THOMISM AND THE QUANTUM ENIGMA WILLIAM A. WALLACE, 0.P. University ofMaryland College Park, Maryland THE RECENT PUBLICATION of Wolfgang Smith's The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key 1 has done more than propose a novel interpretation of quantum theory. It has also reopened a train of thought that has been somewhat muted in recent decades, namely, that of the relevance of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas to solving problems raised by modern physics. What I have in mind are books published in the 1950s and 1960s by Jesuit professors at the Gregorian University in Rome 2 and by Vincent Edward Smith in the United States,3 plus my own writings on the subject before I became heavily involved in the history of science.4 Now, out of the blue, as it were, Aquinas's name is once again being invoked in the context of modern science, this time as originating concepts that provide a "hidden key" to the solution of the quantum 1 Peru, Ill.: Sherwood Sugden & Company, Publishers, 1995, iii + 140 pp., with an appendix, a glossary, and an index of names. 2 Especially the following, all published by the Gregorian University Press, Rome: Peter Hoenen, S.J., Cosmologia, 5th ed. (1956); idem, De noetica geometriae (1954); Philip Soccorsi, S.J., De physica quantica (1956); idem, De vi cognitionis humanae in scientia physica (1958); idem, De geometriis et spatiis non-Euclideis (1960). 3 Notably his Philosophical Physics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); and Footnotes for the Atom (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1951). 4 See my"Newtonian Antinomies Against the Prima Via," The Thomist 19 (1956): 15192 ; "The Reality of Elementary Particles," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 38 (1964): 154-66; "St. Thomas and the Pull of Gravity," in Science and the Liberal Concept (West Hartford, Conn.: St. Joseph College, 1964), 14365 ; and "Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1968): 236-71. 455 456 WILLIAM A. WALLACE enigma. The author of this startling claim, a professor of mathematics at Oregon State University and apparently no relation to Vincent Edward Smith, surely deserves a hearing in these pages. Wolfgang Smith's thesis is set out in six chapters: the first two, "Rediscovering the Corporeal World" and "What is the Physical Universe?," establish the terms of discourse; the next two, "Microworld and Indeterminacy" and "Materia Signata Quantitate," propose Smith's solution, which basically consists in explaining the significance of state vector collapse in quantum theory; and the last two, "On Whether 'God Plays Dice?"' and "In the Beginning," draw out metaphysical implications of this teaching. An appendix provides a brief mathematical introduction to quantum theory so that the reader can appreciate what is meant by state vector collapse and other technical terms. A glossary gives a handy index of such terms and where they occur in the text. In Smith's view, the devil that needs to be exorcised from contemporary physics is the bifurcationism that took its origin from Rene Descartes, then was reinforced by a succession of philosophers from John Locke to Immanuel Kant (chap. 1). This is the split between res extensa and res cogitans, the first denuding the world of sensible qualities and the second creating the impression that all such qualities (and the nature that underlies them, das Ding an sick) are projected into the universe by the observer. The mind-set such bifurcationism puts into physicists is so strong, and has been reinforced in so many ways by their education and culture, that it is almost impossible for them to recognize it, let alone work at eradicating it. But eradicate it they must if they would solve the enigmas of quantum theory. And the only way they can do so, Smith argues, is by rediscovering the corporeal world. What this means is that they must learn what it is to perceive the world as it presents itself in sense experience, to experience in their own lives the "miracle" of sense perception (16).5 The apple is outside us, but we perceive it nonetheless, with its colors and its other attributes, which are as real as we sense them to be (1-20). 5...
