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Ontic Probabilities in Physics - Are Humean Chances a Serious Contender?

Claus Beisbart

Published Feb 17, 2017• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Some of our best physical theories, notably quantum mechanics and statistical physics, are probabilistic. A question thus is what the probabilities from the theories mean. Since the theories provide a very successful account of the world, it is attractive to say that their probabilities mirror real-world (“ontic”) probabilities independent of human observers. The aim of this talk is to assess a view of such probabilities that has lately attracted much attention under the label “Humean chances”. The talk first clarifies what a philosophical view, or interpretation, of probabilities is supposed to achieve and lists the most important views of ontic probabilities. I then explain the Humean account as championed by David Lewis and Barry Loewer, among others, and discuss it critically in view of applications to physics, in particular to statistical physics. The main question is whether the account succeeds as a view about ontic probabilities. The talk is also meant to give an in-depth introduction into important issues in the metaphysics of probability.

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Some of our best physical theories, notably quantum mechanics and statistical physics,
are probabilistic. A question thus is what the probabilities from the theories mean.
Since the theories provide a very successful account of the world, it is attractive to say
that their probabilities mirror real-world (“ontic”) probabilities independent of human
observers. The aim of this talk is to assess a view of such probabilities that has lately
attracted much attention under the label “Humean chances”.
The talk first clarifies what a philosophical view, or interpretation, of probabilities is
supposed to achieve and lists the most important views of ontic probabilities. I then
explain the Humean account as championed by David Lewis and Barry Loewer, among
others, and discuss it critically in view of applications to physics, in particular to statistical
physics. The main question is whether the account succeeds as a view about ontic
probabilities. The talk is also meant to give an in-depth introduction into important
issues in the metaphysics of probability.
Abstract Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.
Abstract Some of the most compelling examples of the existence of truly objective probabilities come from physics, in particular quantum physics and statistical mechanics. So it is crucial to the overall success of HOC that it be compatible with the objective probabilities found in these theories. First, objective probabilities in classical (Boltzmannian) statistical mechanics (SM) are discussed. It is shown that HOC does capture the central probabilistic postulates of SM, and indeed that it may do so in two distinct ways. Second, objective probabilities in standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM), the context in which the notion that fundamental physics is at bottom chancy first became widely accepted, are discussed. It is shown that HOC is especially apt for capturing the probabilities of QM; other accounts may do equally well (though some clearly do not), but none can do the job better.
The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical (deterministic) physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the systems to which they are assigned.I argue that this understanding of chances in quantum mechanics, despite being a part of the orthodox interpretation of the theory and the most prevalent view in the physical community, is incompatible with a very wide range of metaphysical views about the nature of chance. The options that remain are unlikely to be attractive to scientists and scientifically minded philosophers.
The chance of a physical event is the objective, single-case probability that it will occur. In probabilistic physical theories like quantum mechanics, the chances of physical events play the formal role that the values of physical quantities play in classical (deterministic) physics, and there is a temptation to regard them on the model of the latter as describing intrinsic properties of the systems to which they are assigned.I argue that this understanding of chances in quantum mechanics, despite being a part of the orthodox interpretation of the theory and the most prevalent view in the physical community, is incompatible with a very wide range of metaphysical views about the nature of chance. The options that remain are unlikely to be attractive to scientists and scientifically minded philosophers.
Foundational issues in statistical mechanics and the more general question of how probability is to be understood in the context of physical theories are both areas that have been neglected by philosophers of physics. This book fills an important gap in the literature by providing a most systematic study of how to interpret probabilistic assertions in the context of statistical mechanics. The book explores both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of probability, and takes full measure of work in the foundations of probability theory, in statistical mechanics, and in mathematical theory. It will be of particular interest to philosophers of science, physicists and mathematicians interested in foundational issues, and also to historians of science.
In trying to develop a theory of chance, I have so far drawn largely on a metaphysical picture inspired by classical physics, and have used statistical mechanics as my central example of chance arising in physical theories. It has proven difficult to develop an adequate theory of chance. But perhaps things will look different if we turn to quantum mechanics. The theory of quantum mechanics is extremely well confirmed. It is doubtful whether it is strictly true in its current form, due to the well-known conflict between quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity, but it is an outstandingly good example of a successful physical theory, and it represents a stark break from earlier models of the physical world. Perhaps by tapping into these resources, we can develop an adequate metaphysics of chance. The quantum mechanical world It is widely believed that quantum mechanics is starkly opposed to classical physics, because quantum mechanics claims that the world is governed by fundamentally indeterministic laws. As it happens, this common belief oversimplifies somewhat. Quantum mechanics is a theory that is formulated in relatively mathematical terms, quite removed from concepts of directly observable physical entities. Consequently, there is a great deal of room for interpretation of the meaning of the mathematics. Indeed, there are at least three interpretations of quantum mechanics which are serious candidates for giving an adequate account of how the mathematics relates to reality.