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Lecture notes in computer science

Size-Hiding Computation for Multiple Parties

Kazumasa Shinagawa, Koji Nuida, Takashi Nishide, Goichiro Hanaoka, Eiji Okamoto

Published Jan 1, 2016• 5 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-53890-6_31

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In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of parties wish to compute a joint function of their inputs, while preserving properties like privacy, correctness, and independence of inputs. One security property that has typically not been considered in the past relates to the length or size of the parties inputs. This is despite the fact that in many cases the size of a party’s input can be confidential. The reason for this omission seems to have been the folklore belief that, as with encryption, it is impossible to carry out non-trivial secure computation while hiding the size of parties ’ inputs. However some recent results (e.g., Ishai and Paskin at TCC 2007, Ateniese, De Cristofaro and Tsudik at PKC 2011) showed that it is possible to hide the input size of one of the parties for some limited class of functions, including secure two-party set intersection. This suggests that the folklore belief may not be fully accurate. In this work, we initiate a theoretical study of input-size hiding secure computation, and focus on the two-party case. We present definitions for this task, and deal with the subtleties that arise in the setting where there is no a priori polynomial bound on the parties ’ input sizes. Our definitional study yields a multitude of classes of input-size hiding computation, depending
We expand on our work on quantum data hiding - hiding classical data among parties who are restricted to performing only local quantum operations and classical communication (LOCC). We review our scheme that hides one bit between two parties using Bell (1964) states, and we derive upper and lower bounds on the secrecy of the hiding scheme. We provide an explicit bound showing that multiple bits can be hidden bitwise with our scheme. We give a preparation of the hiding states as an efficient quantum computation that uses at most one ebit of entanglement. A candidate data-hiding scheme that does not use entanglement is presented. We show how our scheme for quantum data hiding can be used in a conditionally secure quantum bit commitment scheme.