THOMISM AND THE QUANTUM ENIGMA WILLIAM A. WALLACE, 0.P. University ofMaryland College Park, Maryland THE RECENT PUBLICATION of Wolfgang Smith's The Quantum Enigma: Finding the Hidden Key 1 has done more than propose a novel interpretation of quantum theory. It has also reopened a train of thought that has been somewhat muted in recent decades, namely, that of the relevance of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas to solving problems raised by modern physics. What I have in mind are books published in the 1950s and 1960s by Jesuit professors at the Gregorian University in Rome 2 and by Vincent Edward Smith in the United States,3 plus my own writings on the subject before I became heavily involved in the history of science.4 Now, out of the blue, as it were, Aquinas's name is once again being invoked in the context of modern science, this time as originating concepts that provide a "hidden key" to the solution of the quantum 1 Peru, Ill.: Sherwood Sugden & Company, Publishers, 1995, iii + 140 pp., with an appendix, a glossary, and an index of names. 2 Especially the following, all published by the Gregorian University Press, Rome: Peter Hoenen, S.J., Cosmologia, 5th ed. (1956); idem, De noetica geometriae (1954); Philip Soccorsi, S.J., De physica quantica (1956); idem, De vi cognitionis humanae in scientia physica (1958); idem, De geometriis et spatiis non-Euclideis (1960). 3 Notably his Philosophical Physics (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); and Footnotes for the Atom (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1951). 4 See my"Newtonian Antinomies Against the Prima Via," The Thomist 19 (1956): 15192 ; "The Reality of Elementary Particles," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 38 (1964): 154-66; "St. Thomas and the Pull of Gravity," in Science and the Liberal Concept (West Hartford, Conn.: St. Joseph College, 1964), 14365 ; and "Elementarity and Reality in Particle Physics," Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3 (1968): 236-71. 455 456 WILLIAM A. WALLACE enigma. The author of this startling claim, a professor of mathematics at Oregon State University and apparently no relation to Vincent Edward Smith, surely deserves a hearing in these pages. Wolfgang Smith's thesis is set out in six chapters: the first two, "Rediscovering the Corporeal World" and "What is the Physical Universe?," establish the terms of discourse; the next two, "Microworld and Indeterminacy" and "Materia Signata Quantitate," propose Smith's solution, which basically consists in explaining the significance of state vector collapse in quantum theory; and the last two, "On Whether 'God Plays Dice?"' and "In the Beginning," draw out metaphysical implications of this teaching. An appendix provides a brief mathematical introduction to quantum theory so that the reader can appreciate what is meant by state vector collapse and other technical terms. A glossary gives a handy index of such terms and where they occur in the text. In Smith's view, the devil that needs to be exorcised from contemporary physics is the bifurcationism that took its origin from Rene Descartes, then was reinforced by a succession of philosophers from John Locke to Immanuel Kant (chap. 1). This is the split between res extensa and res cogitans, the first denuding the world of sensible qualities and the second creating the impression that all such qualities (and the nature that underlies them, das Ding an sick) are projected into the universe by the observer. The mind-set such bifurcationism puts into physicists is so strong, and has been reinforced in so many ways by their education and culture, that it is almost impossible for them to recognize it, let alone work at eradicating it. But eradicate it they must if they would solve the enigmas of quantum theory. And the only way they can do so, Smith argues, is by rediscovering the corporeal world. What this means is that they must learn what it is to perceive the world as it presents itself in sense experience, to experience in their own lives the "miracle" of sense perception (16).5 The apple is outside us, but we perceive it nonetheless, with its colors and its other attributes, which are as real as we sense them to be (1-20). 5...
