Building Quantum Computers | NIST

Emanuel H. Knill

Paul E. Black, David R. Kuhn, Carl J. Williams

Fazal Raheman

The first week of August 2022 saw the world’s cryptographers grapple with the second shocker of the year. Another one of the four post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms selected by the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) in a rigorous 5-year process was cracked by a team from Belgium. They took just 62 min and a standard laptop to break the PQC algorithm to win a USD 50,000 bounty from Microsoft. The first shocker came 6 months earlier, when another of the NIST finalists (Rainbow) was taken down. Unfortunately, both failed PQC algorithms are commercially available to consumers. With 80 of the 82 PQC candidates failing the NIST standardization process, the future of the remaining two PQC algorithms is, at best, questionable, placing the rigorous 5-year NIST exercise to build a quantum-safe encryption standard in jeopardy. Meanwhile, there is no respite from the quantum threat that looms large. It is time we take a step back and review the etiology of the problem de novo. Although state-of-the-art computer security heavily relies on cryptography, it can indeed transcend beyond encryption. This paper analyzes an encryption-agnostic approach that can potentially render computers quantum-resistant. Zero-vulnerability computing (ZVC) secures computers by banning all third-party permissions, a root cause of most vulnerabilities. ZVC eliminates the complexities of the multi-layered architecture of legacy computers and builds a minimalist, compact solid-state software on a chip (3SoC) that is robust, energy-efficient, and potentially resistant to malware as well as quantum threats.

Chad Wanless, Dave Palachik

With the looming quantum computer threat, the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) has done an exhaustive search for both quantum resilient encryption, creating new asymmetric algorithms and a separate “lightweight cryptography” suitable for small IoT electronics, selecting ASCON. However, NIST admits that ASCON is only quasi-quantum resilient. AES has also been independently declared quantum resilient. Unfortunately, the four selected quantum resilient asymmetric algorithms and AES are far too computationally heavy for FinTech smart cards’ use. The proposed Randomization Data Handshake (RDH) has been designed to wrap around both ASCON (and AES) allowing each to create and exchange instructions to build their own non-transmitted quantum resilient session keys using 100% randomized data, while simultaneously authenticating both sender and receiver. Furthermore, credit cards, debit cards, PINs, passwords and session keys are never transmitted. In a way, RDH emulates the quantum entanglement’s ability to exchange data (keys) without sending the data.

Rauer, Alexandra

The threat quantum computers pose to current cryptographic algorithms is not just a future problem. It needs to be acted on now. Attackers could be exfiltrating and storing data right now, intending to decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer has been built. Since this is a relatively new threat, it has only recently been discussed in CYBE 3310: Application of Cryptographic Concepts to Cyber Security. This work introduces a new lab assignment for the class that helps students become more familiar with quantum algorithms and Post-Quantum Cryptography solutions. The lab consists of three parts. The first two parts focus on Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, allowing the students to build quantum circuits using Qiskit, IBM’s quantum software development kit, and see how they threaten RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography, and AES. The third part is an opportunity for students to become familiar with ML-KEM and ML-DSA, the Post-Quantum Cryptography algorithms standardized by NIST for key exchange and digital signatures.