abstract: This thesis attempts to explain Everettian quantum mechanics from the ground up, such that those with little to no experience in quantum physics can understand it. First, we introduce the history of quantum theory, and some concepts that make up the framework of quantum physics. Through these concepts, we reveal why interpretations are necessary to map the quantum world onto our classical world. We then introduce the Copenhagen interpretation, and how many-worlds differs from it. From there, we dive into the concepts of entanglement and decoherence, explaining how worlds branch in an Everettian universe, and how an Everettian universe can appear as our classical observed world. From there, we attempt to answer common questions about many-worlds and discuss whether there are philosophical ramifications to believing such a theory. Finally, we look at whether the many-worlds interpretation can be proven, and why one might choose to believe it. (abstract)
Quantum chemists have recorded a huge number of data points which standard quantum mechanics cannot interpret. Many-Worlds quantum mechanics can. Many-Worlds quantum mechanics differs from standard quantum mechanics because in Many-Worlds, the wave function is a relative density of universes in the multiverse amplitude rather than a probability amplitude. In Many-Worlds, the Born frequencies are approached rather than given a priori. Thus in Many-Worlds, the rate of approach to the final frequencies can be calculated and compared with observation. This is a new type of reaction rate. I show how to use Many-Worlds to analyze the breakup of
Br2. Such analysis will experimentally test Many-Worlds fermionic and time-dependent quantum mechanics. Conversely, experimental quantum chemistry has become too sophisticated to be analyzed by standard quantum mechanics. Only Many-Worlds can do the job
Abstract The many-worlds view is one of the most discussed “interpretations” of quantum mechanics. As is well known, this view has some very controversial and much discussed aspects. This paper focuses on one particular problem arising from the combination of quantum mechanics with Special Relativity. It turns out that the ontology of the many-worlds view – the account of what there is and what branches of the universe exist – is relative to inertial frames. If one wants to avoid relativizing ontology, one has to argue either that there is an additional source of branching due to Special Relativity and thus additional branches or worlds. Or one has to argue that there are not only many worlds but also many universes (sets of worlds or world-branches); there is thus not only one tree of many world-branches but many frame-specific trees, a “forest” of many world-trees. The main problem here is how one can understand all or any of this.