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Physics World

Losing individuality in a quantum realm

Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond

Published Apr 1, 2003• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum theory has been subjected to so many different interpretations that one can hardly expect it to lead to any new intellectual vistas. This, nevertheless, is the feat and treat offered by Peter Pesic's stimulating little book. Arguing persuasively that "the crux of modern quantum theory is its clash with our ordinary concept of individuality", the author offers a wide discussion of this concept – ordinary and extraordinary – in philosophy, literature and science.

DOI
10.1088/2058-7058/16/4/42

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Quantum theory has been subjected to so many different interpretations that one can hardly expect it to lead to any new intellectual vistas. This, nevertheless, is the feat and treat offered by Peter Pesic's stimulating little book. Arguing persuasively that "the crux of modern quantum theory is its clash with our ordinary concept of individuality", the author offers a wide discussion of this concept – ordinary and extraordinary – in philosophy, literature and science.
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One recent debate in philosophy of physics has centered whether quantum particles are individuals or not. The received view is that particles are not individuals and the standard methodology is to approach the question via the structure of quantum theory. I challenge both the received view and the standard methodology. I contend not only that the structure of quantum theory is not the right place to look for conditions of individuality that quantum particles may or may not satisfy, but also that there is an important role for traditional metaphysics to play. Consequently, my work brings together the philosophy of physics and traditional metaphysics literatures to shed new light on the debate over the individuality of quantum particles. I defend a set of conditions of individuality and argue that quantum particles satisfy these conditions thereby defending the view that particles are individuals in opposition to the received view. I also challenge a second feature of the standard methodology insofar as I challenge the significance of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in terms of which much discussion in the philosophy of physics literature is framed. My work is significant in a number of additional ways as well. My work implies that the dominant explanation for quantum statistics in terms of non-individuality is incorrect and it also undermines the ontic-structural realists metaphysical underdetermination challenge to the scientific realist.
In this work we argue against the interpretation that underlies the "Standard" account of Quantum Mechanics (SQM) that was established during the 1930s by Niels Bohr and Paul Dirac. Ever since, following this orthodox narrative, physicists have dogmatically proclaimed -- quite regardless of the deep contradictions and problems -- that the the theory of quanta describes a microscopic realm composed of elementary particles (such as electrons, protons and neutrons) which underly our macroscopic world composed of tables, chairs and dogs. After critically addressing this atomist dogma still present today in contemporary (quantum) physics and philosophy, we present a new understanding of quantum individuals defined as the minimum set of relations within a specific degree of complexity capable to account for all relations within that same degree. In this case, quantum individuality is not conceived in absolute terms but -- instead -- as an objectively relative concept which even though depends of the choice of bases and factorizations remain nonetheless part of the same invariant representation.
One of the most famous metaphysical problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerns the individuality status of quantum entities: are they individuals, or non-individuals? The typical approach to the problem consists in defending one of the options by appealing directly to features of quantum mechanics with the addition, eventually, of theoretical virtues the favoured proposal may have. In this paper, we argue that this strategy is inappropriate, because the problem of individuality is ill formulated in the case of quantum mechanics. In a nutshell, our point is that considerations exclusively from quantum mechanics are too general and generic to grant the level of particularity required for providing for a principle of individuality. Problems of individuality appear only at the level of particular applications of the theory in specific contexts, and in these cases, we shall argue, search for a metaphysical notion of individuality may be substituted by an epistemic notion of individuation. The approach also has the benefits of dissolving the problems created by metaphysical underdetermination on this front. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.