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Wiley eBooks

Introduction to Cryptographic Protocols

Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier, Tadayoshi Kohno

Published Oct 6, 2015• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Cryptographic protocols consist of an exchange of messages between participants. Creating secure protocols is challenging. The main problem is that as the designer or implementer has no control over their behavior. This chapter discusses trust, the incentive structure, cryptographic protocols, and messages and steps. Trust is the ultimate basis for all dealings that we have with other people. The incentive structure is another fundamental component of any analysis of a protocol. The function of cryptographic protocols is to minimize the amount of trust required. The function of cryptographic protocols is to minimize the amount of trust required. A typical protocol description consists of a number of messages that are sent between the participants of the protocol and a description of the computations that each participant has to do. Almost all protocol descriptions are done at a very high level.

DOI
10.1002/9781118722367.ch13

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Cryptographic protocols consist of an exchange of messages between participants. Creating secure protocols is challenging. The main problem is that as the designer or implementer has no control over their behavior. This chapter discusses trust, the incentive structure, cryptographic protocols, and messages and steps. Trust is the ultimate basis for all dealings that we have with other people. The incentive structure is another fundamental component of any analysis of a protocol. The function of cryptographic protocols is to minimize the amount of trust required. The function of cryptographic protocols is to minimize the amount of trust required. A typical protocol description consists of a number of messages that are sent between the participants of the protocol and a description of the computations that each participant has to do. Almost all protocol descriptions are done at a very high level.
This chapter explains the elements of key exchange, specifically the steps in a key exchange protocol, the parties that are involved and the messages which may be sent. It details key exchange security models and protocols, considering first the simpler case of unauthenticated key exchange before turning to authenticated protocols. The chapter deals with key exchange protocols designed to be secure against a passive adversary. It examines that unauthenticated protocols may be used as building blocks for authenticated key exchange protocols. Key exchange protocols that allow parties to verify the identity of other participating parties are called authenticated key exchange protocols. Key exchange has a long history and a vast literature, yet remains a very active research area with significant practical impact. It is inevitable that as new computational assumptions emerge as the basis for cryptographic security, so will their use in key exchange be relevant.
Existing work on "rational cryptographic protocols" treats each party (or coalition of parties) running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a fundamentally different approach that is better suited to modeling a protocol under attack from an external entity. Specifically, we consider a two-party game between an protocol designer and an external attacker. The goal of the attacker is to break security properties such as correctness or privacy, possibly by corrupting protocol participants; the goal of the protocol designer is to prevent the attacker from succeeding. We lay the theoretical groundwork for a study of cryptographic protocol design in this setting by providing a methodology for defining the problem within the traditional simulation paradigm. Our framework provides ways of reasoning about important cryptographic concepts (e.g., adaptive corruptions or attacks on communication resources) not handled by previous game-theoretic treatments of cryptography. We also prove composition theorems that-for the first time-provide a sound way to design rational protocols assuming "ideal communication resources" (such as broadcast or authenticated channels) and then instantiate these resources using standard cryptographic tools. Finally, we investigate the problem of secure function evaluation in our framework, where the attacker has to pay for each party it corrupts. Our results demonstrate how knowledge of the attacker's incentives can be used to circumvent known impossibility results in this setting.
This chapter is concerned with cryptographic protocols. We begin with an explanation of what components a cryptographic protocol consists of. We then illustrate the complexity of designing a secure cryptographic protocol by considering an artificially simple scenario, for which we propose and analyse seven candidate protocols. For each of these protocols, we comment on whether, or under which conditions, they meet the required specification. We go on to look at the important class of authentication and key establishment protocols. We identify typical goals and examine some important protocols in this class, including the Diffie–Hellman protocol.
The original cryptographic problem is for Alice and Bob to have a conversation using some insecure communications channel, but preventing Eve both from eavesdropping and in and improper manner tampering with their conversation. This chapter develops the theory of messaging protocols, which is the answer to the original cryptographic problem. The chapter develops a framework for messaging protocols and related security notions. The framework also captures symmetric key channels as a special case. The chapter in particular analyses compositional constructions based on key exchange protocols and channels. The results provides solid solutions for the original cryptographic problem. The chapter also investigates stronger notions of security for messaging protocols, including a design based on role-symmetric key exchange. One important societal goal is to defend against mass surveillance. While cryptography cannot solve this problem on its own, this chapter discusses techniques for preventing messaging protocols from making mass surveillance trivial.
Broadly speaking, cryptography is the problem of doing communication or computation involving two or more parties who may not trust one another. The best known cryptographic problem is the transmission of secret messages. Suppose wish to communicate in secret. For example, you may wish to give your credit card number to a merchant in exchange for goods, hopefully without any malevolent third party intercepting your credit card number. The way this is done is to use a cryptographic protocol. The most important distinction is between private key cryptosystems and public key cryptosystems.
A cryptosystem is a collection of algorithms used to securely encrypt or decrypt messages by transforming plaintext to ciphertext. The abbreviation “cryptosystem” stands for “cryptographic system” and designates a computer system that employs cryptography, a technique for securing electronic information so only authorized users may read and process it. Prototype quantum cryptography devices are now securing Internet traffic in the nation's largest cities. The third and final major development in the evolution of cryptography in the 20th century might be regarded as quantum key distribution i.e. QKD or quantum cryptography. The level of security of the cryptographic scheme depends on the key employed. A secure message, such as a credit card number or other sensitive information, is sent over the internet using cryptosystems. For instance, a platform for secured electronic mail might incorporate key management procedures, strong cryptographic functions, and digital signature systems. Another use of cryptography may be a secure electronic mail system that uses key management procedures, cryptographic hash functions, and digital signature mechanisms. The following is a breakdown of the chapter's structure. The fundamentals of classical cryptography, symmetric and asymmetric encryption are described in Section 14.1. The principle of quantum cryptography is presented in Section 14.2. The Quantum Key Distribution Protocols are discussed in Section 14.3. The impact of the sifting and distillation steps on the key size is Section 14.4, crypt-analysis in Section 14.5, Quantum Key Distribution in the real world and conclusions are discussed in Section 14.6.