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IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)

On the impossibility of information-theoretic composable coin toss extension

Gregor Seiler, Ueli M. Maurer

Published Jul 1, 2016• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Shared randomness is an important resource in cryptography. It is well-known that in the information-theoretic setting there is no protocol that allows two parties who do not trust each other to obtain a uniformly distributed shared bit string solely by exchanging messages such that a dishonest party can not influence the result. On the other hand, in the situation where the two parties already share a random bit string and want to use it in order to construct a longer random bit string, it is only known to be impossible when the protocols are restricted in the number of messages to be exchanged. In this paper we prove that it is also impossible when arbitrarily many messages are allowed.

DOI
10.1109/isit.2016.7541861

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Shared randomness is an important resource in cryptography. It is well-known that in the information-theoretic setting there is no protocol that allows two parties who do not trust each other to obtain a uniformly distributed shared bit string solely by exchanging messages such that a dishonest party can not influence the result. On the other hand, in the situation where the two parties already share a random bit string and want to use it in order to construct a longer random bit string, it is only known to be impossible when the protocols are restricted in the number of messages to be exchanged. In this paper we prove that it is also impossible when arbitrarily many messages are allowed.
We consider the task of extending a given coin toss. By this, we mean the two-party task of using a single instance of a given coin toss protocol in order to interactively generate more random coins. A bit more formally, our goal is to generate n common random coins from a single use of an ideal functionality that gives m<nm<nm<n common random coins to both parties. In the framework of universal composability, we show the impossibility of securely extending a coin toss for statistical and perfect security. On the other hand, for computational security, the existence of a protocol for coin toss extension depends on the number m of random coins that can be obtained “for free.” For the case of stand-alone security, i.e., a simulation-based security definition without an environment, we present a protocol for statistically secure coin toss extension. Our protocol works for superlogarithmic m, which is optimal as we show the impossibility of statistically secure coin toss extension for smaller m. Combining our results with already known results, we obtain a (nearly) complete characterization under which circumstances coin toss extension is possible.
Common randomness is an important resource in many areas such as game theory and cryptography. We discuss the general problem of common randomness amplification between two distrustful parties connected by a communication channel and sharing some initial randomness. In this setting, both parties wish to agree on a common value distributed according to a target distribution by using their initial amount of common randomness and exchanging messages. Our results show that no protocol which is secure in a composable sense can significantly amplify the entropy initially shared by the parties.
An ideal coin tossing resource for two parties outputs the same random bit to both parties. We introduce the notion of an unfair coin tossing resource by relaxing both the fairness and the non-influenceability guarantees that an ideal coin toss would provide. The presence of this non-ideal behavior is necessary in order to understand what coin tossing protocols really achieve in the setting of two distrustful parties, since it is known that such an ideal coin tossing resource cannot be constructed whenever a majority of players is dishonest.
Coin tossing is a cryptographic task in which two parties who do not trust each other aim to generate a common random bit. Using classical communication this is impossible, but nontrivial coin tossing is possible using quantum communication. Here we consider the case when the parties do not want to toss a single coin, but many. This is called bit-string generation. We report the experimental generation of strings of coins which are provably more random than achievable using classical communication. The experiment is based on the "plug and play" scheme developed for quantum cryptography, and therefore well suited for long distance quantum communication.
In coin tossing two remote participants want to share a uniformly distributed random bit. At the least in the quantum version, each participant test whether or not the other has attempted to create a bias on this bit. It is requested that, for b = 0,1, the probability that Alice gets bit b and pass the test is smaller than 1/2 whatever she does, and similarly for Bob. If the bound 1/2 holds perfectly against any of the two participants, the task realised is called an exact coin tossing. If the bound is actually 1/2+ξ1/2 + \xi1/2+ξ where the bias ξ\xiξ vanishes when a security parameter m defined by the protocol increases, the task realised is a (non exact) coin tossing. It is found here that exact coin tossing is impossible. At the same time, an unconditionally secure quantum protocol that realises a (non exact) coin tossing is proposed. The protocol executes m biased quantum coin tossing procedures at the same time. It executes the first round in each of these m procedures sequentially, then the second rounds are executed, and so on until the end of the n procedures. Each procedure requires 4n particles where n∈O(lg⁡m)n \in O(\lg m)n∈O(lgm). The final bit x is the parity of the m random bits. The information about each of these m bits is announced a little bit at a time which implies that the principle used against bit commitment does not apply. The bias on x is smaller than 1/m1/m1/m. The result is discussed in the light of the impossibility result for exact coin tossing.