Recently proposed schemes for verifying quantum computations in the `high complexity' regime i.e. beyond the remit of classical computers, have been based on adaptations of the classical theory of interactive proof systems (IP). These schemes remarkably provide confidence against arbitrarily malicious adversarial behaviour in the misfunctioning of the quantum computing device in the course of the verification protocol. Here we propose a different verification scheme which although not secure against arbitrarily adversarial behaviour, may nevertheless be sufficiently acceptable in many practical situations. Our scheme is far simpler than the IP based schemes, and in contrast to them, our verifier is entirely classical. It is based on the fact that adaptive Clifford circuits on general product state inputs provide universal quantum computation, while the same processes without adaptation are always classically efficiently simulatable.
Recently proposed schemes for verifying quantum computations in the `high complexity' regime i.e. beyond the remit of classical computers, have been based on adaptations of the classical theory of interactive proof systems (IP). These schemes remarkably provide confidence against arbitrarily malicious adversarial behaviour in the misfunctioning of the quantum computing device in the course of the verification protocol. Here we propose a different verification scheme which although not secure against arbitrarily adversarial behaviour, may nevertheless be sufficiently acceptable in many practical situations. Our scheme is far simpler than the IP based schemes, and in contrast to them, our verifier is entirely classical. It is based on the fact that adaptive Clifford circuits on general product state inputs provide universal quantum computation, while the same processes without adaptation are always classically efficiently simulatable.
We propose an efficient scheme for verifying quantum computations in the `high complexity' regime i.e. beyond the remit of classical computers. Previously proposed schemes remarkably provide confidence against arbitrarily malicious adversarial behaviour in the misfunctioning of the quantum computing device. Our scheme is not secure against arbitrarily adversarial behaviour, but may nevertheless be sufficiently acceptable in many practical situations. With this concession we gain in manifest simplicity and transparency, and in contrast to previous schemes, our verifier is entirely classical. It is based on the fact that adaptive Clifford circuits on general product state inputs provide universal quantum computation, while the same processes without adaptation are always classically efficiently simulatable.
The widely held belief that BQP strictly contains BPP raises fundamental questions: Upcoming generations of quantum computers might already be too large to be simulated classically. Is it possible to experimentally test that these systems perform as they should, if we cannot efficiently compute predictions for their behavior? Vazirani has asked: If predicting Quantum Mechanical systems requires exponential resources, is QM a falsifiable theory? In cryptographic settings, an untrusted future company wants to sell a quantum computer or perform a delegated quantum computation. Can the customer be convinced of correctness without the ability to compare results to predictions? To answer these questions, we define Quantum Prover Interactive Proofs (QPIP). Whereas in standard Interactive Proofs the prover is computationally unbounded, here our prover is in BQP, representing a quantum computer. The verifier models our current computational capabilities: it is a BPP machine, with access to few qubits. Our main theorem can be roughly stated as: "Any language in BQP has a QPIP, and moreover, a fault tolerant one". We provide two proofs. The simpler one uses a new (possibly of independent interest) quantum authentication scheme (QAS) based on random Clifford elements. This QPIP however, is not fault tolerant. Our second protocol uses polynomial codes QAS due to BCGHS, combined with quantum fault tolerance and multiparty quantum computation techniques. A slight modification of our constructions makes the protocol "blind": the quantum computation and input are unknown to the prover. After we have derived the results, we have learned that Broadbent at al. have independently derived "universal blind quantum computation" using completely different methods. Their construction implicitly implies similar implications.
