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Cambridge University Press eBooks

What's wrong with this pillow, April 1989

N. David Mermin

Published Jan 5, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Attitudes toward quantum mechanics differ interestingly from one generation of physicists to the next. The first generation are the founding fathers, who struggled through the welter of confusing and self-contradictory constructions to emerge with the modern theory of the atomic world and supply it with the “Copenhagen interpretation.” On the whole they seem to have taken the view that while the theory is extraordinarily strange (Bohr is said to have remarked that if it didn't make you dizzy then you didn't really understand it), the strangeness arises out of some deeply ingrained but invalid modes of thought. Once these are recognized and abandoned the theory makes sense in a perfectly straightforward way. The word “irrational,” which appears frequently in Bohr's early writings about the quantum theory, is almost entirely absent from his later essays. The second generation, those who were students of the founding fathers in the early postrevolutionary period, seem firmly—at times even ferociously—committed to the position that there is really nothing peculiar about the quantum world at all. Far from making bons mots about dizziness, or the opposite of deep truths being deep truths, they appear to go out of their way to make quantum mechanics sound as boringly ordinary as possible. The third generation—mine—were born a decade or so after the revolution and learned about the quantum as kids from popular books like George Gamow's. We seem to be much more relaxed about it than the other two. Few of us brood about what it all means, any more than we worry about how to define mass or time when we use classical mechanics. In contemplative moments some of us think the theory is wonderfully strange and others think it isn't; but we don't hold these views with great passion. Most of us, in fact, feel irritated, bored, or downright uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about quantum mechanics. I'm one of the uncomfortable ones. If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be “Shut up and calculate!” But I won't shut up. I would rather celebrate the strangeness of quantum theory than deny it, because I believe it still has interesting things to teach us about how certain powerful but flawed verbal and mental tools we once took for granted continue to infect our thinking in subtly hidden ways.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781139162579.005

Related papers

What's wrong with this pillow?

N. David Mermin

Attitudes toward quantum mechanics differ interestingly from one generation of physicists to the next. The first generation are the Founding Fathers, who struggled through the welter of confusing and self contradictory constructions to emerge with the modern theory of the atomic world and supply it with the “Copenhagen interpretation.” On the whole they seem to have taken the view that while the theory is extraordinarily strange (Bohr is said to have remarked that if it didn't make you dizzy then you didn't really understand it), the strangeness arises out of some deeply ingrained but invalid modes of thought. Once these are recognized and abandoned the theory makes sense in a perfectly straightforward way. The word “irrational”, which appears frequently in Bohr's early writings about the quantum theory, is almost entirely absent from his later essays. The second generation, those who were students with the Founding Fathers in the early post-revolutionary period, seem firmly – at times even ferociously – committed to the position that there is really nothing peculiar about the quantum world at all. Far from making bon mots about dizziness, or the opposite of deep truths being deep truths, they appear to go out of their way to make quantum mechanics sound as boringly ordinary as possible. The third generation – mine – were born a decade or so after the revolution and learned about the quantum as kids from popular books like George Gamow's. We seem to be much more relaxed about it than the other two. Few of us brood about what it all means, any more than we worry about how really to define mass or time when we use classical mechanics.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Mar 15, 1990•9 citations

Could Feynman Have Said This?

