In contrast to traditional "store-and-forward" routing mechanisms, network coding offers an elegant solution for achieving maximum network throughput.The core idea is that intermediate network nodes linearly combine received data packets so that the destination nodes can decode original files from some authenticated packets.Although network coding has many advantages, especially in wireless sensor network and peer-to-peer network, the encoding mechanism of intermediate nodes also results in some additional security issues.For a powerful adversary who can control arbitrary number of malicious network nodes and can eavesdrop on the entire network, cryptographic signature schemes provide undeniable authentication mechanisms for network nodes.However, with the development of quantum technologies, some existing network coding signature schemes based on some traditional number-theoretic primitives vulnerable to quantum cryptanalysis.In this paper we first present an efficient network coding signature scheme in the standard model using lattice theory, which can be viewed as the most promising tool for designing post-quantum cryptographic protocols.In the security proof, we propose a new method for generating a random lattice and the corresponding trapdoor, which may be used in other cryptographic protocols.Our scheme has many advantages, such as supporting multi-source networks, low computational complexity and low communication overhead.
In contrast to traditional "store-and-forward" routing mechanisms, network coding offers an elegant solution for achieving maximum network throughput.The core idea is that intermediate network nodes linearly combine received data packets so that the destination nodes can decode original files from some authenticated packets.Although network coding has many advantages, especially in wireless sensor network and peer-to-peer network, the encoding mechanism of intermediate nodes also results in some additional security issues.For a powerful adversary who can control arbitrary number of malicious network nodes and can eavesdrop on the entire network, cryptographic signature schemes provide undeniable authentication mechanisms for network nodes.However, with the development of quantum technologies, some existing network coding signature schemes based on some traditional number-theoretic primitives vulnerable to quantum cryptanalysis.In this paper we first present an efficient network coding signature scheme in the standard model using lattice theory, which can be viewed as the most promising tool for designing post-quantum cryptographic protocols.In the security proof, we propose a new method for generating a random lattice and the corresponding trapdoor, which may be used in other cryptographic protocols.Our scheme has many advantages, such as supporting multi-source networks, low computational complexity and low communication overhead.
Abstract The property that linearly homomorphic signature (LHS) enables linear computation on signed data makes this primitive commonly used to secure the network coding based application against pollution attacks. The security of LHS wholly depends on the security of secret signing keys; once a secret key is compromised, the application system’ security will be broken. However, as relatively insecure mobile devices are increasingly used in network coding application systems, the key exposure issue is becoming more prevalent. On the other hand, with the quantum technology development, some existing LHS schemes based on some traditional number-theoretic primitives are susceptible to quantum cryptanalysis. Hence, facing the dual threats of the exposure of secret keys in reality and the future effiffifficient quantum computers, we integrate forward security into LHS, and present a forward-secure identity-based LHS scheme (FSIBLHS) based on lattice assumptions, which achieves post-quantum security, and even if the current secret key is compromised, the validity of signatures of previous time periods is still guaranteed. We defifine the fifirst security model on forward security of LHS, and prove that the proposed scheme can resist adaptively chosen identity and datasets attack under lattice assumption. Moreover, compared with previous related works, the performance analysis shows that our scheme enjoys a comparable computation cost and has a lower communication cost, and provides higher security and stronger functionality.
The rapid development of quantum computing presents a substantial threat to traditional cryptographic algorithms, particularly those relying on mathematical problems such as integer factorization and elliptic curve operations. As a response, the cryptographic community has accelerated the design of post-quantum cryptographic schemes that can withstand attacks from both classical and quantum computers. However, many of these new schemes exhibit inherent trade-offs between performance, key sizes, and implementation complexity. To address this, we propose a novel hybrid cryptographic framework tailored for secure and efficient data transmission in future quantum-aware environments. The proposed system combines three algorithmic paradigms: a lattice-based encryption method for fast and lightweight data protection, a hash-based signature mechanism for authenticity, and a code-based key exchange method to ensure session confidentiality. This layered integration is designed to capitalize on each algorithm’s strengths while mitigating individual limitations. The system is implemented using modular components in a testbed simulating real-world deployments, and its performance is benchmarked across multiple metrics including encryption latency, signature generation time, key sizes, and throughput. Comparative results indicate that the hybrid approach outperforms monolithic schemes in critical areas such as execution time and cryptographic strength under quantum adversary models. The findings support the practicality of using multiple post-quantum primitives in tandem to build robust communication systems. This research contributes a realistic implementation and evaluation of post-quantum security models and highlights key directions for future research and standardization efforts as the global transition to quantum-safe infrastructure begins.
Blockchain technology has gained significant prominence in recent years due to its public, distributed, and decentration characteristics, which was widely applied in all walks of life requiring distributed trustless consensus. However, the most cryptographic protocols used in the current blockchain networks are susceptible to the quantum attack with rapid development of a sufficiently large quantum computer. In this paper, we first give an overview of the vulnerabilities of the modern blockchain networks to a quantum adversary and some potential post-quantum mitigation methods. Then, a new lattice-based signature scheme has been proposed, which can be used to secure the blockchain network over existing classical channels. Meanwhile, the public and private keys are generated by the Bonsai Trees technology withRandBasisalgorithm from the root keys, which not only ensure the randomness, but also construct the lightweight nondeterministic wallets. Then, the proposed scheme can be proved secure in random oracle model, and it is also more efficient than similar literatures. In addition, we also give the detailed description of the post-quantum blockchain transaction. Furthermore, this work can help to enrich the research on the future post-quantum blockchain (PQB).
