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Digital Holography and Three-Dimensional Imaging

Optical image encryption based on classical double random phase encoding: Cyphertext-only attack via speckle correlation

Guowei Li, Dayan Li, Guohai Situ

Published Jan 1, 2017• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We demonstrated experimentally the traditional double random phase encoding (DPRE) technique is unsafe. It is the first experimental demonstration of the cyphertext only attack to the classical DRPE technique to the best of our knowledge
DOI
10.1364/dh.2017.th2a.4

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We demonstrate experimentally that the traditional double random phase encoding (DPRE) technique is vulnerable to the cyphertext-only attack (COA). With the statistical ergodic property of the speckle, we show that the plaintext image can be recovered from the cyphertext alone owing to the fact that their energy spectral density functions are identical. Our result reveals the most serious security issue with the DRPE as it suggests that even the one-time-pad does not guarantee its security. This will open up new inside understanding of current optical security techniques.
Although initial research shows that double-random phase encoding (DRPE) is vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks that use phase retrieval algorithms, subsequent research has shown that phase-only DRPE, in which the Fourier amplitude component of an image encrypted with classical DRPE remains constant, is resistant to attacks that apply phase retrieval algorithms. Herein, we numerically analyze the key-space of DRPE and investigate the distribution property of decryption keys for classical and phase-only DRPE. We determine the difference in the distribution property of successful decryption keys for these DRPE techniques from the numerical analysis results and then discuss the security offered by them.
Abstract Background: The double random phase encoding techniques have received considerable attention from researchers in recent years because of its advantages of parallel and high speed processing capability. Meanwhile, the security of cryptosystem is also one of the major concerns. Methods : We experimentally demonstrated the ciphertext redundancy vulnerability of the coherent double random encryption system (DRPE). Based on the statistical ergodicity of speckles and the consistency of the power spectral density (ESD), we have proved that the most plaintext information can be retrieved from partial ciphertext alone. Results: In this paper, the simulation and experiment result were performed to verify whether the algorithm is effectiveness. The ciphertext redundancy of the DRPE system is analyzed from the results of ciphertext occlusion test. There is a risk of plaintext leakage of this scheme, as long as the average ESD can be estimated from the sub-images. The results will help to open up deeper understanding of limitation of current optical security techniques. Conclusions: The DRPE system has potential redundancy risk. Even one-time-pad manner is not secured in DRPE system. This vulnerability allows a cryptanalyst to estimate the plaintext information with only a half or less ciphertext.
In this paper, a special ciphertext-only attack (COA) scenario to the traditional double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique is proposed based on plaintext shifting. We assume the attacker can illegally manipulate the DRPE system to gain multiple ciphertexts from randomly shifted versions of the same plaintext. The plaintext image can be recovered when our proposed scenario is combined with a speckle correlation attacking method proposed in previous work. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed scheme can successfully crack the DRPE system even when the speckle correlation method alone fails to work in the conventional single ciphertext scenario due to the small size of the plaintext image. The work in this paper reveals a severe security flaw of DRPE systems when minor position shifting of the plaintext occurs.
Classical double-random phase encoding (C-DRPE) is an optical symmetric-key encryption technique. C-DRPE is reported to be vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack (KPA) that uses a phase retrieval algorithm. However, although phase-only DRPE (PO-DRPE) is reported to be more resistant to KPAs than C-DRPE, it is not obvious yet that PO-DRPE is sufficiently resistant to a KPA under any condition, because the vulnerability to KPA varies depending on various factors, such as the number of the known plaintext-ciphertext pairs that are given for the KPA, or the gray level of the known-plaintext image (i.e., binary or multivalued image). In this paper, we investigate the resistance of C-DRPE and PO-DRPE to KPA under various conditions related to the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and to the gray level of the known-plaintext image.