Quantum Collapse Requires Pre-and Immediate Post-measurement States to Belong to Disjoint Sets

Armin Nikkhah Shirazi

This poster points out an internal tension between quantum collapse and expressions which set eigenstates equal to superposition states in a different basis and thereby imply that pre-measurement and immediate post-measurement states are of the same kind. Its resolution appears to be either to discard the collapse postulate or to consider such states to be of distinct kinds with respect to their association with a superposition of properties.

Dipankar Home, M. A. B. Whitaker

Armin Nikkhah Shirazi

THE PROBLEM IN A NUTSHELL CONCLUSION This poster points out an internal tension between quantum collapse and expressions which set eigenstates equal to superposition states in a different basis and thereby imply that pre-measurement and immediate post-measurement states are of the same kind. Its resolution appears to be either to discard the collapse postulate or to consider such states to be of distinct kinds with respect to their association with a superposition of properties. OVERVIEW Quantum collapse is a postulate in orthodox quantum mechanics, but it is poorly understood, though much has been written about it [1]. Here we point out that it also leads to a subtle internal tension in the theory when it is considered in conjunction with expressions that equate eigenstates with superposition states in a different basis because such expressions are consistent with a symmetry between states and observables under quantum superposition that is broken by quantum collapse. The tension can be relieved either by discarding the collapse postulate or by keeping it and considering pre-measurement and immediate post-measurement states to be of distinct kinds, in which case quantum collapse must be considered a transformation between two kinds of states. The basic strategy employed here is to convert a standard quantum mechanical relation into a logical equivalence, and then show that the imposition of the collapse postulate makes it possible to formulate an argument such that the truth value of the conclusion depends on which of the implications that are part of the equivalence is used, from which it is then possible to derive a contradiction.

Rouslan L. Stratonovich

Ephraim Yeruham Levin

Our inability to rewind time may cast some doubt about the genuineness of the effectiveness of our free choice capability. I suggest that the so-called presentiment anomalous experience can be used to verify this genuineness. The idea is to post stimulus compare averaged results from two apparently “similar” presentiment tests ("channels") carried out simultaneously on the same individual. Before the occurrence of the stimulus an experimenter decides, in real time, whether to observe the measurements in any channel or not and immediately performs this decision before the occurrence of the stimulus. A case in which a channel is observed during real time and a case in which it has not belong to different decoherent histories. This holds true because according to the “Orthodox Interpretation” of quantum mechanics the conscious observation collapses the multitude of possible pre stimulus measurements to just the perceived one. In such cases quantum mechanics imposes a disappearance of the retrospective presentiment effect. Thus, in such a parallel design one can compare what happens when an observation is carried out and is not carried out at the same time instance. The presentiment effect disappearance in the observed channel despite its appearance in the unobserved channel for the same moments is thus evidence for the effectiveness of the experimenter's willed observation.

Basudev Nag Chowdhury