N. David Mermin

Fifteen years ago, I mused in a Reference Frame column on how different generations of physicists differed in the degree to which they thought that the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains a serious problem (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 42 4 1989 9 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2810963. April 1989, page 9 ). I declared myself to be among those who feel uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about the quantum theory, adding that "If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be "Shut up and calculate!"In the intervening years, I've come to hold a milder and more nuanced opinion of the Copenhagen view, but that should be the subject of another column. The subject of this one is the habit of misquotation or misattribution that afflicts our profession, a rather different example of which I pointed out a few months ago (February 2004, page 10).Given my capacity for intellectual development ("inconsistency," in the terminology deployed in the current American political season), it's fortunate that I've now reached an age at which I tend to forget about things I've written more than a few years ago. Indeed, I find it downright irritating when somebody asks me questions about papers I wrote a mere half dozen years ago, naively identifying me with the author of those ancient texts. Until quite recently, I had no memory of ever having written such a childishly brusque dismissal of such an exquisitely subtle point of view, much less of having published it in so widely read a venue.This amnesia, combined with the evolution in my thinking that had distanced me from my long forgotten words, may explain why I was initially somewhat puzzled by the slight sensation of discomfort that passed over me when, browsing the e-print archive earlier this year, I read a characterization of Max Born's probability rule as "the favorite ingredient of what has been nicknamed, after Feynman's famous dictum, the shut up and calculate interpretation of quantum mechanics."I yield to nobody in my admiration for Richard Feynman's aphorisms on the nature of quantum mechanics. Indeed, long ago I published a poem (Physics Today, April 1985, page 47) consisting of nothing more than a resetting as verse of a paragraph Feynman had written about his own attitude toward the quantum theory, in his now (but not then) famous article that launched the whole field of quantum computation. I like to think I have devoured everything Feynman ever wrote on the character of quantum mechanics. But while "shut up and calculate" sounded dimly familiar to me as a characterization of a certain interpretive stance, I couldn't recall where Feynman had written it. Mulling this over, a terrible thought began to dawn on me. Could it be that I myself had once used the phrase? If so, then it would appear that I had picked it up from something by Feynman, forgotten the source, and presented it as my own. Devastating!It was devastating because I have a horror of writing or uttering any witticism that is not original with me, unless I make it absolutely clear where and (if known) from whom I got it. I don't even like to tell jokes unless I've made them up myself. (I digress to offer you my favorite:Question: What is the difference between theoretical physics and mathematical physics? Answer: Theoretical physics is done by physicists who lack the necessary skills to do real experiments; mathematical physics is done by mathematicians who lack the necessary skills to do real mathematics. Mathematical physicists tend not to like this joke, but other physicists seem to. Nonphysicists, of course, are entirely immune to its charms.)So with growing trepidation, I searched through my past writings on quantum mechanics. I was dismayed when I came upon my 1989 column, which confirmed my worst fears. Not only had I appropriated without proper attribution a Feynman quote, but it appeared to be a famous one. How humiliating! I was afflicted with visions of knowledgeable Physics Today readers shaking their heads 15 years ago at what must have struck them as my shameless attempt to ride to literary glory on the unacknowledged shoulders of Feynman.So I went to the Web to find the source, hoping I could then salvage my reputation by persuading Physics Today to print an addendum or erratum. Google gives more than 130 hits containing both "shut up and calculate" and "feynman." Most of these do not directly link the two, but about a dozen do. Here are a few: "Shut up and calculate" was a motto of Richard Feynman.For example, there's Feynman's "shut up and calculate."My personal philosophy is that of the famous physicist Richard Feynman, who said: "Shut up and calculate."When asked which interpretation of QM he favored, Feynman replied "Shut up and calculate."Richard Feynman foreslog ligefrem en "shut up and calculate" fortolkning af kvantemekanikken.Shut up and calculate—Richard Feynman.Just to make sure, I also searched for "shut up and calculate" and "mermin." I found only 10 hits, all of them mentioning me in ways that had nothing to do with their use, elsewhere, of "shut up and calculate." So it would have been clear to the world that I had indeed passed off Feynman's words as my own.Or had I …?I noticed that not a single one of the Web sites attributing the phrase to Feynman cited a source or hinted at the circumstances under which he had said it. A ray of hope flickered on: Could I once again have become a victim of the Matthew effect?The Matthew effect was enunciated by the great sociologist of science, Robert Merton. 