The Thomist 65 (2001): 223-38 QUANTUM MECHANICS: A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO REALITY WOJCIECH P. GRYGIEL The Priestly Fraternity ofSt. Peter Wigratzbad-Opfenbach, Germany In a recent article, Wolfgang Smith states that "the ongoing deChristianization of Western society is due in large measure to the imposition of the prevailing scientistic world view."1 One need be neither a philosopher nor a scientist to notice that deChristianization makes its presence felt in every aspect of the life of a citizen in the modern West-familial, professional, cultural, and religious. Thus it opposes the two-and-a-half-millennial tradition that began in ancient Greece and achieved its full development in medieval Christian philosophy. This tradition is one of constant refinement and crystallization, continuously coupled with and catalyzed by the divine plan of salvation of mankind from the bondage of original sin. This complex phenomenon was well encapsulated by Etienne Gilson: It is hardly possible to realize the continuity that prevails through the whole history of Western culture, unless one keeps in mind the important part played by the Church in the work of its transmission. The Greek and Latin Fathers of the Church had so carefully preserved the classical notion of man that when St. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, undertook to build up a complete exposition of Christian truth, he did not scruple to borrow for his technical equipment from the pagan Aristotle, whose logic, physics, biology, ethics and 1 W. Smith, "From Schrodinger's Cat to Thomistic Ontology," The Thomist 63 (1999): 49. 223 224 WOJCIECH P. GRYGIEL metaphysics were then transformed by his medieval disciple into as many elements of Christian synthesis.2 This Christian synthesis is central to the understanding of science as an integral part of the classical Western world view. In it all beings are perceived as purposefully ordered in their natures towards their ultimate goal, which is the glory and praise of God. In his Summa Theologiae St. Thomas writes Therefore since sacred scripture considers things insofar as they are divinely revealed, according to what has been said all things whatsoever that are able to be divinely revealed share in the one formal object of this science, and so they are included under sacred theology as under a single science.3 This position radically contradicts the currently dominant mind set that goes back at least to Descartes's decoupling of philosophical and theological wisdom, with its bifurcation of nature into res cogitans and res extensa.4 As the term extensa indicates, in Cartesian philosophy matter appears to the human mind clearly and distinctly only under the aspect of quantity. All the other Aristotelian categories of accident are thus reducible to quantity. As a result the human mind is unable to discern natures, and so is cut off from the possibility of investigating change, the object of physical science.5 The Cartesian assimilation of corporeality to pure mathematics, based on Descartes's own distrust of sense experience, has boxed science into, one could say, living a life of extension without any reference to the nature of reality. The mathematicism of Galileo, and in some ways that 2 E. Gilson, The Unity ofPhilosophical Experience (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), 221. 3 Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, a. 3. • One of the most striking examples ofscientism practically bordering on mythology is the Darwinian theory of evolution. The drastic imposition of stochasticism on the vital mechanisms of natural generation with minimal experimental evidence seems more like an attempt to carry out a deliberate philosophical agenda than an honest scientific investigation. A solid refutation of Darwinian theory based on microbiological and biochemical evidence can be found in Michael J. Behe, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: Touchstone, 1996). 5 Aristotle, Physics 2.2.193b31-35. QUANTUM MECHANICS 225 of Isaac Newton, further implanted a conviction in the modern mind that physical phenomena can be accounted for simply by the use of mathematical equations. The implications of such reductionism were well summarized by Alfred North Whitehead: The laws of nature are nothing else that the observed identities of pattern persisting throughout the series of comparative observations. Thus a law of nature says something about...
Introduction Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one. My more immediate aim here is to give the social scientific reader an introductory understanding of the experimental findings of quantum theory, its key concepts, and the debates about its interpretation. The discussion assumes no prior knowledge of quantum physics and makes no use of mathematics. Quantum theory without equations might seem like an oxymoron, and certainly reading this Part will not enable anyone to use quantum theory. But to a perhaps surprising degree it is possible to understand quantum theory without being able to use it. Its findings can be communicated in ordinary language, and the same goes for its main concepts and interpretive debates. One consequence of this has been the emergence of a virtual cottage industry of books on quantum theory for a lay audience. Most are written by physicists, and many are quite good. However, it is not just popular treatments that do without equations: much of the professional philosophical literature does as well. (I draw on both kinds of literature below.) Philosophers of physics are trained to understand the math, of course, which is necessary for a full appreciation of the issues.
