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Physical Review A

Comment on “Bit-string oblivious transfer based on quantum state computational distinguishability”

Guang Ping He

Published Oct 30, 2015• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We show that in the protocol proposed in Phys. Rev. A 91, 042306 (2015), a dishonest sender can always ensure with certainty that the receiver fails to get the secret message. Thus the security requirement of oblivious transfer is not met. This security problem also makes the protocol unsuitable for serving as a building block for 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.92.046301

Related papers

Bit-string oblivious transfer based on quantum state computational distinguishability

André Souto, Paulo Mateus, Pedro Adão +1 more

Oblivious transfer protocol is a basic building block in cryptography and is used to transfer information from a sender to a receiver in such a way that, at the end of the protocol, the sender does not know if the receiver got the message or not. Since Shor's quantum algorithm appeared, the security of most of the classical cryptographic schemes has been compromised, as they rely on the fact that factoring is infeasible. To overcome this, quantum mechanics has been used intensively in the past decades, and alternatives resistant to quantum attacks have been developed in order to fulfill the (potential) lack of security of a significant number of classical schemes. In this paper, we present a quantum computationally secure protocol for bit-string oblivious transfer between two parties, under the assumption of quantum hardness of state distinguishability and the constraint of performing at most few-qubit measurements (leaving open the question of general attacks performed on all qubits involved). The protocol is feasible, in the sense that it is implementable in polynomial time.

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Reply to “Comment on ‘Bit-string oblivious transfer based on quantum state computational distinguishability’ ”

André Souto, Paulo Mateus, Pedro Adão +1 more

In the Comment the author states that the proposed all-or-nothing oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in our paper is insecure against a dishonest Alice and, as a corollary, derives an attack to Cr\'epeau's construction of 1-out-of-2 OT. The security criterion used in the Comment is indeed stronger than the one used in our paper. However, we argue that the criterion used in our paper is in the spirit of the original idea of the OT protocol proposed by Rabin. Moreover, a protocol that satisfies the criterion in our paper can be used to construct useful multiparty protocols. Finally, the protocol in our paper can be used, together with a secure bit commitment scheme, to construct a 1-out-of-2 OT secure against malicious Alice, achieving the security requirement considered in the Comment.

Physical Review A•Oct 30, 2015•7 citations

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Oblivious transfer (OT) is an important tool in cryptography. It serves as a subroutine to other complex procedures of both theoretical and practical significance. A common attribute of OT protocols is that one party (Alice) has to send a message to another party (Bob) and has to stay oblivious to whether Bob did receive the message. Specific (OT) protocols vary by exact definition of the task---in the all-or-nothing protocol, Alice sends a single bit-string message, which Bob is able to read with only $50%$ probability, whereas in a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol Bob reads one out of two messages sent by Alice. These two flavors of protocol are known to be equivalent. Recently, a computationally secure all-or-nothing OT protocol based on quantum states was developed by A. Souto et al. [Phys. Rev. A 91, 042306 (2015)], which, however, cannot be reduced to a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol by standard means. Here we present an elaborate reduction of this protocol that retains the security of the original.

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Coherent attack on oblivious transfer based on single-qubit rotations

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Abstract Recently a bit-string quantum oblivious transfer (OT) protocol based on single-qubit rotations was proposed (Rodrigues et al 2017 J. Phys. A: Math. Theor . 50 205301) and proven secure against few-qubit measurements. However, it was left as an open question whether the protocol remains secure against general attacks. Here, we close the gap by showing that if the receiver Bob can perform collective measurements on all qubits, then he can learn Alice’s secret message with a probability close to one . Thus the protocol fails to meet the security criterion of OT.

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Oblivious transfer protocol,which is an important and useful cryptographic protocol,has been widely applied in cryptographic field,especially in construction of secure multi-party computation protocol.However,all of present oblivious transfer protocols have two drawbacks for requirement of their secrets: ① the receiver does not know whether message received is one of the messages held by the sender;② the sender does not know whether message received by the receiver is one of the messages designated by himself.In order to conquer these drawbacks,we firstly introduce the notion of verifiable oblivious transfer protocol,and firstly construct it by using proof protocol of knowledge,i.e.,∑-protocol,as main tool.