1 1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 Merton worked in those innocent days when sociologists were interested only in the behavior of scientists and not in the content of their science. (To be fair to contemporary sociologists of science, I should modify that last phrase to "and not in the manifestations of that behavior in the content of their science.") I first learned of the Matthew effect more than 20 years ago, on the occasion of my first and, perhaps until now, only, victimization at the hands of the New York Times.I learned the name for what the Times had done to me when I received a very nice note from P. W. Anderson in which he expressed his regret that the newspaper had given him exclusive credit for a nomenclatural advance that was entirely due to me. "A depressingly typical example of the Matthew effect" was how he characterized the misattribution. (I reported the entire history of this contretemps in these pages back in those dark ages [April 1981, page 46] before there were Reference Frame columns.) When I wrote back asking him what the Matthew effect was, he referred me to Merton.It was Merton who identified and named the tendency always to assign exclusive scientific credit to the most eminent among all the plausible candidates. At least I hope it was he, though I'm sure Merton, who invented many wonderful jokes himself, would have been delighted if the credit for it turned out to be misattributed to him. Merton named the effect after the Gospel According to Matthew, because there it is written, For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.—Matthew 25:29.Could the widespread attribution of my wretched witticism to Feynman be another instance of this same deplorable practice? Had I once again been matthewed?Although I didn't say so in my old Reference-Frame article, what inspired this not so terribly bon mot were vivid memories of the responses my conceptual inquiries elicited from my professors—whom I viewed as agents of Copenhagen—when I was first learning quantum mechanics as a graduate student at Harvard, a mere 30 years after the birth of the subject. "You'll never get a PhD if you allow yourself to be distracted by such frivolities," they kept advising me, "so get back to serious business and produce some results." "Shut up," in other words, "and calculate." And so I did, and probably turned out much the better for it. At Harvard, they knew how to administer tough love in those olden days.This bit of history is relevant to the question of whether Feynman's abundance might have been augmented by a portion of the little that I had. Can you imagine the young Feynman ever having had a similar experience that seared "shut up and calculate" into his tender consciousness? No, of course you can't! Nobody could ever have had the slightest reason to direct the best human calculator that ever was to shut up and calculate.But perhaps Feynman was offering such advice to others who were searching for a better understanding of the quantum mechanical formalism. I can't believe that. He said that he "always had a great deal of difficulty understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents," and added, "I still get nervous with it." 2 2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 Nobody who felt that way would ever respond with "shut up and calculate" to conceptual inquiries from the perplexed.Well maybe Feynman, like me, was merely dismissing an interpretive position of others by lampooning it as a "shut up and calculate interpretation." I find this unlikely. For one thing, his strong preference for working things out for himself and, of course, his well-known disdain for philosophy make me doubt that he ever paid much attention to the interpretive positions of others. For another, would one for whom calculation was so effortless and understanding so important be likely to translate anybody's admonition against fruitless speculation into such terms?In short, I suspect that it is only Feynman's habitual irreverence that has linked him in the minds of many to the phrase "shut up and calculate." Who else among the high and mighty—and Merton has taught us that it is only among the high and mighty that people tend to look—could have said it? Albert Einstein? Don't be silly. Erwin Schrödinger? Of course not. Niels Bohr? Don't make me laugh. None of them besides Feynman could have said it. Does that mean that Feynman said it? No!Broaden the search to embrace the low and powerless. Among them am I, who hereby put forth the hypothesis that I was the first to use "shut up and calculate" in the context of quantum foundations. I'm not proud of having said it. It's not a beautiful phrase. It's not very clever. It's snide and mindlessly dismissive. But, damn it, if I'm the one who said it first, then that means I did not, even unconsciously, appropriate the words of Richard Feynman and pass them off as my own. So I have nothing to be ashamed of other than having characterized the Copenhagen interpretation in such foolish terms—a lesser offense than unconscious plagiarism, in my moral bookkeeping.So, dear reader, if you have evidence that Feynman really did say "shut up and calculate," please send it to me. I will not be happy to receive it. I'd rather be a Matthew victim than a plagiarist. But I'd like to know the truth.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2004 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•May 1, 2004•133 citations

