Abstract. We introduce the notion of resource-fair protocols. Informally, this property states that if one party learns the output of the protocol, then so can all other parties, as long as they expend roughly the same amount of resources. As opposed to similar previously proposed definitions, our definition follows the standard simulation paradigm and enjoys strong composability properties. In particular, our definition is similar to the security definition in the universal composability (UC) framework, but works in a model that allows any party to request additional resources from the environment to deal with dishonest parties that may prematurely abort. In this model we specify the ideally fair functionality as allowing parties to “invest resources ” in return for outputs, but in such an event offering all other parties a fair deal. (The formulation of fair dealings is kept independent of any particular functionality, by defining it using a “wrapper.”) Thus, by relaxing the notion of fairness, we avoid a well-known impossibility result for fair multi-party computation with corrupted majority; in particular, our definition admits constructions that tolerate arbitrary number of corruptions. We also show that, as in the UC framework, protocols in our framework may be arbitrarily and concurrently composed. Turning to constructions, we define a “commit-prove-fair-open ” functionality and design an efficient resource-fair protocol that securely realizes it, using a new variant of a cryptographic primitive known as “timelines.” With (the fairly wrapped version of) this functionality we show that some of the existing secure multi-party computation protocols can be easily transformed into resource-fair protocols while preserving their security. 1
Abstract. We introduce the notion of resource-fair protocols. Informally, this property states that if one party learns the output of the protocol, then so can all other parties, as long as they expend roughly the same amount of resources. As opposed to similar previously proposed definitions, our definition follows the standard simulation paradigm and enjoys strong composability properties. In particular, our definition is similar to the security definition in the universal composability (UC) framework, but works in a model that allows any party to request additional resources from the environment to deal with dishonest parties that may prematurely abort. In this model we specify the ideally fair functionality as allowing parties to “invest resources ” in return for outputs, but in such an event offering all other parties a fair deal. (The formulation of fair dealings is kept independent of any particular functionality, by defining it using a “wrapper.”) Thus, by relaxing the notion of fairness, we avoid a well-known impossibility result for fair multi-party computation with corrupted majority; in particular, our definition admits constructions that tolerate arbitrary number of corruptions. We also show that, as in the UC framework, protocols in our framework may be arbitrarily and concurrently composed. Turning to constructions, we define a “commit-prove-fair-open ” functionality and design an efficient resource-fair protocol that securely realizes it, using a new variant of a cryptographic primitive known as “timelines.” With (the fairly wrapped version of) this functionality we show that some of the existing secure multi-party computation protocols can be easily transformed into resource-fair protocols while preserving their security. 1
We consider the problem of constructing secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols that are completely fair — meaning that either all the parties learn the output of the function, or nobody does — even when a majority of the parties are corrupted. We first propose a framework for fair multi-party computation (FMPC), within which we formulate a definition of secure and fair protocols. The definition follows the standard simulation paradigm, but is modified to allow the protocol to depend on the runing time of the adversary. In this way, we avoid a well-known impossibility result for fair MPC with corrupted majority; in particular, our definition admits constructions that tolerate up to (n− 1) corruptions, where n is the total number of parties. Next, we define a “commit-prove-fair-open” functionality and construct an efficient protocol that realizes it, using a new variant of a cryptographic primitive known as “time-lines.” With this functionality, we show that some of the existing secure MPC protocols can be easily transformed into fair protocols while preserving their security. Furthermore, these protocols remain secure when arbitrarily composed with any protocols, which means, in particular, that they are concurrently composable and non-malleable. This is joint work with Phil MacKenzie and Ke Yang.