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Unconditionally secure quantum oblivious transfer

Guang-Ping He, Z. D. Wang

Based on quantum uncertainty and quantum entanglement, an quantum allor-nothing oblivious transfer protocol is proposed. It is illustrated in detail that the protocol is unconditionally secure. The distinct merit of the present protocol lies in that it is not based on quantum bit commitment. The full utilization of the entanglement makes the protocol different from previous insecure ones, thus its security is not restricted by the no-go theorem of twoparty secure computations. Typeset using REVTEX 1 The research on the oblivious transfer (OT) problem may be traced back to more than twenty years ago [1,2]. Kilian [3] pointed out later that OT is very important in two-party and multi-party protocols. This is because in most symmetrical protocols, the participants always know each others ’ data. If some participants are dishonest or try to get extra information, the protocols become insecure. OT can create some secret between the participants and break this symmetry. Thus it can be used to implement multi-party protocols such as

•Dec 19, 2003•0 citations
We show that in the protocol proposed in Phys. Rev. A 91, 042306 (2015), a dishonest sender can always ensure with certainty that the receiver fails to get the secret message. Thus the security requirement of oblivious transfer is not met. This security problem also makes the protocol unsuitable for serving as a building block for 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer.
Oblivious transfer protocol is a basic building block in cryptography and is used to transfer information from a sender to a receiver in such a way that, at the end of the protocol, the sender does not know if the receiver got the message or not. Since Shor's quantum algorithm appeared, the security of most of the classical cryptographic schemes has been compromised, as they rely on the fact that factoring is infeasible. To overcome this, quantum mechanics has been used intensively in the past decades, and alternatives resistant to quantum attacks have been developed in order to fulfill the (potential) lack of security of a significant number of classical schemes. In this paper, we present a quantum computationally secure protocol for bit-string oblivious transfer between two parties, under the assumption of quantum hardness of state distinguishability and the constraint of performing at most few-qubit measurements (leaving open the question of general attacks performed on all qubits involved). The protocol is feasible, in the sense that it is implementable in polynomial time.
In the Comment the author states that the proposed all-or-nothing oblivious transfer (OT) protocol in our paper is insecure against a dishonest Alice and, as a corollary, derives an attack to Cr\'epeau's construction of 1-out-of-2 OT. The security criterion used in the Comment is indeed stronger than the one used in our paper. However, we argue that the criterion used in our paper is in the spirit of the original idea of the OT protocol proposed by Rabin. Moreover, a protocol that satisfies the criterion in our paper can be used to construct useful multiparty protocols. Finally, the protocol in our paper can be used, together with a secure bit commitment scheme, to construct a 1-out-of-2 OT secure against malicious Alice, achieving the security requirement considered in the Comment.
Oblivious transfer (OT) is an important tool in cryptography. It serves as a subroutine to other complex procedures of both theoretical and practical significance. A common attribute of OT protocols is that one party (Alice) has to send a message to another party (Bob) and has to stay oblivious to whether Bob did receive the message. Specific (OT) protocols vary by exact definition of the task---in the all-or-nothing protocol, Alice sends a single bit-string message, which Bob is able to read with only 5050%50 probability, whereas in a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol Bob reads one out of two messages sent by Alice. These two flavors of protocol are known to be equivalent. Recently, a computationally secure all-or-nothing OT protocol based on quantum states was developed by A. Souto et al. [Phys. Rev. A 91, 042306 (2015)], which, however, cannot be reduced to a 1-out-of-2 OT protocol by standard means. Here we present an elaborate reduction of this protocol that retains the security of the original.
Abstract Recently a bit-string quantum oblivious transfer (OT) protocol based on single-qubit rotations was proposed (Rodrigues et al 2017 J. Phys. A: Math. Theor . 50 205301) and proven secure against few-qubit measurements. However, it was left as an open question whether the protocol remains secure against general attacks. Here, we close the gap by showing that if the receiver Bob can perform collective measurements on all qubits, then he can learn Alice’s secret message with a probability close to one . Thus the protocol fails to meet the security criterion of OT.
Oblivious transfer protocol,which is an important and useful cryptographic protocol,has been widely applied in cryptographic field,especially in construction of secure multi-party computation protocol.However,all of present oblivious transfer protocols have two drawbacks for requirement of their secrets: ① the receiver does not know whether message received is one of the messages held by the sender;② the sender does not know whether message received by the receiver is one of the messages designated by himself.In order to conquer these drawbacks,we firstly introduce the notion of verifiable oblivious transfer protocol,and firstly construct it by using proof protocol of knowledge,i.e.,∑-protocol,as main tool.
Based on quantum uncertainty and quantum entanglement, an quantum allor-nothing oblivious transfer protocol is proposed. It is illustrated in detail that the protocol is unconditionally secure. The distinct merit of the present protocol lies in that it is not based on quantum bit commitment. The full utilization of the entanglement makes the protocol different from previous insecure ones, thus its security is not restricted by the no-go theorem of twoparty secure computations. Typeset using REVTEX 1 The research on the oblivious transfer (OT) problem may be traced back to more than twenty years ago [1,2]. Kilian [3] pointed out later that OT is very important in two-party and multi-party protocols. This is because in most symmetrical protocols, the participants always know each others ’ data. If some participants are dishonest or try to get extra information, the protocols become insecure. OT can create some secret between the participants and break this symmetry. Thus it can be used to implement multi-party protocols such as