Now I shall try to give you an idea of the way in which physicists at present endeavour to overcome this failure. One might term it an ‘emergency exit’, though it was not intended as such, but as a new theory. I mean, of course, wave mechanics. (Edding-ton called it ‘not a physical theory but a dodge— and a very good dodge too’.) The situation is about as follows. The observed facts (about particles and light and all sorts of radiation and their mutual interaction) appear to be repugnant to the classical ideal of a continuous description in space and time. (Let me explain myself to the physicist by hinting at one example: Bohr's famous theory of spectral lines in 1913 had to assume that the atom makes a sudden transition from one state into another state, and that in doing so it emits a train of light waves several feet long, containing hundreds of thousands of waves and requiring for its formation a considerable time. No information about the atom during this transition can be offered.) So the facts of observation are irreconcilable with a continuous description in space and time; it just seems impossible, at least in many cases. On the other hand, from an incomplete description—from a picture with gaps in space and time—one cannot draw clear and unambiguous conclusions; it leads to hazy, arbitrary, unclear thinking—and that is the thing we must avoid at all costs! What is to be done?
Now I shall try to give you an idea of the way in which physicists at present endeavour to overcome this failure. One might term it an ‘emergency exit’, though it was not intended as such, but as a new theory. I mean, of course, wave mechanics. (Edding-ton called it ‘not a physical theory but a dodge— and a very good dodge too’.) The situation is about as follows. The observed facts (about particles and light and all sorts of radiation and their mutual interaction) appear to be repugnant to the classical ideal of a continuous description in space and time. (Let me explain myself to the physicist by hinting at one example: Bohr's famous theory of spectral lines in 1913 had to assume that the atom makes a sudden transition from one state into another state, and that in doing so it emits a train of light waves several feet long, containing hundreds of thousands of waves and requiring for its formation a considerable time. No information about the atom during this transition can be offered.) So the facts of observation are irreconcilable with a continuous description in space and time; it just seems impossible, at least in many cases. On the other hand, from an incomplete description—from a picture with gaps in space and time—one cannot draw clear and unambiguous conclusions; it leads to hazy, arbitrary, unclear thinking—and that is the thing we must avoid at all costs! What is to be done?
Now I shall try to give you an idea of the way in which physicists at present endeavour to overcome this failure. One might term it an ‘emergency exit’, though it was not intended as such, but as a new theory. I mean, of course, wave mechanics. (Eddington called it ‘not a physical theory but a dodge—and a very good dodge too’.) The situation is about as follows. The observed facts (about particles and light and all sorts of radiation and their mutual interaction) appear to be repugnant to the classical ideal of a continuous description in space and time. (Let me explain myself to the physicist by hinting at one example: Bohr's famous theory of spectral lines in 1913 had to assume that the atom makes a sudden transition from one state into another state, and that in doing so it emits a train of light waves several feet long, containing hundreds of thousands of waves and requiring for its formation a considerable time. No information about the atom during this transition can be offered.) So the facts of observation are irreconcilable with a continuous description in space and time 5 it just seems impossible, at least in many cases.
Introduction When I was a student I had much difficulty with quantum mechanics. It was comforting to find that even Einstein had had such difficulties for a long time. Indeed they had led him to the heretical conclusion that something was missing in the theory: ‘I am, in fact, rather firmly convinced that the essentially statistical character of contemporary quantum theory is solely to be ascribed to the fact that this (theory) operates with an incomplete description of physical systems.’ More explicitly, in ‘a complete physical description, the statistical quantum theory would … take an approximately analogous position to the statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics …’. Einstein did not seem to know that this possibility, of peaceful coexistence between quantum statistical predictions and a more complete theoretical description, had been disposed of with great rigour by J. von Neumann. I myself did not know von Neumann's demonstration at first hand, for at that time it was available only in German, which I could not read. However I knew of it from the beautiful book by Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance , which was in fact one of the highlights of my physics education. Discussing how physics might develop Born wrote: ‘I expect … that we shall have to sacrifice some current ideas and to use still more abstract methods. However these are only opinions.
