Simpler Generic Constructions for Strongly Secure One-round Key Exchange from Weaker Assumptions
Zheng Yang, Junyu Lai, Chao Liu +2 more
In PKC 2015, Bergsma et al. introduced a generic one-round key exchange (ORKE) protocol (which is referred to as BJS) from digital signature (SIG) and simplified non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) without involving any identity. The BJS scheme is shown to satisfy extended Canetti and Krawczyk-PFS security if the NIKE is adaptive-CKS-light secure and the SIG is strongly secure against existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks. However, the BJS scheme cannot be instantiated with NIKE scheme with identity (e.g. the one proposed by Boneh and Zhandry in Crypto 2014). In this paper, we propose a much simpler generic construction for ORKE from NIKE and SIG. In particular, our scheme only makes weaker security assumptions on the underlying building blocks. Namely, we first show that the static-CKS-light security of NIKE, where the target identities are chosen by the adversary before seeing the system parameters, is sufficient for our construction. On the second, we observe that the SIG only needs to provide strong existential unforgeability under weak chosen message attacks for our construction. These results enable our proposal to have more concrete instantiations which might be easier to build and realize. At the same time, our new protocol is much more computationally efficient than the BJS protocol.
The Computer Journal•Nov 10, 2016•7 citations