Abstract The most successful theory in all of science--and the basis of one third of our economy--says the strangest things about the world and about us. Can you believe that physical reality is created by our observation of it? Physicists were forced to this conclusion, the quantum enigma, by what they observed in their laboratories. Trying to understand the atom, physicists built quantum mechanics and found, to their embarrassment, that their theory intimately connects consciousness with the physical world. Quantum Enigma explores what that implies and why some founders of the theory became the foremost objectors to it. Schrödinger showed that it "absurdly" allowed a cat to be in a "superposition" simultaneously dead and alive. Einstein derided the theory's "spooky interactions." With Bell's Theorem, we now know Schrödinger's superpositions and Einstein's spooky interactions indeed exist. Authors Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner explain all of this in non-technical terms with help from some fanciful stories and bits about the theory's developers. They present the quantum mystery honestly, with an emphasis on what is and what is not speculation. Physics' encounter with consciousness is its skeleton in the closet. Because the authors open the closet and examine the skeleton, theirs is a controversial book. Quantum Enigma's description of the experimental quantum facts, and the quantum theory explaining them, is undisputed. Interpreting what it all means, however, is controversial. Every interpretation of quantum physics encounters consciousness. Rosenblum and Kuttner therefore turn to exploring consciousness itself--and encounter quantum physics. Free will and anthropic principles become crucial issues, and the connection of consciousness with the cosmos suggested by some leading quantum cosmologists is mind-blowing. Readers are brought to a boundary where the particular expertise of physicists is no longer a sure guide. They will find, instead, the facts and hints provided by quantum mechanics and the ability to speculate for themselves.
The relation between Physics and Philosophy brings to mind the proverbial marriage of high drama; the parties do not approve of each other, but separated they cannot live. Philosophers find physicists shallow, and many physicists claim that they find philosophic speculations useless or worse. Mostly both display a lack of knowledge and understanding of the methods and goals of the other. A few researchers have tried to bridge this gap and explore the worlds of both parties. Michael Redhead has worked in this borderland, and when he retired from his chair in Cambridge, a symposium was arranged to honour him. The talks presented on this occasion are now published in a volume presenting much food for thought to both philosophers and physicists. The essays in this publication do not offer easy reading; not too many readers will have the preparation to penetrate the technical arguments offered. The authors are well acquainted with both philosophical argumentation and mathematical formalism, and, following the lead of Professor Redhead, they combine these in intricate and suggestive ways. Only a close reading can offer understanding of the points of view taken by the various authors. Browsing and mere reading defines the scenery, exploring it demands much more. Many of the nine essays included investigate the meaning of terms used loosely in physics contexts: locality, beables, symmetries and time in relativity. All essays utilize the mathematical structures of physics, but the approach is mainly philosophical; concepts like reality and metaphysics are applied. Some writings are more physical in their treatment of technical questions relating to modern quantum theory. Bohmian mechanics, localized quantum states and gauge symmetries are discussed in detail. It is, however, found that these present interpretational problems that are usually glossed over in purely physical treatments. For an old sceptic like myself, it is quite refreshing to find that many assertions, taken for granted in our textbooks, are indeed doubtful and offer conceptual or technical difficulties. This insight is what a philosophical analysis can offer the working physicist; future progress may well arise from such realizations. However, the results offered by philosophical analysis are usually found unsatisfactory; the hope that philosophy can suggest novel directions for the theory remains unfounded. Philosophers can learn that modern physics rests on a very shaky conceptual foundation. The theory has evolved by a combination of serendipity and opportunism. The beast that finally has emerged is neither well founded nor internally consistent. Its only merit is that it works. That offers the ultimate philosophical problem of modern physics. If the present book can help the philosopher to behold this challenging but overwhelming wilderness, then it serves a useful purpose indeed. But the prospective researcher has to learn to master the difficult language used by the natives, who are not always friendly. I enjoyed reading the book immensely, but the technical difficulty of the text made my understanding remain mostly superficial. I hope to have the time to return some of the essays, and look into the references and issues involved. The work is genuinely what it promises: a guide From Physics to Philosophy .
For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.