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to conventional public-key cryptographic mechanisms deployed in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs). Due to their decentralized architecture, dynamic topology, and resource-constrained nodes, MANETs require security solutions that are not only quantum-resistant but also computationally efficient. This paper presents a comparative evaluation of lattice-based and code-based post-quantum digital signature schemes for secure data transmission in MANET environments. The study focuses on analyzing key performance parameters including key generation time, signature and verification latency, end-to-end transmission delay, and overall security strength under varying mobility conditions. Simulation experiments are conducted using realistic mobility datasets and network models to assess the feasibility of deploying post-quantum signatures in dynamic MANET scenarios. The results demonstrate that while lattice-based schemes offer better computational efficiency, code-based schemes provide stronger security guarantees at the cost of increased communication overhead. This work highlights the critical trade-offs between security, performance, and scalability, and provides practical insights for designing lightweight post-quantum security frameworks for future mobile networks.
Digital signatures are indispensable for security on the Internet, because they guarantee authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation, of namely e-mails, software updates, and in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol which is used for secure data transfer, for example. Most signature schemes that are currently in use such as the RSA signature scheme, are considered secure as long as the integer factorization problem or the discrete logarithm (DL) problem are computationally hard. At present, no algorithms have yet been found to solve these problems on conventional computers in polynomial time. However, in 1997, Shor published a polynomial-time algorithm that uses quantum computation to solve the integer factorization and the DL problem. In particular, this means that RSA signatures are considered broken as soon as large-scale quantum computers exist. Due to significant advances in the area of quantum computing, it is reasonable to assume that within 20 years, quantum computers that are able to break the RSA scheme, could exist. In order to maintain authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of data, cryptographic schemes that cannot be broken by quantum attacks are required. In addition, these so-called post-quantum secure schemes should be sufficiently efficient to be suitable for all established applications. Furthermore, solutions enabling a timely and secure transition from classical to post-quantum schemes are needed. This thesis contributes to the above-mentioned transition. In this thesis, we present the two lattice-based digital signature schemes TESLA and qTESLA, whereby lattice-based cryptography is one of five approaches to construct post-quantum secure schemes. Furthermore, we prove that our signature schemes are secure as long as the so-called Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is computationally hard to solve. It is presumed that even quantum computers cannot solve the LWE problem in polynomial time. The security of our schemes is proven using security reductions. Since our reductions are tight and explicit, efficient instantiations are possible that provably guarantee a selected security level, as long as the corresponding LWE instance provides a certain hardness level. Since both our reductions (as proven in the quantum random oracle model) and instantiations, take into account quantum attackers, TESLA and qTESLA are considered post-quantum secure. Concurrently, the run-times for generating and verifying signatures of qTESLA are similar (or faster) than those of the RSA scheme. However, key and signature sizes of RSA are smaller than those of qTESLA. In order to protect both the theoretical signature schemes and their implementations against attacks, we analyze possible vulnerabilities against implementation attacks. In particular, cache-side-channel attacks resulting from observing the cache behavior and fault attacks, which recover secret information by actively disrupting the execution of an algorithm are focused. We present effective countermeasures for each implementation attack we found. Our analyses and countermeasures also influence the design and implementation of qTESLA. Although our schemes are considered (post-quantum) secure according to state-of-the-art LWE attacks, cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes is still a relatively new field of research in comparison to RSA schemes. Hence, there is a lack of confidence in the concrete instantiations and their promised security levels. However, due to developments within the field of quantum computers, a transition to post-quantum secure solutions seems to be more urgently required than ever. To solve this dilemma, we present an approach to combine two schemes, e.g., qTESLA and the RSA signature scheme, so that the combination is secure as long as one of the two combined schemes is secure. We present several of such combiners to construct hybrid signature schemes and hybrid key encapsulation mechanisms to ensure both authenticity and confidentiality in our Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). Lastly, we also demonstrate how to apply the resulting hybrid schemes in standards such as X.509 or TLS. To summarize, this work presents post-quantum secure candidates which can, using our hybrid schemes, add post-quantum security to the current classical security in our PKI.
The advent of quantum computing presents a paradigm shift in modern cybersecurity, threatening the foundations of classical cryptographic systems such as RSA, ECC, and Diffie–Hellman key exchange. Quantum algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s can efficiently break these schemes, rendering existing encryption mechanisms vulnerable and obsolete. This growing risk necessitates the development of quantum-resilient or post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) solutions that can safeguard data and computation in the era of quantum networks. Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC), a cornerstone of privacy-preserving computation, enables multiple entities to jointly compute a function over their private inputs without revealing them. However, its traditional security assumptions are also undermined by quantum threats. This research aims to explore and evaluate quantum-safe cryptographic protocols for integrating PQC into SMPC frameworks, thereby ensuring both confidentiality and correctness even in the presence of quantum-capable adversaries. The study focuses on lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based cryptographic primitives, analyzing their resilience, efficiency, and scalability when applied to distributed systems. A comparative framework is proposed to assess the performance and security trade-offs of different post-quantum SMPC implementations under realistic network conditions. The findings are expected to contribute to the design of a new class of cryptographic protocols capable of resisting quantum attacks, supporting the secure functioning of next-generation networks, and guiding policymakers and technologists toward practical post-quantum standardization. Ultimately, this research strengthens the bridge between theoretical cryptography and real-world cybersecurity readiness in the post-quantum era.