How highly abstract quantum concepts were represented in language, and how these concepts were later taken up by philosophers, literary critics, and new-age gurus. The principles of quantum physics—and the strange phenomena they describe—are represented most precisely in highly abstract algebraic equations. Why, then, did these mathematically driven concepts compel founders of the field, particularly Erwin Schrödinger, Niels Bohr, and Werner Heisenberg, to spend so much time reflecting on ontological, epistemological, and linguistic concerns? What is it about quantum concepts that appeals to latter-day Eastern mystics, poststructuralist critics, and get-rich-quick schemers? How did their interpretations and misinterpretations of quantum phenomena reveal their own priorities? In this book, Jennifer Burwell examines these questions and considers what quantum phenomena—in the context of the founders' debates over how to describe them—reveal about the relationship between everyday experience, perception, and language. Drawing on linguistic, literary, and philosophical traditions, Burwell illuminates representational and linguistic problems posed by quantum concepts—the fact, for example, that quantum phenomena exist only as probabilities or tendencies toward being and cannot be said to exist in a particular time and place. She traces the emergence of quantum theory as an analytic tool in literary criticism, in particular the use of wave/particle duality in interpretations of gender differences in the novels of Virginia Woolf and critics' connection of Bohr's Principle of Complementarity to poetic form; she examines the “quantum mysticism” of Fritjof Capra and Gary Zukav; and she concludes by analyzing “nuclear discourse” in the context of quantum concepts, arguing that it, too, adopts a language of the unthinkable and the indescribable.
How highly abstract quantum concepts were represented in language, and how these concepts were later taken up by philosophers, literary critics, and new-age gurus. The principles of quantum physics—and the strange phenomena they describe—are represented most precisely in highly abstract algebraic equations. Why, then, did these mathematically driven concepts compel founders of the field, particularly Erwin Schrödinger, Niels Bohr, and Werner Heisenberg, to spend so much time reflecting on ontological, epistemological, and linguistic concerns? What is it about quantum concepts that appeals to latter-day Eastern mystics, poststructuralist critics, and get-rich-quick schemers? How did their interpretations and misinterpretations of quantum phenomena reveal their own priorities? In this book, Jennifer Burwell examines these questions and considers what quantum phenomena—in the context of the founders' debates over how to describe them—reveal about the relationship between everyday experience, perception, and language. Drawing on linguistic, literary, and philosophical traditions, Burwell illuminates representational and linguistic problems posed by quantum concepts—the fact, for example, that quantum phenomena exist only as probabilities or tendencies toward being and cannot be said to exist in a particular time and place. She traces the emergence of quantum theory as an analytic tool in literary criticism, in particular the use of wave/particle duality in interpretations of gender differences in the novels of Virginia Woolf and critics' connection of Bohr's Principle of Complementarity to poetic form; she examines the “quantum mysticism” of Fritjof Capra and Gary Zukav; and she concludes by analyzing “nuclear discourse” in the context of quantum concepts, arguing that it, too, adopts a language of the unthinkable and the indescribable.
‘Sprache und Wirklichkeit in der modernen Physik’ is the title of a lecture Heisenberg gave in 1960 at the Bayerische Akademie der Schönen Künste. The polemics that had accompanied the establishment of quantum mechanics were over by then and the so-called problems of its foundations had lost much of their initial interest. Einstein had been dead for some years. Right up to the end he had expressed his profound dissatisfaction with a theory which, in his opinion, had something unreasonable about it. With the volume dedicated to him by the community of physicists and philosophers, the long debate between Bohr and Einstein had come to an end. It had been a disappointing conclusion, marked by the reaffirmation of the respective viewpoints of two scientists who by now found great difficulty even in defining a common code of communication. As though seeking to narrow the gap between them, Heisenberg took the opportunity to underline the existence of a common feature in their contributions to 20th century physics. Their discoveries had in fact made it possible to recognize that ‘even the fundamental and most elementary concepts of science, such as space, time, place, velocity, have become problematic and must be re-examined’. The conceptual and cognitive implications of relativity and of quantum mechanics were obviously different but Heisenberg maintained that both theories asked the same question: ‘Does the language we use when we speak of experiments correspond to the artificial language of mathematics which, as we know, describes real relationships correctly; or has it become separated from it so that we must be content with imprecise linguistic formulations and only return to the artificial language of mathematics when we are forced to express ourselves with precision?’.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
This book gives a detailed study of the development and the interpretation given to Niels Bohr's Principle of Correspondence. It also describes the role that this principle played in guiding Bohr's research over the critical period from 1920 to 1927. Quantum mechanics, developed in the 1920s and 1930s by Bohr, Heisenberg, Born, Schrödinger and Dirac, represents one of the most profound turning points in science. This theory required a wholly new kind of physics in which many of the principles, concepts and models representing reality, that had formed the basis of classical physics since Galileo and Newton, had to be abandoned. This book re-examines the birth of quantum mechanics, in particular examining the development of crucial and original insights of Niels Bohr.
The argument of this article is threefold. First, the article argues that from its rise in the sixteenth century to our own time, the advancement of modern physics as mathematical-experimental science has been defined by the invention of new mathematical structures. Second, the article argues that quantum theory, especially following quantum mechanics, gives this thesis a radically new meaning by virtue of the following two features: on the one hand, quantum phenomena are defined as essentially different from those found in all previous physics by purely physical features; and on the other, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are defined by purely mathematical postulates, which connect them to quantum phenomena strictly in terms of probabilities, without, as in all previous physics, representing or otherwise relating to how these phenomena physically come about. While these two features may appear discordant, if not inconsistent, I argue that they are in accord with each other, at least in certain interpretations (including the one adopted here), designated as “reality without realism”, RWR, interpretations. This argument also allows this article to offer a new perspective on a thorny problem of the relationships between continuity and discontinuity in quantum physics. In particular, rather than being concerned only with the discreteness and continuity of quantum objects or phenomena, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory relate their continuous mathematics to the irreducibly discrete quantum phenomena in terms of probabilistic predictions while, at least in RWR interpretations, precluding a representation or even conception of how these phenomena come about. This subject is rarely, if ever, discussed apart from previous work by the present author. It is, however, given a new dimension in this article which introduces, as one of its main contributions, a new principle: the mathematical complexity principle.
The argument of this article is threefold. First, the article argues that, from its rise in the sixteenth century to our own time, the advancement of modern physics, as mathematical-experimental science, has been defined by the invention of new mathematical structures. Secondly, the article argues that quantum theory, specifically with quantum mechanics, gave this thesis a radically new meaning by virtue of the following two features: one the one hand, quantum phenomena themselves are defined by purely physical features, as essentially different from all previous physics; and on the other, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory are defined by purely mathematical postulates, which connect them to quantum phenomena strictly in terms of probabilities, without representing or otherwise relating to how these phenomena physically come about. While these two features may appear discordant, if not inconsistent, I argue that they are in accord with each other, at least in certain interpretations (including the one adopted here), designated as “reality without realism,” RWR, interpretations. This argument allows this article to offer a new perspective on a thorny problem of the relationships between continuity and discontinuity in quantum physics. In particular, rather than being concern only with the discreteness and continuity of quantum objects or phenomena, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory relate their continuous mathematics to the irreducibly discrete quantum phenomena, in terms of probabilistic predictions, while, at least in RWR interpretations, precluding a representation or even conception of how these phenomena come about. This subject is rarely, if ever discussed, apart from previous work by the present author. It will, however, be given a new dimension in this article which introduces, as one of its main contributions, a new principle: the mathematical complexity principle.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.