The classical physical theories that prevailed in science from the time of Isaac Newton until the dawn of the twentieth century were empirically based on human experience and made predictions about our mental experiences, yet excluded from the dynamics all mental properties. But how can one rationally get mental things out if no mental elements are put in? The key step in the creation of quantum mechanics during 1925 by Heisenberg and his colleagues was to recognize and emphasize the essential dynamical role of mental properties in the creation of our mental empirical findings. This basic feature of quantum mechanics was cast into rigorous mathematical form by John von Neumann, and was made a central feature of contemporary relativistic quantum field theory by the work of Tomonaga and Schwinger. That theory is causally strictly forward in time. But it is explained here how it can nevertheless accommodate the seeming backward-in-time causal effects reported by D.J. Bem, and many others, by means of a slight biasing of the famous Born Rule. The purpose of this communication is to explain how those reported retrocausal findings can be explained by a strictly forward-in-time and nearly orthodox causal dynamics that, however, permits the Born Rule to be slightly biased under certain conditions. A feasible experiment is proposed that, if it gives the outcomes predicted by the proposed theory, will provide evidence in favor of this causally forward-in-time and nearly orthodox explanation of the reported retrocausal effects.
The classical physical theories that prevailed in science from the time of Isaac Newton until the dawn of the twentieth century were empirically based on human experience and made predictions about our mental experiences, yet excluded from the dynamics all mental properties. But how can one rationally get mental things out if no mental elements are put in? The key step in the creation of quantum mechanics during 1925 by Heisenberg and his colleagues was to recognize and emphasize the essential dynamical role of mental properties in the creation of our mental empirical findings. This basic feature of quantum mechanics was cast into rigorous mathematical form by John von Neumann, and was made a central feature of contemporary relativistic quantum field theory by the work of Tomonaga and Schwinger. That theory is causally strictly forward in time. But it is explained here how it can nevertheless accommodate the seeming backward-in-time causal effects reported by D.J. Bem, and many others, by means of a slight biasing of the famous Born Rule. The purpose of this communication is to explain how those reported retrocausal findings can be explained by a strictly forward-in-time and nearly orthodox causal dynamics that, however, permits the Born Rule to be slightly biased under certain conditions. A feasible experiment is proposed that, if it gives the outcomes predicted by the proposed theory, will provide evidence in favor of this causally forward-in-time and nearly orthodox explanation of the reported retrocausal effects.
The principle of sufficient reason asserts that anything that happens does so for a reason: no definite state of affairs can come into being unless there is a sufficient reason why that particular thing should happen. This principle is usually attributed to Leibniz, although the first recorded Western philosopher to use it was Anaximander of Miletus. The demand that nature be rational, in the sense that it be compatible with the principle of sufficient reason, conflicts with a basic feature of contemporary orthodox physical theory, namely the notion that nature's response to the probing action of an observer is determined by pure chance, and hence on the basis of absolutely no reason at all. This appeal to pure chance can be deemed to have no rational fundamental place in reason-based Western science. It is argued here, on the basis of the other basic principles of quantum physics, that in a world that conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, the usual quantum statistical rules will naturally emerge at the pragmatic level, in cases where the reason behind nature's choice of response is unknown, but that the usual statistics can become biased in an empirically manifest way when the reason for the choice is empirically identifiable. It is shown here that if the statistical laws of quantum mechanics were to be biased in this way then the basically forward-in-time unfolding of empirical reality described by orthodox quantum mechanics would generate the appearances of backward-time-effects of the kind that have been reported in the scientific literature.
The cognitive frame in which most neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behavior is conducted contains the assumption that brain mechanisms per se fully suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms must therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. One consequence of this stance is that psychological terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (terms such as "feeling," "knowing," and "effort") have not been included as primary causal factors in neuropsychological research: insofar as properties are not described in material terms they are deemed irrelevant to the causal mechanisms underlying brain function. However, the origin of this demand that experiential realities be excluded from the causal base is a theory of nature that has been known for more that three quarters of a century to be fundamentally incorrect. It is explained here why it is consequently scientifically unwarranted to assume that material factors alone can in principle explain all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience. More importantly, it is explained how a key quantum effect can be introduced into brain dynamics in a simple and practical way that provides a rationally coherent, causally formulated, physics-based way of understanding and using the psychological and physical data derived from the growing set of studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.
The principle of sufficient reason asserts that anything that happens does so for a reason: no definite state of affairs can come into being unless there is a sufficient reason why that particular thing should happen. This principle is usually attributed to Leibniz, although the first recorded Western philosopher to use it was Anaximander of Miletus. The demand that nature be rational, in the sense that it be compatible with the principle of sufficient reason, conflicts with a basic feature of contemporary orthodox physical theory, namely the notion that nature's response to the probing action of an observer is determined by pure chance, and hence on the basis of absolutely no reason at all. This appeal to pure chance can be deemed to have no rational fundamental place in reason-based Western science. It is argued here, on the basis of the other basic principles of quantum physics, that in a world that conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, the usual quantum statistical rules will naturally emerge at the pragmatic level, in cases where the reason behind Nature's choice of response is unknown, but that the usual statistics can become biased in an empirically manifest and apparently retrocausal way when the reason for the choice is empirically identifiable. It is shown here that if the statistical laws of quantum mechanics were to be biased in a certain plausible way then the basically forward-in-time unfolding of empirical reality described by orthodox quantum mechanics would generate the appearance of backward-time-causation of the kind that have been reported in the scientific literature.
Many experiments seem to require causal influences acting into the backward light cone. Any such effect, if true, would conflict with the basic forward-in-time-dynamics of orthodox relativistic quantum field theory. It is shown here how such an appearance can arise from a difference between two different conceptions of the past. Two diagrams will illustrate how the Bem-reported results of his "erotic picture" experiments can be understood within forward-in-time realistically interpreted orthodox quantum field theory. A separate second topic is "quasi-orthodox quantum mechanics" in which nature's responses to the observer's probing queries are biased away from the Born-rule prediction, and in favor of "stimulating" human experiences, in concordance with Bem's data.
Since its inception, quantum mechanics has faced a series of “mysteries” that emerge from it if we consider this scientific theory from a realistic point of view. In the early development of the theory, scientists like Albert Einstein noticed the consequences of accepting a theory like this, which allow phenomena such as non-locality. This led a part of the scientific community to believe that quantum mechanics was an incomplete theory, since there should be variables that might explain those “disturbing” phenomena such as the correlation between entangled particles.Different interpretations of quantum mechanics have been proposed that have tried to reveal or explain the reality underlying its formalism. One of those interpretations is the “Transactional Interpretation” of quantum mechanics, advocated mainly by physicist John G. Cramer. According to this interpretation, quantum events are understood as causal interactions between delayed waves traveling forward in time and advanced waves traveling backward in time. This interpretation opens the door to accept a model of causation to the past or retrocausation.Authors like Phil Dowe or Huw Price have shown a favorable attitude toward the model of retrocausation because it seems to be capable of effectively solve some of the most disturbing features derived from quantum mechanics. Despite the intuitive cost is rather high, retrocausation is one of the possible interpretations for the results of the correlation between entangled particles to provide us with an explanatory framework with some interesting advantages.In this paper we explore such advantages, as the retrocausation gives us a generalizable explanatory model for all cases of this type and assumes processes and entities that are not only in the field of speculation but allow certain possibilities of testing. Also, we will rescue the importance of not-predictive explanatory models as has been the case in other fields of natural sciences, provided that those model do not be ad hoc due to restrictions that prevent its application to any case.
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.