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Physical Review A

Practical security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution with finite sampling bandwidth effects

Chao Wang, Peng Huang, Duan Huang, Dakai Lin, Guihua Zeng

Published Feb 11, 2016• 45 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Practical security of the continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system with finite sampling bandwidth of analog-to-digital converter (ADC) at the receiver's side is investigated. We find that the finite sampling bandwidth effects may decrease the lower bound of secret key rate without awareness of the legitimate communicators. This leaves security loopholes for Eve to attack the system. In addition, this effect may restrains the linear relationship of secret key bit rate with repetition rate of the system; subsequently, there is a saturation value for the secret key bit rate with the repetition rate. To resist such kind of effects, we propose a dual sampling detection approach in which two ADCs are employed so that the finite sampling bandwidth effects are removed.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.93.022315

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Practical security of the continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system with finite sampling bandwidth of analog-to-digital converter (ADC) at the receiver's side is investigated. We find that the finite sampling bandwidth effects may decrease the lower bound of secret key rate without awareness of the legitimate communicators. This leaves security loopholes for Eve to attack the system. In addition, this effect may restrains the linear relationship of secret key bit rate with repetition rate of the system; subsequently, there is a saturation value for the secret key bit rate with the repetition rate. To resist such kind of effects, we propose a dual sampling detection approach in which two ADCs are employed so that the finite sampling bandwidth effects are removed.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) is an important application of quantum technology, which enables long-distance communicating parties to establish a string of unconditionally secure keys in an insecure environment. However, in a practical CVQKD system, the finite sampling bandwidth of the analog-to-digital converter (ADC) at the receiver may create inaccurate sampling results, leading to errors in parameter estimation process and leaving a security loophole for eavesdroppers. In order to eliminate the finite sampling bandwidth effect, we propose a peak-compensation-based CVQKD scheme, which estimates the discrepancy between the maximum sampling value and the peak value of each pulse based on the characteristics of Gaussian pulse. The maximum sampling values are compensated by the estimated discrepancy, so that the legitimate parties can obtain correct sampling results. We analyze the influence of the finite sampling bandwidth on the security of the system, expounding the specific steps of peak-compensation, comparing the estimated excess noise before and after peak-compensation, and discussing the security of the system under Gaussian collective attacks. Simulation results show that this scheme can greatly improve the accuracy of pulse peak sampling and remove the finite sampling bandwidth effect. Moreover, the channel parameters estimated by the communicating parties are also corrected by using the compensated values. Compared with the scheme without peak-compensation, this scheme eliminates the limitation of the system repetition to the secret key bit rate, and has longer secure transmission distance and higher secret key bit rate. In addition, compared with other methods of solving the finite sampling bandwidth effect, the proposed scheme can be directly implemented in data processing stage after sampling without any additional devices, and thus increasing no complexity of the system.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system, finite sampling bandwidth of the employed analog-to-digital converter at the receiver's side may lead to inaccurate results of pulse peak sampling. Then, errors in the parameters estimation resulted. Subsequently, the system performance decreases and security loopholes are exposed to eavesdroppers. In this paper, we propose a novel data acquisition scheme which consists of two parts, i.e., a dynamic delay adjusting module and a statistical power feedback-control algorithm. The proposed scheme may improve dramatically the data acquisition precision of pulse peak sampling and remove the finite sampling bandwidth effects. Moreover, the optimal peak sampling position of a pulse signal can be dynamically calibrated through monitoring the change of the statistical power of the sampled data in the proposed scheme. This helps to resist against some practical attacks, such as the well-known local oscillator calibration attack.
When developing a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD), the detector is necessary at the receiver’s side. We investigate the practical security of the CVQKD system with an unbalanced heterodyne detector. The results show that unbalanced heterodyne detector introduces extra excess noise into the system and decreases the lower bound of the secret key rate without awareness of the legitimate communicators, which leaves loopholes for Eve to attack the system. In addition, we find that the secret key rate decreases more severely with the increase in the degree of imbalance and the excess noise induced by the imbalance is proportional to the intensity of the local oscillator (LO) under the same degree of imbalance. Finally, a countermeasure is proposed to resist these kinds of effects.
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) has attracted extensive attention due to its compatibility and low costs. However, bandwidth mismatch exists to varying degrees between the transmitter and receiver. This may prevent frequency components carrying modulation information from being fully perceived by the legitimate party. In this paper, we identify a practical security loophole caused by bandwidth mismatch and propose a corresponding spectral attack scheme. Different from previous approaches that exploit security loopholes to conceal the excess noise introduced by intercept-resend attacks, this scheme can directly obtain raw-key information without introducing additional disturbances. A proof-of-principle attack on a CVQKD system with filtering operation is constructed to verify the feasibility. Experimental results indicate that Eve can obtain enough information to render the system insecure if this practical security loophole is ignored. Based on the identified security loophole, corresponding defense strategies are proposed. This work helps bridge the gap between theoretical models and practical implementations, providing a reference for defense design in practical quantum communication systems.
The finite sampling bandwidth of an analog-to-digital converter has a negative effect on the continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD), which leaves a potential loophole for an eavesdropper and weakens the practical security of the system. To compensate for the loss in free space, we deploy an adaptive optics (AO) unit in the detector of the CVQKD system with discrete modulations. Since the closed-loop control bandwidth of the embedded AO unit can be optimized with the sampling frequency, the practical security of the system can be enhanced in terms of the secret key rate. The security analysis is demonstrated on the basis of the derived secret key rate with numerical simulations, providing a feasible implementation of CVQKD in realistic free-space environments.
In a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, the optical attenuator can adjust the Gaussian-modulated coherent states and the local oscillator signal to an optimal value for guaranteeing the security of the system and optimizing the performance of the system. However, the performance of the optical attenuator may deteriorate due to the intentional and unintentional damage of the device. In this paper, we investigate the practical security of a CVQKD system with reduced optical attenuation. We find that the secret key rate of the system may be overestimated based on the investigation of parameter estimation under the effects of reduced optical attenuation. This opens a security loophole for Eve to successfully perform an intercept-resend attack in a practical CVQKD system. To close this loophole, we add an optical fuse at Alice's output port and design a scheme to monitor the level of optical attenuation in real time, which can make the secret key rate of the system evaluated precisely. The analysis shows that these countermeasures can effectively resist this potential attack.