Mathematics and Mechanics of Complex Systems

Quantum mechanics: light and shadows (ontological problems and epistemic solutions)

Gianfausto Dell’Antonio

Published Dec 31, 2016• 2 citations

Abstract

We discuss several problems that arise in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, in an attempt to come to grips with what E. T. Jaynes has called the quantum omelette.1

DOI: 10.2140/memocs.2016.4.423

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