Could Feynman have said this? May 2004

N. David Mermin

Fifteen years ago, I mused in a Reference Frame column on how different generations of physicists differed in the degree to which they thought that the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains a serious problem. I declared myself to be among those who feel uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about the quantum theory, adding that “If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be ‘Shut up and calculate!’” In the intervening years, I've come to hold a milder and more nuanced opinion of the Copenhagen view, but that should be the subject of another column. The subject of this one is the habit of misquotation or misattribution that afflicts our profession, a rather different example of which I pointed out a few months ago. Given my capacity for intellectual development (“inconsistency,” in the terminology deployed in the current American political season), it's fortunate that I've now reached an age at which I tend to forget about things I've written more than a few years ago. Indeed, I find it downright irritating when somebody asks me questions about papers I wrote a mere half dozen years ago, naively identifying me with the author of those ancient texts. Until quite recently, I had no memory of ever having written such a childishly brusque dismissal of such an exquisitely subtle point of view, much less of having published it in so widely read a venue. This amnesia, combined with the evolution in my thinking that had distanced me from my long-forgotten words, may explain why I was initially somewhat puzzled by the slight sensation of discomfort that passed over me when, browsing the e-print archive earlier this year, I read a characterization of Max Born's probability rule as “the favorite ingredient of what has been nicknamed, after Feynman's famous dictum, the shut up and calculate interpretation of quantum mechanics.” I yield to nobody in my admiration for Richard Feynman's aphorisms on the nature of quantum mechanics. Indeed, long ago I published a poem consisting of nothing more than a resetting as verse of a paragraph Feynman had written about his own attitude toward the quantum theory, in his now (but not then) famous article that launched the whole field of quantum computation. I like to think I have devoured everything Feynman ever wrote on the character of quantum mechanics.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jan 5, 2016•0 citations

Historical perspective

Franck Laloë

The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 30, 2012•1 citation

A Midrash upon Quantum Mechanics

Dietrick E. Thomsen

The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.

