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Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

A quantum theory account of order effects and conjunction fallacies in political judgments

James M. Yearsley, Jennifer S. Trueblood

Published Sep 6, 2017• 27 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.3758/s13423-017-1371-z

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People make logically inconsistent probability judgments.The "Linda" problem is a well-known example, which often elicits a conjunction/disjunction fallacy: probability of constituent event A (B) judged more/less likely than their conjunction/disjunction.The Quantum Judgment model (QJM, Busemeyer et al 2011) explains such errors, which are not explainable within classical probability theory.We propose an alternative axiomatic approach in the framework of quantum probability theory that employs positive operators representing the set of general queries, in constast to QJM which uses projection operators.Like QJM, our model accounts for conjunction/disjunction fallacies, averaging type errors, and unpacking effects, suggesting that it provides a viable model of judgement error.Further differences between our model and QJM are also discussed.
The conjunction fallacy refers to situations when a person judges a conjunction to be more likely than one of the individual conjuncts, which is a violation of a key property of classical probability theory. Recently, quantum probability (QP) theory has been proposed as a coherent account of these and many other findings on probability judgment "errors" that violate classical probability rules, including the conjunction fallacy. Tentori, Crupi, and Russo (2013) presented an alternative account of the conjunction fallacy based on the concept of inductive confirmation. They presented new empirical findings consistent with their account, and they also claimed that these results were inconsistent with the QP theory account. This comment proved that our QP model for the conjunction fallacy is completely consistent with the main empirical results from Tentori et al. (2013). Furthermore, we discuss experimental tests that can distinguish the 2 alternative accounts.