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On Paranormal Phenomena.

Johan Noldus

Published Jan 1, 2017• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

I present a short note on my expectations regarding this subject based upon my thoughts in my previous two books on relativistic quantum theory and a note on the emergence of consensus in science.

Related papers

Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond

Makoto Katsumori

Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...

Configurations•Sep 1, 2004•0 citations

A Note on Quantum Theory and Metaphysics

Carlton W. Berend

The Journal of Philosophy•Oct 22, 1942•2 citations

Some Critical Considerations on the Present Epistemological and Scientific Debate on Quantum Mechanics

G. C. Ghirardi

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1988•4 citations

Bits on Quantum Information

Gregg S. Jaeger

I was honored to see my book Quantum Information: An Overview (Springer, 2007) reviewed alongside David Mermin’s masterful new textbook ( Quantum Computer Science: An Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2007). However, I was disappointed by reviewer Barbara Terhal’s facile and inappropriate approach (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 61 3 2008 54 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2897953. March 2008, page 54 ).Terhal states, “The preface of the book speaks of his intentions: to write a text that provides an overview of the fundamentals of the field.” However, my intent, which was thoroughly laid out in the preface, goes far beyond that characterization. As a result, my necessary constraints on the book are misrepresented and underappreciated. In particular, I made it clear that the book was intended as “a handy reference … that also treats foundational aspects of quantum mechanics connected with quantum information science.” Unlike Mermin’s excellent monograph, mine was never intended to serve as an easily read introduction to the field or to provide unique insight. An overview such as mine cannot be the same thing as a textbook and should not be evaluated as one.Terhal further complains that the monograph contains little by way of personal insight, but that point was made clear both in the foreword by Tommaso Toffoli and in the preface. When presenting a subject as nascent and controversial as quantum information science, it is a good idea, particularly in the case of an overview, not to inject too much of oneself.More surprisingly, after recognizing that my book does provide a comprehensive overview of this rapidly expanding area, the reviewer questions “whether there is an audience for such encyclopedic texts, especially given the easy access to online sources of information such as the arXiv e-print server and Wikipedia.” That question is relatively easily answered: Yes, there is periodically a need for a concise and comprehensive monograph that is above the anarchy and distortions on Wikipedia and to a lesser extent the e-print servers and that can serve those with mathematical training and limited free time to cull accurate treatments from the Web.Moreover, because quantum information science is an area that transcends physics itself, the physics itself can sometimes be distorted, a situation more prevalent in online offerings such as Wikipedia and e-prints. Can one seriously rely on Wikipedia and e-print servers as clear and valid guides to the foundation and breadth of quantum information science? Are those the sources where researchers outside the area can obtain an organized overview of the subject? The unevenness and unreliable nature of the perspectives offered on free portions of the Web are reasons why I chose to write Quantum Information in the first place.Another aspect of my monograph, also clearly noted in its preface, is that the book discusses “a number of pertinent … results from earlier decades of the twentieth century … because they will likely prove important to future progress in both quantum mechanics and information theory.” Terhal’s only mention of that aspect was apparently her reference to the unspecified portion of the text she considered “mathematical and superfluous detail.” My reason for including that extra material is to show the extent to which quantum information science is grounded in fundamental physics and is capable of making great contributions to quantum foundations, provided the physics remains squarely in view.Like a standard quantum measurement, the effect of this lukewarm book review is, in all likelihood, irreversible. Fortunately, though, many who have carefully read the book’s preface and who, therefore, have understood the entirety of its purpose and constraints have expressed their satisfaction with the book over the 16 months since its publication. Those readers have been glad to have a reliable source to guide them into this exploding body of literature.© 2008 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Jul 1, 2008•0 citations

Logic and Probability in Physics

C. G. DARWIN

ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.

