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International Journal of Information Security

Generic construction of an $$\mathrm {eCK}$$ eCK -secure key exchange protocol in the standard model

Janaka Alawatugoda

Published Aug 5, 2016• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s10207-016-0346-9

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LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security model for authenticated key agreement, namely the eCK model. They also constructed a protocol, namely the NAXOS protocol, that enjoys a simple security proof in the eCK model. However, the NAXOS protocol uses a random-oracle-based technique to combine the long-term secret key and the per-session-randomness; so-called NAXOStrick, in order to achieve the eCK security definition. For NAXOS-trick-based protocols, the leakage of per-session-randomness modelled in the eCK model is somewhat unnatural, because the eCK model leaks per-session-randomness, while the output of the NAXOS-trick computation remains safe. In this work, we present a standard model eCK-secure protocol construction, eliminating the NAXOS-trick. Moreover, our protocol is a generic constructions, which can be instantiated with arbitrary suitable cryptographic primitives. Thus, we present a generic eCK-secure, NAXOS-free, standard model key exchange protocol. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper on generic transformation of a CCA2-secure public key encryption scheme to an eCK-secure key exchange protocol in the standard model.

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Efficient eCK-secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the Standard Model.

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The extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for authenticated key exchange protocols that capture leakage of various kinds of secret information like the long-term private key and session-specific secret state. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS like trick. A generic construction GC-KKN satisfying those requirements is first given relying on standard cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency. On the second a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting. Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous eCK secure protocols in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and implement algorithms of protocol which require to be resilience of state leakage.

•Jan 1, 2013•0 citations
Generic construction of an eCK\mathrm {eCK}eCK eCK -secure key exchange protocol in the standard model
LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin presented a strong security model for authenticated key agreement, namely the eCK model. They also constructed a protocol, namely the NAXOS protocol, that enjoys a simple security proof in the eCK model. However, the NAXOS protocol uses a random-oracle-based technique to combine the long-term secret key and the per-session-randomness; so-called NAXOStrick, in order to achieve the eCK security definition. For NAXOS-trick-based protocols, the leakage of per-session-randomness modelled in the eCK model is somewhat unnatural, because the eCK model leaks per-session-randomness, while the output of the NAXOS-trick computation remains safe. In this work, we present a standard model eCK-secure protocol construction, eliminating the NAXOS-trick. Moreover, our protocol is a generic constructions, which can be instantiated with arbitrary suitable cryptographic primitives. Thus, we present a generic eCK-secure, NAXOS-free, standard model key exchange protocol. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper on generic transformation of a CCA2-secure public key encryption scheme to an eCK-secure key exchange protocol in the standard model.
The extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security models, are widely used to provide security arguments for authenticated key exchange protocols that capture leakage of various kinds of secret information like the long-term private key and session-specific secret state. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructing eCK secure AKE protocol without random oracles and NAXOS like trick. A generic construction GC-KKN satisfying those requirements is first given relying on standard cryptographic primitives following the guideline of efficiency. On the second a concrete protocol is proposed which is the first eCK secure protocol in the standard model under both standard assumptions and post-specified peer setting. Both proposed schemes can be more efficiently implemented with secure device than previous eCK secure protocols in the standard model, where the secure device might be normally used to store the long-term private key and implement algorithms of protocol which require to be resilience of state leakage.