Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Springer eBooks

Ontology Implied by the Copenhagen Interpretation

Kalervo V. Laurikainen

Published Jan 1, 1997• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-60560-4_6

Related papers

Copenhagen Interpretation

Andrey Anatoljevich Grib, Waldyr A. Rodrigues

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1999•2 citations

Trying to Fancy What the Flame of a Candle Is Like After the Candle Is Blown Out: Some Notes About the Ontological Structure of the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Luigi Laino

In the present article the author will deal with an inquiry of the ontological structure of quantum mechanics, and he will analyze the evolution of the heno-ontological equation (the identity of being one and of being) in the shape of the new arrangement prepared by the orthodox interpretation of the theory.Hence the article will particularly focus on the Copenhagen interpretation and the lack of intuition [Anschaulichkeit] in the representation of physical external objects; as far as the latter topic is concerned, the author will also consider the classic representation of Heisenberg's philosophy given by Heelan.The author will then show the impossibility of holding the old physical body-representation which worked for classical mechanics as well, because quantum mechanics denies an absolute localizability of physical entities.A non-defective determination of localizability was in fact the very postulate which lays at the basis of the heno-ontological equation as Aristotle had envisaged it: what is not localizable, is not one being.It also has to be considered a specific lack as regards the chronological permanence of the identity of the quantum object, which appears to be constantly modified by its interaction with the devices and with other particles.Accordingly, the author will explain the peculiar definition of physical entity in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics as a non-substantial entity, as a non-body, considering the argument that henceforth the actual substance, in physics, will be only the whole totality.Arguing about the latter point, the author will develop a definition of individuality which could not be extraneous to the most recent interpretations of quantum mechanics.He will indeed aim for a non strictly ontological definition of individuality, if one has to figure out the individuum as a body of daily experience.Rather than a body, the quantum individuum is almost a being whose ontological content is only relative to the transformations of a primitive context: this implies that his ontological charge cannot be considered permanent.From this point of view, one can argue that quantum mechanics is very close to the old representation of nature as being by the ancient Greek physicists, which tended to distinguish between the ontological definition of individual entities and the unity of being as a whole.Hence the article will show, through Cassirer's review, how it is possible to depict a new setting for the relationship between one and being, as well as trying to shed some light on the basic assumptions of the ontology of Copenhagen interpretation and of modern quantum mechanics.

Philosophy of Science and Technology•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations

Niels Bohr's Interpretation and the Copenhagen Interpretation—Are the Two Incompatible?

Ravi V. Gomatam

The Copenhagen interpretation, which informs the textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, depends fundamentally on the notion of ontological wave-particle duality and a viewpoint called “complementarity.” In this paper, Bohr's own interpretation is traced in detail and is shown to be fundamentally different from and even opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation in virtually all its particulars. In particular, Bohr's interpretation avoids the ad hoc postulate of wave function ‘collapse’ that is central to the Copenhagen interpretation. The strengths and weakness of both interpretations are summarized.

Philosophy of Science•Dec 1, 2007•15 citations

Copenhagen Interpretation

Daniel M. Greenberger, Klaus Hentschel, Friedel Weinert

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 2009•0 citations

Reconsidering the EPR Paradox through the Separation of Prediction and Observation

Kei Itoh

This paper reexamines the EPR paradox through a logical separation of “prediction” and “observation.” Even when a conditional prediction supplied by quantum theory reaches probability 1, this fact alone does not imply that an observation event has occurred at a remote location or that a particular ontology holds for an unobserved quantity. When this distinction is generalized into a minimal rule against generating ontology without warrant from an observational formalism, the inference that depends on EPR’s criterion of reality can be stopped without introducing new dynamics or a superluminal mechanism. At the same time, correlations that resist local causal factorization, as manifested in violations of Bell inequalities, remain. Thus, EPR-type “instantaneous remote determination” need not be identified with Bell nonlocality. The paper further reconsiders the possibility of reading state collapse as conditioning on an observation outcome rather than as transport through spacetime, its relation to the invariance of the speed of light, Bohr’s response to EPR and the logical ambiguity of the Copenhagen interpretation, and Einstein’s ontological concerns. Finally, the problem is considered as a “renewed Kantian overreach of reason,” in which an overreach that had been constrained by modern science and Kantian critique reappears through the mediation of precise quantum formalism. AI Assistance DisclosureGenerative AI was used as an auxiliary tool in drafting, adjusting expressions, and organizing the structure of this paper. The author bears final responsibility for the text, claims, citations, and factual verification. Keywords: EPR paradox, prediction, observation, state collapse, Bell nonlocality, Copenhagen interpretation, ontology, Kant