Science News•Jul 11, 1987•1 citation

Quantum World Is Only Smoke and Mirrors

H. D. Zeh

David Mermin reported that nobody seems to know what Niels Bohr really said—or meant—or what the Copenhagen interpretation really is. I find that amusing. It appears typical for the confusion arising (necessarily?) from attempts to give Bohr’s ingenious pragmatism a consistent meaning.Could it be that three generations of physicists learned, accepted, and taught an ill-defined quantum theory, and that Einstein’s and Schrödinger’s reservations were justified—even though those two great men were not yet ready to accept a nonlocal (entangled) reality, as it is described by a general wave function? © 2004 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Oct 1, 2004•1 citation
Attitudes toward quantum mechanics differ interestingly from one generation of physicists to the next. The first generation are the founding fathers, who struggled through the welter of confusing and self-contradictory constructions to emerge with the modern theory of the atomic world and supply it with the “Copenhagen interpretation.” On the whole they seem to have taken the view that while the theory is extraordinarily strange (Bohr is said to have remarked that if it didn't make you dizzy then you didn't really understand it), the strangeness arises out of some deeply ingrained but invalid modes of thought. Once these are recognized and abandoned the theory makes sense in a perfectly straightforward way. The word “irrational,” which appears frequently in Bohr's early writings about the quantum theory, is almost entirely absent from his later essays. The second generation, those who were students of the founding fathers in the early postrevolutionary period, seem firmly—at times even ferociously—committed to the position that there is really nothing peculiar about the quantum world at all. Far from making bons mots about dizziness, or the opposite of deep truths being deep truths, they appear to go out of their way to make quantum mechanics sound as boringly ordinary as possible. The third generation—mine—were born a decade or so after the revolution and learned about the quantum as kids from popular books like George Gamow's. We seem to be much more relaxed about it than the other two. Few of us brood about what it all means, any more than we worry about how to define mass or time when we use classical mechanics. In contemplative moments some of us think the theory is wonderfully strange and others think it isn't; but we don't hold these views with great passion. Most of us, in fact, feel irritated, bored, or downright uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about quantum mechanics. I'm one of the uncomfortable ones. If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be “Shut up and calculate!” But I won't shut up. I would rather celebrate the strangeness of quantum theory than deny it, because I believe it still has interesting things to teach us about how certain powerful but flawed verbal and mental tools we once took for granted continue to infect our thinking in subtly hidden ways.
Attitudes toward quantum mechanics differ interestingly from one generation of physicists to the next. The first generation are the Founding Fathers, who struggled through the welter of confusing and self contradictory constructions to emerge with the modern theory of the atomic world and supply it with the “Copenhagen interpretation.” On the whole they seem to have taken the view that while the theory is extraordinarily strange (Bohr is said to have remarked that if it didn't make you dizzy then you didn't really understand it), the strangeness arises out of some deeply ingrained but invalid modes of thought. Once these are recognized and abandoned the theory makes sense in a perfectly straightforward way. The word “irrational”, which appears frequently in Bohr's early writings about the quantum theory, is almost entirely absent from his later essays. The second generation, those who were students with the Founding Fathers in the early post-revolutionary period, seem firmly – at times even ferociously – committed to the position that there is really nothing peculiar about the quantum world at all. Far from making bon mots about dizziness, or the opposite of deep truths being deep truths, they appear to go out of their way to make quantum mechanics sound as boringly ordinary as possible. The third generation – mine – were born a decade or so after the revolution and learned about the quantum as kids from popular books like George Gamow's. We seem to be much more relaxed about it than the other two. Few of us brood about what it all means, any more than we worry about how really to define mass or time when we use classical mechanics.
Fifteen years ago, I mused in a Reference Frame column on how different generations of physicists differed in the degree to which they thought that the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains a serious problem (Physics Today, Physics Today 0031-9228 42 4 1989 9 https://doi.org/10.1063/1.2810963. April 1989, page 9 ). I declared myself to be among those who feel uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about the quantum theory, adding that "If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be "Shut up and calculate!"In the intervening years, I've come to hold a milder and more nuanced opinion of the Copenhagen view, but that should be the subject of another column. The subject of this one is the habit of misquotation or misattribution that afflicts our profession, a rather different example of which I pointed out a few months ago (February 2004, page 10).Given my capacity for intellectual development ("inconsistency," in the terminology deployed in the current American political season), it's fortunate that I've now reached an age at which I tend to forget about things I've written more than a few years ago. Indeed, I find it downright irritating when somebody asks me questions about papers I wrote a mere half dozen years ago, naively identifying me with the author of those ancient texts. Until quite recently, I had no memory of ever having written such a childishly brusque dismissal of such an exquisitely subtle point of view, much less of having published it in so widely read a venue.This amnesia, combined with the evolution in my thinking that had distanced me from my long forgotten words, may explain why I was initially somewhat puzzled by the slight sensation of discomfort that passed over me when, browsing the e-print archive earlier this year, I read a characterization of Max Born's probability rule as "the favorite ingredient of what has been nicknamed, after Feynman's famous dictum, the shut up and calculate interpretation of quantum mechanics."I yield to nobody in my admiration for Richard Feynman's aphorisms on the nature of quantum