The Many-Worlds Theory

Detlef Dürr, Dustin Lazarovici

Kim Joris Boström

A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.

астрономия Физика

Anthony Short

We consider how to define a natural probability distribution over worlds within a simple class of deterministic many-worlds theories. This can help us understand the typical properties of worlds within such states, and hence explain the empirical success of quantum theory within a many-worlds framework. We give three reasonable axioms which lead to the Born rule in the case of quantum theory, and also yield natural results in other cases, including a many-worlds variant of classical stochastic dynamics.

David Baker

Gordon G. Globus

The appearing of world is approached via the dream world which has generally been thought to be merely derivative: a "composition" of memory traces from waking life, which are merged and fused into a dream world that in some instances can be indiscernable from the world of waking life. Two dreams are presented which challenge the composition theory of dream formation. An alternative unified theory of world appearance in both waking and dreaming is proposed, which makes use of developments in quantum brain dynamics. For this "monadological" proposal the wake world and the dream world are ontologically at parity. This surprising conclusion extends the quantum revolution to our very Existenz.