The promise of scalable quantum technology appears more realistic, after recent advances in both theory and experiment. Assuming a quantum computer is developed, the task of verifying the correctness of its outcome becomes crucial. Unfortunately, for a system that involves many particles, predicting its evolution via classical simulation becomes intractable. Moreover, verification of the outcome by computational methods, i.e. involving a classical witness, is believed inefficient for the hardest problems solvable by a quantum computer. A feasible alternative to verify quantum computation is via cryptographic methods, where an untrusted prover has to convince a weak verifier for the correctness of his outcome. This is the approach we take in this thesis. In the most standard configuration the prover is capable of computing all polynomial-time quantum circuits and the verifier is restricted to classical with very modest quantum power. The goal of existing verification protocols is to reduce the quantum requirements for the verifier - ideally making it purely classical - and reduce the communication complexity. In Part II we propose a composition of two existing verification protocols [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012], [Aharonov et al., 2010] that achieves quadratic improvement in communication complexity, while keeping the quantum requirements for the verifier modest. Along this result, several new techniques are proposed, including the generalization of [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] to prime dimensions. In Part III we discuss the idea of model-specific quantum verification, where the prover is restricted to intermediate quantum power, i.e. between full-fledged quantum and purely classical, thus more feasible experimentally. As a proof of principle we propose a verification protocol for the One-Pure-Qubit computer [Knill and Laflamme, 1998], which tolerates noise and is capable of computing hard problems such as large matrix trace estimation. The verification protocol is an adaptation of [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] running on Measurement-Based Quantum Computing with newly proved properties of the underlying resources. Connections of quantum verification to other security primitives are considered in Part IV. Authenticated quantum communication has been already proved to relate to quantum verification. We expand this by proposing a quantum authentication protocol derived from [Fitzsimons and Kashefi, 2012] and discuss implications to verification with purely classical verifier. Connections between quantum security primitives, namely blindness - prover does not learn the computation -, and classical security are considered in Part V. We introduce a protocol where a client with restricted classical resources computes blindly a universal classical gate with the help of an untrusted server, by adding modest quantum capabilities to both client and server. This example of quantum-enhanced classical security we prove to be a task classically impossible.
We present verification protocols to gain confidence in the correct performance of a device implementing an arbitrary quantum computation. The derivation of the protocols is based on the fact that matchgate computations, which are classically efficiently simulable, become universal if supplemented with additional resources. We combine tools from weak simulation, randomized compiling, and statistics to derive verification circuits that (i) strongly resemble the original circuit and (ii) can be classically efficiently simulated not only in the ideal, i.e., error free scenario, but also in the realistic situation where errors are present. In fact, in one of the protocols we apply exactly the same circuit as in the original computation, however, to a slightly modified input state. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
We present verification protocols to gain confidence in the correct performance of the realization of an arbitrary universal quantum computation. The derivation of the protocols is based on the fact that matchgate computations, which are classically efficiently simulable, become universal if supplemented with additional resources. We combine tools from weak simulation, randomized compiling, and classical statistics to derive verification circuits. These circuits have the property that (i) they strongly resemble the original circuit and (ii) cannot only be classically efficiently simulated in the ideal, i.e. error free, scenario, but also in the realistic situation where errors are present. In fact, in one of the protocols we apply exactly the same circuit as in the original computation, however, to a slightly modified input state.
We give a new theoretical solution to a leading-edge experimental challenge, namely to the verification of quantum computations in the regime of high computational complexity. Our results are given in the language of quantum interactive proof systems. Specifically, we show that any language in BQP has a quantum interactive proof system with a polynomial-time classical verifier (who can also prepare random single-qubit pure states), and a quantum polynomial-time prover. Here, soundness is unconditional—i.e., it holds even for computationally unbounded provers. Compared to prior work achieving similar results, our technique does not require the encoding of the input or of the computation; instead, we rely on encryption of the input (together with a method to perform computations on encrypted inputs), and show that the random choice between three types of input (defining a computational run, versus two types of test runs) suffices. Because the overhead is very low for each run (it is linear in the size of the circuit), this shows that verification could be achieved at minimal cost compared to performing the computation. As a proof technique, we use a reduction to an entanglement-based protocol; to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this technique has been used in the context of verification of quantum computations, and it enables a relatively straightforward analysis.