IET Information Security

Cryptanalysis of a generic one‐round key exchange protocol with strong security

Zheng Yang, Junyu Lai, Guoyuan Li

Published Sep 4, 2017• 0 citations

Abstract

In Public‐Key Cryptography (PKC) 2015, Bergsma et al . introduced an interesting one‐round key exchange protocol (which will be referred to as BJS scheme) with strong security in particular for perfect forward secrecy (PFS). In this study, the authors unveil a PFS attack against the BJS scheme. This would simply invalidate its security proof. An improvement is proposed to fix the problem of the BJS scheme with minimum changes.

DOI: 10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0055

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