mechanics. Indeed, long ago I published a poem (Physics Today, April 1985, page 47) consisting of nothing more than a resetting as verse of a paragraph Feynman had written about his own attitude toward the quantum theory, in his now (but not then) famous article that launched the whole field of quantum computation. I like to think I have devoured everything Feynman ever wrote on the character of quantum mechanics. But while "shut up and calculate" sounded dimly familiar to me as a characterization of a certain interpretive stance, I couldn't recall where Feynman had written it. Mulling this over, a terrible thought began to dawn on me. Could it be that I myself had once used the phrase? If so, then it would appear that I had picked it up from something by Feynman, forgotten the source, and presented it as my own. Devastating!It was devastating because I have a horror of writing or uttering any witticism that is not original with me, unless I make it absolutely clear where and (if known) from whom I got it. I don't even like to tell jokes unless I've made them up myself. (I digress to offer you my favorite:Question: What is the difference between theoretical physics and mathematical physics? Answer: Theoretical physics is done by physicists who lack the necessary skills to do real experiments; mathematical physics is done by mathematicians who lack the necessary skills to do real mathematics. Mathematical physicists tend not to like this joke, but other physicists seem to. Nonphysicists, of course, are entirely immune to its charms.)So with growing trepidation, I searched through my past writings on quantum mechanics. I was dismayed when I came upon my 1989 column, which confirmed my worst fears. Not only had I appropriated without proper attribution a Feynman quote, but it appeared to be a famous one. How humiliating! I was afflicted with visions of knowledgeable Physics Today readers shaking their heads 15 years ago at what must have struck them as my shameless attempt to ride to literary glory on the unacknowledged shoulders of Feynman.So I went to the Web to find the source, hoping I could then salvage my reputation by persuading Physics Today to print an addendum or erratum. Google gives more than 130 hits containing both "shut up and calculate" and "feynman." Most of these do not directly link the two, but about a dozen do. Here are a few: "Shut up and calculate" was a motto of Richard Feynman.For example, there's Feynman's "shut up and calculate."My personal philosophy is that of the famous physicist Richard Feynman, who said: "Shut up and calculate."When asked which interpretation of QM he favored, Feynman replied "Shut up and calculate."Richard Feynman foreslog ligefrem en "shut up and calculate" fortolkning af kvantemekanikken.Shut up and calculate—Richard Feynman.Just to make sure, I also searched for "shut up and calculate" and "mermin." I found only 10 hits, all of them mentioning me in ways that had nothing to do with their use, elsewhere, of "shut up and calculate." So it would have been clear to the world that I had indeed passed off Feynman's words as my own.Or had I …?I noticed that not a single one of the Web sites attributing the phrase to Feynman cited a source or hinted at the circumstances under which he had said it. A ray of hope flickered on: Could I once again have become a victim of the Matthew effect?The Matthew effect was enunciated by the great sociologist of science, Robert Merton. 1 1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 Merton worked in those innocent days when sociologists were interested only in the behavior of scientists and not in the content of their science. (To be fair to contemporary sociologists of science, I should modify that last phrase to "and not in the manifestations of that behavior in the content of their science.") I first learned of the Matthew effect more than 20 years ago, on the occasion of my first and, perhaps until now, only, victimization at the hands of the New York Times.I learned the name for what the Times had done to me when I received a very nice note from P. W. Anderson in which he expressed his regret that the newspaper had given him exclusive credit for a nomenclatural advance that was entirely due to me. "A depressingly typical example of the Matthew effect" was how he characterized the misattribution. (I reported the entire history of this contretemps in these pages back in those dark ages [April 1981, page 46] before there were Reference Frame columns.) When I wrote back asking him what the Matthew effect was, he referred me to Merton.It was Merton who identified and named the tendency always to assign exclusive scientific credit to the most eminent among all the plausible candidates. At least I hope it was he, though I'm sure Merton, who invented many wonderful jokes himself, would have been delighted if the credit for it turned out to be misattributed to him. Merton named the effect after the Gospel According to Matthew, because there it is written, For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.—Matthew 25:29.Could the widespread attribution of my wretched witticism to Feynman be another instance of this same deplorable practice? Had I once again been matthewed?Although I didn't say so in my old Reference-Frame article, what inspired this not so terribly bon mot were vivid memories of the responses my conceptual inquiries elicited from my professors—whom I viewed as agents of Copenhagen—when I was first learning quantum mechanics as a graduate student at Harvard, a mere 30 years after the birth of the subject. "You'll never get a PhD if you allow yourself to be distracted by such frivolities," they kept advising me, "so get back to serious business and produce some results." "Shut up," in other words, "and calculate." And so I did, and probably turned out much the better for it. At Harvard, they knew how to administer tough love in those olden days.This bit of history is relevant to the question of whether Feynman's abundance might have been augmented by a portion of the little that I had. Can you imagine the young Feynman ever having had a similar experience that seared "shut up and calculate" into his tender consciousness? No, of course you can't! Nobody could ever have had the slightest reason to direct the best human calculator that ever was to shut up and calculate.But perhaps Feynman was offering such advice to others who were searching for a better understanding of the quantum mechanical formalism. I can't believe that. He said that he "always had a great deal of difficulty understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents," and added, "I still get nervous with it." 2 2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 Nobody who felt that way would ever respond with "shut up and calculate" to conceptual inquiries from the perplexed.Well maybe