Science•Aug 19, 1938•2 citations

On the quantum mechanics of consciousness, with application to anomalous phenomena

R. G. Jahn, Brenda J. Dunne

Foundations of Physics•Aug 1, 1986•147 citations
Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...
I was honored to see my book Quantum Information: An Overview (Springer, 2007) reviewed alongside David Mermin’s masterful new textbook ( Quantum Computer Science: An Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 2007). However, I was disappointed by reviewer Barbara Terhal’s facile and inappropriate approach (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 61 3 2008 54 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2897953. March 2008, page 54 ).Terhal states, “The preface of the book speaks of his intentions: to write a text that provides an overview of the fundamentals of the field.” However, my intent, which was thoroughly laid out in the preface, goes far beyond that characterization. As a result, my necessary constraints on the book are misrepresented and underappreciated. In particular, I made it clear that the book was intended as “a handy reference … that also treats foundational aspects of quantum mechanics connected with quantum information science.” Unlike Mermin’s excellent monograph, mine was never intended to serve as an easily read introduction to the field or to provide unique insight. An overview such as mine cannot be the same thing as a textbook and should not be evaluated as one.Terhal further complains that the monograph contains little by way of personal insight, but that point was made clear both in the foreword by Tommaso Toffoli and in the preface. When presenting a subject as nascent and controversial as quantum information science, it is a good idea, particularly in the case of an overview, not to inject too much of oneself.More surprisingly, after recognizing that my book does provide a comprehensive overview of this rapidly expanding area, the reviewer questions “whether there is an audience for such encyclopedic texts, especially given the easy access to online sources of information such as the arXiv e-print server and Wikipedia.” That question is relatively easily answered: Yes, there is periodically a need for a concise and comprehensive monograph that is above the anarchy and distortions on Wikipedia and to a lesser extent the e-print servers and that can serve those with mathematical training and limited free time to cull accurate treatments from the Web.Moreover, because quantum information science is an area that transcends physics itself, the physics itself can sometimes be distorted, a situation more prevalent in online offerings such as Wikipedia and e-prints. Can one seriously rely on Wikipedia and e-print servers as clear and valid guides to the foundation and breadth of quantum information science? Are those the sources where researchers outside the area can obtain an organized overview of the subject? The unevenness and unreliable nature of the perspectives offered on free portions of the Web are reasons why I chose to write Quantum Information in the first place.Another aspect of my monograph, also clearly noted in its preface, is that the book discusses “a number of pertinent … results from earlier decades of the twentieth century … because they will likely prove important to future progress in both quantum mechanics and information theory.” Terhal’s only mention of that aspect was apparently her reference to the unspecified portion of the text she considered “mathematical and superfluous detail.” My reason for including that extra material is to show the extent to which quantum information science is grounded in fundamental physics and is capable of making great contributions to quantum foundations, provided the physics remains squarely in view.Like a standard quantum measurement, the effect of this lukewarm book review is, in all likelihood, irreversible. Fortunately, though, many who have carefully read the book’s preface and who, therefore, have understood the entirety of its purpose and constraints have expressed their satisfaction with the book over the 16 months since its publication. Those readers have been glad to have a reliable source to guide them into this exploding body of literature.© 2008 American Institute of Physics.
ENERAL philosophy claims to be the critical subject which lays down for all of us what we may be allowed to think, and yet it has played no part whatever in the great revolutions of human thought of the present century-those connected with relativity and the quantum theory. It might have been expected that the scientists would have been constantly consulting the philosophers as to the legitimacy of their various speculations, but nothing of the kind has happened. Since no one can dispense with some sort of metaphysic, each scientist has made one for himself, and no doubt they contain many crudities, but it would seem that a deep interest in metaphysic is a disadvantage rather than an advantage to the physicist-at least I have the impression that those of my friends who are most inclined to speculate on the ultimate things appear to be the ones whose scientific work is most hampered by doing so. Now I propose to risk a similar indiscretion. I want to embody in it the practical philosophy of a physicist, and I do not mean it as an attack on the pure philosophers, who are very reasonable people, only chargeable with the minor offence of not having made me want to read their books! I had better begin by stating shortly the ideas I intend to discuss. There is a notable contrast between the way we think about things and the way we think we ought to think about them.