Quantum Oblivious Transfer: a secure practical implementation

Guang Ping He

Daniel Mansy, Peter Rindal

Oblivious Transfer has played a crucial role in the design of secure multi party computation. Nevertheless, there are not many practical solutions that achieve simulation based security and at the same time instantiable based on different assumptions. In this work, we consider a simulation based security notion that we call endemic security. We show how to construct highly efficient oblivious transfer in the random oracle model that achieves endemic security under a wide range of assumptions, among them DDH, CDH, LWE and coding based assumptions. We construct a secure oblivious transfer based on DDH that takes only a single communication round which allows significant performance gains. We also instantiate our oblivious transfer with the Crystals.Kyber key agreement. Our implementation shows that both instantiations can be computed in under one millisecond. Further, we revisit, correct and improve existing oblivious transfer extension techniques. We provide an implementation of an oblivious transfer extension protocol in the ideal cipher model that is actively secure, processing up to 23 million OTs per second and up to 10 times faster than previous secure implementations. We also show that our framework can compute endemically secure OT extension and the base OTs in just two rounds.

Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard A, Claude Crépeau +1 more

Yaqi Song, Li Yang

Oblivious transfer (OT) and bit commitment (BC) are two-party cryptographic protocols which play crucial roles in the construction of various cryptographic protocols. We propose three practical quantum cryptographic protocols in this paper. We first construct a practical quantum random oblivious transfer (R-OT) protocol based on the fact that non-orthogonal states cannot be reliably distinguished. Then, we construct a fault-tolerant one-out-of-two oblivious transfer ( O T 1 2 ) protocol based on the quantum R-OT protocol. Afterwards, we propose a quantum bit commitment (QBC) protocol which executes the fault-tolerant O T 1 2 several times. Mayers, Lo and Chau (MLC) no-go theorem proves that QBC protocol cannot be unconditionally secure. However, we find that computing the unitary transformation of no-go theorem attack needs so many resources that it is not realistically implementable. We give a definition of physical security for QBC protocols and prove that the practical QBC we proposed is physically secure and can be implemented in the real world.

HU YANGLIN

Atsushi Waseda, Takayuki TAKAGI, Masakazu Soshi +1 more