Feynman, like me, was merely dismissing an interpretive position of others by lampooning it as a "shut up and calculate interpretation." I find this unlikely. For one thing, his strong preference for working things out for himself and, of course, his well-known disdain for philosophy make me doubt that he ever paid much attention to the interpretive positions of others. For another, would one for whom calculation was so effortless and understanding so important be likely to translate anybody's admonition against fruitless speculation into such terms?In short, I suspect that it is only Feynman's habitual irreverence that has linked him in the minds of many to the phrase "shut up and calculate." Who else among the high and mighty—and Merton has taught us that it is only among the high and mighty that people tend to look—could have said it? Albert Einstein? Don't be silly. Erwin Schrödinger? Of course not. Niels Bohr? Don't make me laugh. None of them besides Feynman could have said it. Does that mean that Feynman said it? No!Broaden the search to embrace the low and powerless. Among them am I, who hereby put forth the hypothesis that I was the first to use "shut up and calculate" in the context of quantum foundations. I'm not proud of having said it. It's not a beautiful phrase. It's not very clever. It's snide and mindlessly dismissive. But, damn it, if I'm the one who said it first, then that means I did not, even unconsciously, appropriate the words of Richard Feynman and pass them off as my own. So I have nothing to be ashamed of other than having characterized the Copenhagen interpretation in such foolish terms—a lesser offense than unconscious plagiarism, in my moral bookkeeping.So, dear reader, if you have evidence that Feynman really did say "shut up and calculate," please send it to me. I will not be happy to receive it. I'd rather be a Matthew victim than a plagiarist. But I'd like to know the truth.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<CITING ARTICLES1. R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56 (1968). https://doi.org/10.1126/science.159.3810.56 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI2. R. P. Feynman, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21, 471 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02650179 , Google ScholarCrossref, ISI© 2004 American Institute of Physics.
Fifteen years ago, I mused in a Reference Frame column on how different generations of physicists differed in the degree to which they thought that the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains a serious problem. I declared myself to be among those who feel uncomfortable when asked to articulate what we really think about the quantum theory, adding that “If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen interpretation says to me, it would be ‘Shut up and calculate!’” In the intervening years, I've come to hold a milder and more nuanced opinion of the Copenhagen view, but that should be the subject of another column. The subject of this one is the habit of misquotation or misattribution that afflicts our profession, a rather different example of which I pointed out a few months ago. Given my capacity for intellectual development (“inconsistency,” in the terminology deployed in the current American political season), it's fortunate that I've now reached an age at which I tend to forget about things I've written more than a few years ago. Indeed, I find it downright irritating when somebody asks me questions about papers I wrote a mere half dozen years ago, naively identifying me with the author of those ancient texts. Until quite recently, I had no memory of ever having written such a childishly brusque dismissal of such an exquisitely subtle point of view, much less of having published it in so widely read a venue. This amnesia, combined with the evolution in my thinking that had distanced me from my long-forgotten words, may explain why I was initially somewhat puzzled by the slight sensation of discomfort that passed over me when, browsing the e-print archive earlier this year, I read a characterization of Max Born's probability rule as “the favorite ingredient of what has been nicknamed, after Feynman's famous dictum, the shut up and calculate interpretation of quantum mechanics.” I yield to nobody in my admiration for Richard Feynman's aphorisms on the nature of quantum mechanics. Indeed, long ago I published a poem consisting of nothing more than a resetting as verse of a paragraph Feynman had written about his own attitude toward the quantum theory, in his now (but not then) famous article that launched the whole field of quantum computation. I like to think I have devoured everything Feynman ever wrote on the character of quantum mechanics.
The founding fathers of quantum mechanics had already perceived the essence of the difficulties of quantum mechanics; today, after almost a century, the discussions are still lively and, if some very interesting new aspects have emerged, at a deeper level the questions have not changed so much. What is more recent, nevertheless, is a general change of attitude among physicists: until about 1970 or 1980, most physicists thought that the essential questions had been settled, and that “Bohr was right and proved his opponents to be wrong”. This was probably a consequence of the famous discussions between Bohr, Einstein, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Pauli, de Broglie, and others (in particular at the Solvay meetings [1–3], where Bohr's point of view had successfully resisted Einstein's extremely clever attacks). The majority of physicists did not know the details of the arguments. They nevertheless thought that the standard “Copenhagen interpretation” had clearly emerged from the infancy of quantum mechanics as the only sensible attitude for good scientists. This interpretation includes the idea that modern physics must contain indeterminacy as an essential ingredient: it is fundamentally impossible to predict the outcome of single microscopical events; it is impossible to go beyond the formalism of the wave function (or its generalization, the state vector ∣ψ) and complete it.
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
David Mermin reported that nobody seems to know what Niels Bohr really said—or meant—or what the Copenhagen interpretation really is. I find that amusing. It appears typical for the confusion arising (necessarily?) from attempts to give Bohr’s ingenious pragmatism a consistent meaning.Could it be that three generations of physicists learned, accepted, and taught an ill-defined quantum theory, and that Einstein’s and Schrödinger’s reservations were justified—even though those two great men were not yet ready to accept a nonlocal (entangled) reality, as it is described by a general wave function? © 2004 American Institute of Physics.