•Sep 17, 2026•0 citations

On the Origins of the Copenhagen Interpretation

Arthur I. Miller

•Jan 1, 1988•4 citations
In the present article the author will deal with an inquiry of the ontological structure of quantum mechanics, and he will analyze the evolution of the heno-ontological equation (the identity of being one and of being) in the shape of the new arrangement prepared by the orthodox interpretation of the theory.Hence the article will particularly focus on the Copenhagen interpretation and the lack of intuition [Anschaulichkeit] in the representation of physical external objects; as far as the latter topic is concerned, the author will also consider the classic representation of Heisenberg's philosophy given by Heelan.The author will then show the impossibility of holding the old physical body-representation which worked for classical mechanics as well, because quantum mechanics denies an absolute localizability of physical entities.A non-defective determination of localizability was in fact the very postulate which lays at the basis of the heno-ontological equation as Aristotle had envisaged it: what is not localizable, is not one being.It also has to be considered a specific lack as regards the chronological permanence of the identity of the quantum object, which appears to be constantly modified by its interaction with the devices and with other particles.Accordingly, the author will explain the peculiar definition of physical entity in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics as a non-substantial entity, as a non-body, considering the argument that henceforth the actual substance, in physics, will be only the whole totality.Arguing about the latter point, the author will develop a definition of individuality which could not be extraneous to the most recent interpretations of quantum mechanics.He will indeed aim for a non strictly ontological definition of individuality, if one has to figure out the individuum as a body of daily experience.Rather than a body, the quantum individuum is almost a being whose ontological content is only relative to the transformations of a primitive context: this implies that his ontological charge cannot be considered permanent.From this point of view, one can argue that quantum mechanics is very close to the old representation of nature as being by the ancient Greek physicists, which tended to distinguish between the ontological definition of individual entities and the unity of being as a whole.Hence the article will show, through Cassirer's review, how it is possible to depict a new setting for the relationship between one and being, as well as trying to shed some light on the basic assumptions of the ontology of Copenhagen interpretation and of modern quantum mechanics.
The Copenhagen interpretation, which informs the textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, depends fundamentally on the notion of ontological wave-particle duality and a viewpoint called “complementarity.” In this paper, Bohr's own interpretation is traced in detail and is shown to be fundamentally different from and even opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation in virtually all its particulars. In particular, Bohr's interpretation avoids the ad hoc postulate of wave function ‘collapse’ that is central to the Copenhagen interpretation. The strengths and weakness of both interpretations are summarized.
This paper reexamines the EPR paradox through a logical separation of “prediction” and “observation.” Even when a conditional prediction supplied by quantum theory reaches probability 1, this fact alone does not imply that an observation event has occurred at a remote location or that a particular ontology holds for an unobserved quantity. When this distinction is generalized into a minimal rule against generating ontology without warrant from an observational formalism, the inference that depends on EPR’s criterion of reality can be stopped without introducing new dynamics or a superluminal mechanism. At the same time, correlations that resist local causal factorization, as manifested in violations of Bell inequalities, remain. Thus, EPR-type “instantaneous remote determination” need not be identified with Bell nonlocality. The paper further reconsiders the possibility of reading state collapse as conditioning on an observation outcome rather than as transport through spacetime, its relation to the invariance of the speed of light, Bohr’s response to EPR and the logical ambiguity of the Copenhagen interpretation, and Einstein’s ontological concerns. Finally, the problem is considered as a “renewed Kantian overreach of reason,” in which an overreach that had been constrained by modern science and Kantian critique reappears through the mediation of precise quantum formalism. AI Assistance DisclosureGenerative AI was used as an auxiliary tool in drafting, adjusting expressions, and organizing the structure of this paper. The author bears final responsibility for the text, claims, citations, and factual verification. Keywords: EPR paradox, prediction, observation, state collapse, Bell nonlocality, Copenhagen interpretation, ontology, Kant