The difficulties of the old quantum theory were largely dispelled by the development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s. First Heisenberg (1925) developed the rather abstract matrix mechanics and soon after Schro¨dinger (1926; see also Eckart, 1926) developed the physically more appealing wave mechanics. Subsequently he showed them to be mathematically equivalent. The physicists were greatly relieved; now they had once again a mathematical formalism that enabled the results of experiments to be calculated. It was possible to move forward. It is certainly a very elegant and indeed beautiful formalism, and does enable the results of many physical measurements to be calculated with great accuracy. It is used daily by atomic and nuclear physicists; there is no other way to make calculations. From the earliest days there has been intense debate about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and it shows no signs of being settled; if anything it is becoming more intense over the years. As Penrose has remarked, no one understands quantum mechanics. Feynman (1967; see also Sykes, 1994) also admitted that ‘nobody understands quantum mechanics’, and Einstein once remarked: ‘I have thought a hundred times as much about the quantum problems as I have about general relativity theory’ (Pais, 1994, p. 57). It should therefore be evident that the most that can be done here is to try to show where the real difficulties lie, and how the failure to recognize that quantum mechanics is an essentially statistical theory has led to a series of confusing quantum paradoxes. It is just these paradoxes that have often been used to support theological speculations. It is useful to ask what ‘understanding quantum mechanics’ actually means. Certainly it means being able to calculate the results of many measurements. The same applies to Newton’s theory of gravitation, which we understand in the sense that we can use it as a basis of calculation, although we do not really understand the gravitational force itself. Very often, especially in modern physics, the mathematical formalism does not give us the sort of intuitive physical feeling for what is going on that we often obtain from classical mechanics. Perhaps we can never achieve more than this for quantum mechanics. In classical mechanics we can assume that a property that is measured objectively exists prior to the interaction of the measuring apparatus with the observed system. Quantum mechanics, however, ‘is incompatible with the proposition that measurement discovers some unknown but pre-existing property’ (Peres, 1997, p. 14). There is an important distinction between mysteries and absurdities. We may be forced to live with mysteries, but there is no reason why we should put up with absurdities such as the wave-particle duality, tunnelling through potential barriers, acausal events and the collapse of the wave function. These are the quantum paradoxes that will be discussed later on. They arise within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics and are solved by other interpretations. These alternative interpretations enable us to make conjectures about what is going on, even though we cannot understand it in detail. This is acceptable and a stimulus to further research. It is certainly difficult enough to understand quantum mechanics, but there is no need to try to visualize logical absurdities in the effort to do so. Quantum mechanics is a mathematical formalism that makes it possible to calculate the results of some experiments. Anything more than this, such as questions about the interpretation of what is measured and whether it tells us what is actually going on in the system being studied, belongs to philosophy. Thus we are concerned here with what is essentially a philosophical debate; if it were just a matter of physics the debate would have been settled long ago. One of the difficulties is that it invokes the results of experiments and uses the language of quantum mechanics. Inevitably this language uses philosophical terms and then it is easy to give the impression that the philosophical propositions are in some way entailed by the physical results. These in turn can influence theological thinking. In order to be quite clear which arguments are justified and which are not, it is essential to separate the three levels of discourse: physical, philosophical and theological. Our task is to relate these together, and this immediately raises the traditional problems of the philosophy of science, including the relation of experiment to theory, and of theory to explanation. We begin by discussing experiments, distinguishing between those that are real and those that are imaginary.
The new physics just described was still based largely on Newtonian ideas. Indeed, in its theoretical aspects, it might not unfairly be described as a final attempt to explain the world in materialistic terms—as particles being pushed and pulled about in space and time. Nevertheless, the new physics had found it necessary to abolish most of the forces of pushing and pulling, replacing the gradual changes of motion of the particles under these forces by sudden and unpredictable jumps. These appeared to involve violations of the law of causality, both in the disintegration of radioactive atoms and also in the internal changes of ordinary atoms. We seemed to see Fate defying this law as she picked out certain atoms for disintegration or collapse and, by her apparently capricious acts, sent the universe along one path or another according to her whim. On such lines the new physics had explained many phenomena which had hitherto seemed inexplicable, but it had by no means met with complete success. For instance, while it gave a perfect interpretation of the simplest spectrum of all, namely that of the hydrogen atom, it failed with more complex spectra. This was not necessarily a fatal objection; a few emendations and possibly a few new ad hoc assumptions might have effected a complete reconciliation, although this seems improbable.
Abstract It will probably be agreed that among all the recent developments of the quantum theory, one of the least satisfactory is the theory of radiation. The present paper is intended as a preliminary to a new line of attack on the subject. It was begun some time ago, but owing to lack of success in carrying it to a conclusion, its publication has been much delayed. In the meantime other papers have appeared, which in some respects follow the same train of thought. The authors of these works have carried their methods further in some directions than I have attempted, but there is still perhaps room for the discussion of a number of questions from the rather different point of view adopted here. 1. The main principle of the present work is the idea that, since matter and light both possess the dual characters of particle and wave, a similar mathematical treatment ought to be applied to both, and that this has not yet bee done as fully as should be possible. Whereas we have a fairly complete calculus for dealing with the behaviour of any number of electrons or atoms, for photons the existing processes are much less satisfactory. The central difficulty, which makes it hard to apply the ordinary methods of wave mechanics to light, is the fact that (at least according to our present ideas) photons can be created and annihilated, and to represent this in a wave system we have to be able to think of a medium suddenly coming into existence and then going out again, when the light that it was carrying is absorbed. Such behaviour is a grave difficulty in the way of allowing us to think of the photon as a wave, and tends to make us think with more favour of its particle aspect, until we recall that after all it is quite unlike any known particle to come into existence and later to disappear without trace. The theories at present current, such as that of Heisenberg and Pauli, avoid these difficulties because they are mainly formal generalisations of the classical theory; this frees them from the above difficulties, but they pay for it in being highly abstract, and, as it has turned out, rather unsuccessful.
In a period when a limited domain of physical phenomena is exciting wide fervent interest and commanding intensive study, and continues for years to monopolize the attention of many brilliant theorists, sometimes it is the fortune of an ingenious mind to express or interpret or picture the already-discovered laws in a new way which makes so greatly favourable an impression, that in a moment it sweeps its rivals from the field. The new theory may not lead to more or better agreements with experience than did its predecessors; it need not make predictions which they were incapable of making; its mathematical processes may be identical with theirs, the old symbols reappearing with new names in the old equations. Contrariwise it may be born well endowed with these advantages which normally decide the contest between old theories and new, yet owe its victory not to them at all. It triumphs because it seems natural or sensible or reasonable or elegant or beautiful-words said of a theory which fulfils some deep-seated demand or evades some deep-rooted prejudice in the minds of its judges. Later its vogue may pass, not through the disclosure of any intrinsic defect, but because the physicists of the rising generation do not share the prejudices and the predilections of those who first applauded it. The kinetic theory of gases was welcomed by a generation which wished to believe in atoms; the electromagnetic theory by people prejudiced against the notion of action at a distance; the quantum-theory has always had to do battle against those who yearn for continuity in their images of Nature, and the theory to which these pages are devoted has captivated the world of physics in a few brief months because it seems to promise a fulfilment of that long-baffled and insuppressible desire.