorem. Its violation is not proof of nonlocality, but empirical evidence against the ontology of independent local facts. Bell's mathematics is correct, but its physical significance depends on ontological axioms that may not hold. The JED ontology provides a local, realistic (but not fact-local) framework consistent with the correlations. Distinction from Hidden Variables: The approach is explicitly not a hidden-variable theory. It introduces no hidden parameters λ governing individual outcomes. The relation R is a structural definition of the entangled whole, not a hidden cause of correlations. Probabilities are treated as a descriptive layer over the admissible ontological structures. Methodology: The work is developed in the spirit of the "pencil-case" methodology, constructing minimal ontological models to analyze the logical roots of physical puzzles without adding new dynamical mechanisms. Scope and Intent: The present work should be read as a contribution to the philosophy of physics: it does not aim at proposing a new physical theory, but at clarifying the ontological assumptions underlying existing formalisms. It seeks to shift the discussion from "how do the parts communicate?" to "what kind of whole do the parts constitute?" The formalism is shown to be logically consistent with the standard quantum correlation function (e.g., E(θ,φ) = -cos(θ-φ)), without deriving it, thereby separating the ontological question of admissibility from the empirical-statistical question of probability distribution. Keywords: EPR Paradox, Bell's Theorem