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Physics World

NSA keys into quantum computing

Jon Cartwright

Published Feb 1, 2014• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Leaked documents suggest that the US National Security Agency is developing quantum computers to crack cryptography codes, but what progress has the agency really made? Jon Cartwright investigates.
DOI
10.1088/2058-7058/27/02/10

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