The study presents a new efficient way to construct the one‐round key exchange (ORKE) without random oracles based on standard hard complexity assumptions. The authors propose a (PKI‐based) ORKE protocol which is more computational efficient than existing pairing‐based ORKE protocols without random oracles in the post‐specified peer setting. The core idea of this construction is to integrate the consistency check of the ephemeral public key and the verification of the signature into the session key generation. This enables us to roughly save two pairing operations. The authors just call this kind of scheme that is deeply composed by signature and one‐round key exchange as SignORKE. The authors’ protocol is shown to be secure in a variant of the Canetti–Krawczyk security model which covers the majority of state‐of‐the‐art active attacks.
The study presents a new efficient way to construct the one‐round key exchange (ORKE) without random oracles based on standard hard complexity assumptions. The authors propose a (PKI‐based) ORKE protocol which is more computational efficient than existing pairing‐based ORKE protocols without random oracles in the post‐specified peer setting. The core idea of this construction is to integrate the consistency check of the ephemeral public key and the verification of the signature into the session key generation. This enables us to roughly save two pairing operations. The authors just call this kind of scheme that is deeply composed by signature and one‐round key exchange as SignORKE. The authors’ protocol is shown to be secure in a variant of the Canetti–Krawczyk security model which covers the majority of state‐of‐the‐art active attacks.
We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.
One-round group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocols typically provide implicit authentication and appealing bandwidth efficiency. As a special case of GAKE – the pairing-based one-round tripartite authenticated key exchange (3AKE), recently gains much attention of research community due to its strong security. Several pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocols have recently been proposed to achieve provable security in the g-eCK model. In contrast to earlier GAKE models, the g-eCK model particularly formulates the security properties regarding resilience to the leakage of various combinations of long-term key and ephemeral session state, and provision of weak perfect forward secrecy in a single model. However, the g-eCK security proofs of previous protocols are only given under the random oracle model. In this work, we give a new construction for pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocol which is provably secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles. Security of proposed protocol is reduced to the hardness of Cube Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CBDDH) problem for symmetric pairing. We also extend the proposed 3AKE scheme to a GAKE scheme with more than three group members, based on multilinear maps. We prove g-eCK security of our GAKE scheme in the standard model under the natural multilinear generalization of the CBDDH assumption.
Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols that covers many attacks on existing models. An ID-based AKE protocol with Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) (respectively Master Perfect Forward Secrecy (MPFS)) ensures that revelation of the static keys of the parties (respectively the master secret key of the private key generator), must not compromise even a single bit of the session keys of the past sessions between the parties. Currently, to the best of our knowledge, there is no ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocol with either PFS or MPFS. In our preliminary version [18] we have proposed, without proofs, ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols with PFS and MPFS in the random oracle model. To achieve this, we also have constructed ID-based eCK secure single round AKE protocols, one without Master Forward Secrecy (MFS) and one with MFS, almost at the same computational cost as the existing efficient ID-based eCK Secure Single Round AKE protocols. In this full version, we provide proofs to show that all of our protocols are secure under the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (GBDH) problem.
A new certificateless signcryption scheme without using the bilinear pairings was presented based Discrete-Logarithm firstly,which was proved security in the random oracle model.Secondly,with the proposes signcryption scheme Canetti-Krawczyk model,the author proposes an efficient certificateless authentication and key exchange protocol without pairings.The security analysis of the proposed protocol in the implementation plan with the Canetti-Krawczyk model is presented in this paper.The results show that the proposed protocol is session-key secure with perfect forward secrecy.Moreover,the implementation of the protocol is just 1 encryption operation,3 exponent operations and twice communications.