This chapter argues that, due to the circumstances described in Chapter 7, techniques developed for interpreting ordinary QM lack straightforward extension to the interpretation of QM∞. These techniques are variations on the maximal beable approach inspired by John Bell, which reduces the task of interpreting a quantum theory to the task of isolating from its family of physical magnitudes a largest set of observables which can be attributed values simultaneously. The chapter links the satisfactory execution of this task—an execution which grounds explanations of quantum state preparation–to the presence of atoms in the von Neumann algebras typical of ordinary QM. What stymies the maximal beable approach to QM∞ is the ubiquity of non-atomic von Neumann algebras.
This chapter argues that, due to the circumstances described in Chapter 7, techniques developed for interpreting ordinary QM lack straightforward extension to the interpretation of QM∞. These techniques are variations on the maximal beable approach inspired by John Bell, which reduces the task of interpreting a quantum theory to the task of isolating from its family of physical magnitudes a largest set of observables which can be attributed values simultaneously. The chapter links the satisfactory execution of this task—an execution which grounds explanations of quantum state preparation–to the presence of atoms in the von Neumann algebras typical of ordinary QM. What stymies the maximal beable approach to QM∞ is the ubiquity of non-atomic von Neumann algebras.
QM∞ includes quantum field theory and the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics — theories which, unlike the 'ordinary' quantum theories typically discussed by philosophers, concern infinite systems. The mathematical framework appropriate for the presentation of a theory of ordinary quantum mechanics is essentially unique. For theories of QM∞, this is not so. This prompts interpretive questions—for instance, about what makes a quantum theory the quantum theory it is — this work aims to chronicle. Having introduced a formal apparatus (operator algebra theory) suited to pursue these questions, the book articulates a variety of accounts of the content of quantum theories, accounts responsive to QM∞'s characteristic non-uniqueness. To evaluate these accounts, the book examines QM∞ settings (e.g. spontaneous symmetry breaking, cosmological particle creation, superconductivity) in which that characteristic non-uniqueness seems to matter, with a view toward determining which accounts sustain the uses to which the non-uniqueness is put. This approach not only brings work on the foundations of quantum theories in contact with the foundational investigation of other sorts of physical theories (e.g., thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, solid state physics, general relativity, and cosmology), it also brings the philosophy of physics in contact with other sorts of philosophy of science (e.g., accounts of explanation, reduction, and explanationist defenses of scientific realism). The book concludes that received notions of physical content and physical modality must be revised if they are to apply usefully to particular physical theories.
John Bell once argued that one ought to select, out of the 'observables' of quantum theory, some subset of 'beables' that can be consistently ascribed determinate values. Moreover, this subset should be selected so as to guarantee (among other things) that we can dispense with the orthodox interpretation's loose talk about 'measurement values': "...the probability of a beable being a particular value would be calculated just as was formerly calculated the probability of observing that value". Working in the framework of C*-algebras (in particular, Segal algebras), I propose an algebraic characterization of those subsets of bounded observables of a quantum system that can have beable status with respect to any (fixed) state of the system. It turns out that observables with beable status in a state need not all commute (a possibility Bell himself does not consider), but they must at least form a certain kind of 'quasicommutative' subalgebra determined by the state. A virtue of the analysis is that it applies to beables with continuous spectra, usually neglected in discussions of the no-hidden-variables theorems. In the (very) special case where the algebra of observables for a system is representable on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, I give a complete characterization of the maximal beable subalgebras determined by any state of the system; the infinite-dimensional case remains open. These results are discussed in relation to previous results of a similar nature, to 'no-collapse' interpretations of quantum mechanics, and to algebraic relativistic quantum field theory.
