International Conference on Communications
Combating full-duplex active eavesdropper: A game-theoretic perspective
Xiao Tang, Pinyi Ren, Zhu Han
Abstract
Security issue is of paramount importance yet significant challenge for wireless communications, and this problem can be even more intricate when facing with a full-duplex adversary. In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security of a legitimate transmission link in the presence of a full-duplex active eavesdropper, who is capable to perform eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously. The legitimate user aims at a target secrecy rate while the eavesdropper intends to maximize its wiretap rate. To this end, the eavesdropper imposes a jamming signal at the legitimate receiver to stimulate higher-power legitimate transmissions and thus facilitates its eavesdropping. This, however, generates residual self-interference at the eavesdropper itself and is subject to a linear price for the jamming power. The problem is then formulated within a game-theoretic framework, where the closed-form strategies of both the legitimate user and active eavesdropper are obtained. Moreover, we analyze the performance in terms of secrecy outage probability for the legitimate link in such a hostile situation. Also provided are the simulation results which validate our theoretical analysis.