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Practical Test of a Quantum Key Distribution System

Teemu Manninen

Published Mar 13, 2017• 0 citations
OpenAlex

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Kvanttiavainjakelujärjestelmän käytännön testaus

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The development of quantum computers presents a threat to the security of modern communication systems; with Shor’s algorithm, all currently used asymmetric cryptography schemes can be broken. Fortunately, secure communication is still possible in the post-quantum era using symmetric encryption algorithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or the provably secure one-time pad (OTP). However, the main problem of symmetric cryptography, the key distribution, has to be solved. Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics to distribute encryption keys in a provably secure manner. In this thesis, the practical applicability of QKD is examined. This is achieved by testing the performance, stability, and usability of one of the few commercially available QKD platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis 2. The tested system was stable for multiple months in normal operation and did not require any intervention from the user. The maximum distance with the test platform was 54 km. However, at these distances, the secret key rate was only tens of bits per second. For distances below 25 km, secret key rates in the kilobits per second range were achieved. Thus, if high data rates or communication distances close to 50 km are desired, ciphers less secure than OTP have to be used. Additionally, two flaws were discovered in the tested system, one making the system unstable, and the other preventing the key distribution process from starting. Fortunately, neither issue reduces the security of the system, and both could be fixed by modifying the software. Our results show that QKD can be considered as a mature technology that is ready for practical applications and even for commercial use.

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a commonly used method is to patch the loopholes in the existing QKD systems. However, in this work, we show an adversary's capability of exploiting the imperfection of the patch itself to bypass the patch. Specifically, we experimentally demonstrate that, in the detector under test, the patch of photocurrent monitor against the detector blinding attack can be defeated by the pulse illumination attack proposed in this paper. We also analyze the secret key rate under the pulse illumination attack, which theoretically confirmed that Eve can conduct the attack to learn the secret key. This work indicates the importance of inspecting the security loopholes in a detection unit to further understand their impacts on a QKD system. The method of pulse illumination attack can be a general testing item in the security evaluation standard of QKD.

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Quantum key distribution and its applications

Masahiro Takeoka

Elsevier eBooks•Jan 1, 2024•0 citations
As in conventional communication systems, test and measurement play important roles in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Besides the observation that QKD protocols estimate the bound of information leakage from the measurement results on the transmission channel, test of quantum apparatus is necessary to ensure that the assumptions behind the security proof are satisfied in practice. Moreover, precise characterization of the device imperfection improves the final key rate, because one can specify the effect of the errors originated from the devices and sbtract it. However, careful consideration is required to guarantee that the test and measurement procedure will not open a loop-hole to the eavesdroppers.
The development of quantum computers presents a threat to the security of modern communication systems; with Shor’s algorithm, all currently used asymmetric cryptography schemes can be broken. Fortunately, secure communication is still possible in the post-quantum era using symmetric encryption algorithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or the provably secure one-time pad (OTP). However, the main problem of symmetric cryptography, the key distribution, has to be solved. Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics to distribute encryption keys in a provably secure manner. In this thesis, the practical applicability of QKD is examined. This is achieved by testing the performance, stability, and usability of one of the few commercially available QKD platforms, ID Quantique’s Clavis 2. The tested system was stable for multiple months in normal operation and did not require any intervention from the user. The maximum distance with the test platform was 54 km. However, at these distances, the secret key rate was only tens of bits per second. For distances below 25 km, secret key rates in the kilobits per second range were achieved. Thus, if high data rates or communication distances close to 50 km are desired, ciphers less secure than OTP have to be used. Additionally, two flaws were discovered in the tested system, one making the system unstable, and the other preventing the key distribution process from starting. Fortunately, neither issue reduces the security of the system, and both could be fixed by modifying the software. Our results show that QKD can be considered as a mature technology that is ready for practical applications and even for commercial use.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a commonly used method is to patch the loopholes in the existing QKD systems. However, in this work, we show an adversary's capability of exploiting the imperfection of the patch itself to bypass the patch. Specifically, we experimentally demonstrate that, in the detector under test, the patch of photocurrent monitor against the detector blinding attack can be defeated by the pulse illumination attack proposed in this paper. We also analyze the secret key rate under the pulse illumination attack, which theoretically confirmed that Eve can conduct the attack to learn the secret key. This work indicates the importance of inspecting the security loopholes in a detection unit to further understand their impacts on a QKD system. The method of pulse illumination attack can be a general testing item in the security evaluation standard of QKD.