In his seminal result, Cleve [STOC’86] established that secure distributed computation— guaranteeing fairness—is impossible in the presence of dishonest majorities. A generous number of proposals for relaxed notions of fairness ensued this seminal result, by weakening in various ways the desired security guarantees. While these works also suggest completeness results (i.e., the ability to design protocols which achieve their fairness notion), their assessment is typically of an all-or-nothing nature. That is, when presented with a protocol which is not designed to be fair according to their respective notion, they most likely would render it unfair and make no further statement about it. In this work we put forth a comparative approach to fairness. We present new intuitive notions that when presented with two arbitrary protocols, provide the means to answer the question “Which of the protocols is fairer? ” The basic idea is that we can use an appropriate utility function to express the preferences of an adversary who wants to break fairness. Thus, we can compare protocols with respect to how fair they are, placing them in a partial order according to this relative-fairness relation. After formulating such utility-based fairness notions, we turn to the question of finding optimal protocols—i.e., maximal elements in the above partial order. We investigate—and answer—this question for secure function evaluation, both in the two-party and multi-party settings. To our knowledge, the only other fairness notion providing some sort of comparative state-ment is that of 1/p-security (aka “partial fairness”) by Gordon and Katz [Eurocrypt’10]. We also show in this paper that for a special class of utilities our notion strictly implies 1/p-security. In addition, we fix a shortcoming of the definition which is exposed by our comparison, thus strengthening that result. Key words: Cryptographic protocols, secure multi-party computation, fairness, rational protocol design. 1
Abstract. The recently proposed universally composable (UC) security framework, for analyzing security of cryptographic protocols, provides very strong security guarantees. In particular, a protocol proven secure in this framework is guaranteed to maintain its security even when deployed in arbitrary multi-party, multi-protocol, multi-execution environments. Protocols for securely carrying out essentially any cryptographic task in a universally composable way exist, both in the case of an honest majority (in the plain model, i.e., without set-up assumptions) and in the case of no honest majority (in the common reference string model). However, in the plain model, little was known for the case of no honest majority and, in particular, for the important special case of two-party protocols. We study the feasibility of universally composable two-party function evaluation in the plain model. Our results show that very few functions can be computed in this model so as to provide the UC security guarantees. Specifically, for the case of deterministic functions, we provide a full characterization of the functions computable in this model. (Essentially, these are the functions that depend on at most one of the parties’ inputs, and furthermore are “efficiently invertible ” in a sense defined within.) For the case of probabilistic functions, we show that the only functions computable in this model are those where one of the parties can essentially uniquely determine the joint output. 1
We propose a novel paradigm for defining security of cryptographic protocols, called universally composable security. The salient property of universally composable definitions of security is that they guarantee security even when a secure protocol is composed of an arbitrary set of protocols, or more generally when the protocol is used as a component of an arbitrary system. This is an essential property for maintaining security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as the Internet. In particular, universally composable definitions guarantee security even when an unbounded number of protocol instances are executed concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner, they guarantee non-malleability with respect to arbitrary protocols, and more. We show how to formulate universally composable definitions of security for practically any cryptographic task. Furthermore, we demonstrate that practically any such definition can be realized using known techniques, as long as only a minority of the participants are corrupted. We then proceed to formulate universally composable definitions of a wide array of cryptographic tasks, including authenticated and secure communication, key-exchange, public-key encryption, signature, commitment, oblivious transfer, zero knowledge and more. We also make initial steps towards studying the realizability of the proposed definitions in various settings.
Security of distributed cryptographic protocols usually requires privacy (inputs of the honest parties remain hidden), correctness (the adversary cannot improperly affect the outcome), and fairness (if the adversary learns the output, all honest parties do also). Cleve's seminal result (STOC '86) implies that satisfying these properties simultaneously is impossible in the presence of dishonest majorities, and led to several proposals for relaxed notions of fairness. While these works also suggest completeness results (i.e., the ability to design protocols which achieve their fairness notion), their assessment is typically of an all-or-nothing nature. In this work we put forth a new approach for defining relaxed fairness guarantees that allows for a quantitative comparison between protocols with regard to the level of fairness they achieve. The basic idea is to use an appropriate utility function to express the preferences of an adversary who wants to violate fairness. We also show optimal protocols with respect to our notion, in both the two-party and multi-party settings.
We put forward a framework for the modular design and analysis of multi-party protocols. Our framework is called “GNUC ” (with the recursive meaning “GNUC’s Not UC”), already alluding to the similarity to Canetti’s Universal Composability (UC) framework. In particular, like UC, we offer a universal composition theorem, as well as a theorem for composing protocols with joint state. We deviate from UC in several important aspects. Specifically, we have a rather different view than UC on the structuring of protocols, on the notion of polynomial-time protocols and attacks, and on corruptions. We will motivate our definitional choices by explaining why the definitions in the UC framework are problematic, and how we overcome these problems. Our goal is to offer a framework that is largely compatible with UC, such that previous results formulated in UC carry over to GNUC with minimal changes. We exemplify this by giving explicit formulations for several important protocol tasks, including authenticated and secure communication, as well as commitment and secure function evaluation. 1