Introduction: The Theory of Local Beables John Bell's most celebrated contribution to the foundations of physics is his famous theorem. The theorem demonstrates that any physical theory capable of generating the predictions of the standard quantum-mechanical algorithm, in particular the prediction of violations of Bell's inequality for experiments done at spacelike separation, cannot be local. The sense of “locality” used here is the same sense that Einstein had in mind when he pointed out that the standard interpretation of the quantum algorithm was committed to “spooky action at a distance” To this day, the import of Bell's theorem is not universally appreciated. I have written about this elsewhere [1], and others in this volume will take up that task. It is properly the main focus during this 50th anniversary of that great achievement. But it is also important to recall and celebrate Bell's other achievements. In many of his later writings, including “The Theory of Local Beables,” “Quantum Mechanics for Cosmologists,” “On the Impossible Pilot Wave,” “Beables for Quantum Field Theory,” “Six Possible Worlds of Quantum Mechanics,” “Are There Quantum Jumps?” and “Against ‘Measurement,”’ 1 Bell turned his attention to the more general problem of physically construing the mathematical formalism used to derive these predictions. This activity is often denominated “interpreting quantum theory” as if there were some precise physical theory that might somehow be supplemented with an “interpretation” Once the issue is framed this way it is easy to ask: But if I already have a theory in hand, what can be gained by supplementing it with an “interpretation”? Many physicists, at this juncture, are happy to conclude that “interpretations” are not a matter of physics at all – maybe they are only of interest to philosophers – and that therefore the whole enterprise of “interpreting quantum theory” is not within the purview of physics per se. What then is in the purviewof physics proper?One answer to this question goes under the banner “instrumentalism”: all physics as such, is concerned about is predicting the outcomes of experiments .
In a certain sense, object and apparatus were essentially on the same footing in von Neumann's measurement theory. They were systems with k and l degrees of freedom respectively (page 146). There were no constraints on the numbers k and l , which could, for example, be of the same order of magnitude. Quite possibly, it was this lack of differentiation between object and apparatus that led Wigner to assert that ‘the state of the apparatus has no classical description’ (page 137), a state of affairs that produced the infinite von Neumann chain which only ended in the observer's consciousness. In this and the following chapter we shall break with von Neumann and assume that k is small, i.e., of the order of unity, and that l is large, i.e., within a few orders of magnitude of Avogadro's number. The room for manoeuvre that this provides will allow us to break with Wigner and explore systems with states that do have classical descriptions. It will not surprise the informed reader that the room for manoeuvre created by our assumption will be filled, very substantially, by von Neumann's own work. This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 9.1 is devoted to a theorem of von Neumann on observables that commute with each other. This prepares the way to our treatment of macroscopic observables, which is based on the commuting approximations to P and Q devised by von Neumann; these results, together with their antecedents, are presented in Section 9.2. In Section 9.3, an attempt is made to resolve some of Wigner's doubts.
Quantum theory is the soul of contemporary physics. It was discovered in an adventurous way, under the urge to solve the puzzles posed by atomic spectra and blackbody radiation. But after its invention, it immediately became clear that it was not just a theory of specific physical systems: it was rather a new language of universal applicability. Already in 1928, the theory had received solid mathematical foundations by Hilbert, von Neumann, and Nordheim, and this work was brought to completion in the monumental work of von Neumann, in the form that we still study nowadays. The theory is extraordinarily successful, and its predictions have been confirmed to an astonishing level of precision in a large spectrum of experiments. However, almost 90 years after von Neumann's book, quantum theory remains mysterious. Its mathematical formulation – based on Hilbert spaces and self-adjoint operators – is far from having an intuitive interpretation. The association of physical systems to Hilbert spaces whose unit vectors represent pure states, the representation of transformations by unitary operators and of observables by self-adjoint operators – all such postulates look artificial and ad hoc . A slightly more operational approach is provided by the C * -algebraic formulation of quantum theory – still, this formulation relies on the assumption that observables form an algebra , where the physical meanings of the multiplication and the sum are far from clear. In short, the postulates of quantum theory impose mathematical structures without providing any simple reason for this choice: the mathematics of Hilbert spaces is adopted as a magic blackbox that “works well” at producing experimental predictions. However, in a satisfactory axiomatization of a physical theory the mathematical structures should emerge as a consequence of postulates that have a direct physical interpretation. By this we mean postulates referring, e.g., to primitive notions like physical system, measurement, or process, rather than notions like, e.g., Hilbert space, C * -algebra, unit vector, or selfadjoint operator. The crucial question thus remains unanswered: why quantum theory? Which are the principles at the basis of the theory? A case that is often invoked in contrast is that of Special Relativity theory, which directly follows from the simple understandable principle of relativity.