February 2000, “The Quantum View” What a really nice article! I read it once this evening with dinner (at a place that served grilled chicken – not so easy to scroll through a computer screen under those conditions!). Now, with my jetlag in distinct control – its 3:30 AM for me – let me read it again and make a few comments here and there. (I just arrived in Haifa yesterday for a visit with Asher Peres; I'll be here a little over a week.) Why don't you write the following for your requested reference: C. A. Fuchs, “The Structure of Quantum Information,” available at […] [Of course, it is no longer available. Instead, see note to Carl Caves, dated 21 December 1997.] I like this view of physics as being like a jig-saw puzzle. Note a typo in this paragraph: you misspelled de Broglie. Ruskai-ism 1: As far as I am aware, there is no evidence that either Heisenberg or Schrödinger was motivated by political or social factors . Actually there is a pretty strong case that these two guys were indeed quite motivated by cultural factors to find an indeterministic element in physics. And that was long before quantum mechanics took a final form. Two important articles to read in this regard are: P. Forman, “Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918–1927: Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual Environment,” in Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, Vol. 3 , edited by R. McCormmach (U. Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1971), pp. 1–115. […]
February 2000, “The Quantum View” What a really nice article! I read it once this evening with dinner (at a place that served grilled chicken – not so easy to scroll through a computer screen under those conditions!). Now, with my jetlag in distinct control – its 3:30 AM for me – let me read it again and make a few comments here and there. (I just arrived in Haifa yesterday for a visit with Asher Peres; I'll be here a little over a week.) Why don't you write the following for your requested reference: C. A. Fuchs, “The Structure of Quantum Information,” available at […] [Of course, it is no longer available. Instead, see note to Carl Caves, dated 21 December 1997.] I like this view of physics as being like a jig-saw puzzle. Note a typo in this paragraph: you misspelled de Broglie. Ruskai-ism 1: As far as I am aware, there is no evidence that either Heisenberg or Schrödinger was motivated by political or social factors . Actually there is a pretty strong case that these two guys were indeed quite motivated by cultural factors to find an indeterministic element in physics. And that was long before quantum mechanics took a final form. Two important articles to read in this regard are: P. Forman, “Weimar Culture, Causality, and Quantum Theory, 1918–1927: Adaptation by German Physicists and Mathematicians to a Hostile Intellectual Environment,” in Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, Vol. 3 , edited by R. McCormmach (U. Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1971), pp. 1–115. […]
On 25 March 1935, the Physical Review received a paper from Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, with the title “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” A few days later, on 30 March 1935, I was born. My life with Einstein was off to a promising start. Some would call it an inauspicious start. Abraham Pais, for example, says in his otherwise admirable biography of Einstein [1] that “the only part of this article that will ultimately survive, I believe, is this last phrase [ No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this ], which so poignantly summarizes Einstein's views on quantum mechanics in his later years.” But today, in this centenary of the Einstein annus mirabilis, as the EPR paper and I both turn 70, it is, in fact, the most cited of all Einstein's papers [2]. The debate over its conceptual implications rages hotter than ever, and for the first time, practical (well, for the moment still gedanken practical) applications of the EPR effect have emerged in cryptography and in other areas of quantum information processing. Being only five weeks old, I was unprepared to pay attention to the article that appeared in the New York Times on 4 May 1935 under an elaborate set of headlines and subheads: And I was completely oblivious to the stern rebuke from Einstein himself, published three days later in the Times , which declared that “any information upon which the article … is based was given to you without my authority. It is my invariable practice to discuss scientific matters only in the appropriate forum and I deprecate advance publication of any announcement in regard to such matters in the secular press.” Apparently Podolsky had tipped off the Times to the article, which did not appear in the sacred press until the 15 May issue of Physical Review. It is not clear that Einstein ever forgave him, and I wish I had been old enough to send Podolsky a cross letter myself. Anyone growing up in America in the 1940s knew that the preeminent genius of our age, and perhaps of any other, lived in Princeton, New Jersey, had a predilection for baggy sweaters, and was always badly in need of a haircut—as far ahead of his time in dress and grooming as he was ahead in science during his 1905 annus mirabilis.
In The Conceptual Development of Quantum Physics, Max Jammer observes that “certain philosophical ideas of the late nineteenth century not only prepared the intellectual climate for, but contributed decisively to, the formation of the new conceptions of the modern quantum theory”—specifically, “contingentism, existentialism, pragmatism, and logical empiricism,” which, argues Jammer “united in rejecting causality though on different grounds” and “prepared, so to speak, the philosophical background for modern quantum mechanics.” Regarding this same rejection of causality in physics in Weimar Germany—a rejection central to the quantum interpretation—Paul Forman argues that “substantive problems in atomic physics played only a secondary role in the genesis of this acausal persuasion, [and] that the most important factor was the social-intellectual pressure exerted upon the physicists as members of the German academic community.” Along these same lines, in an interview with Einstein in 1932, James Gardner Murphy said, “scientists live in the world just like other people…. They cannot escape the influence of the milieu in which they live. And that milieu at the present time is characterized largely by a struggle to get rid of the causal chain in which the world has entangled itself.” In all of these cases, the development of quantum physics is attributed to the zeitgeist of the time, with the critics adopting a “hypodermic” model wherein intellectual currents have a direct influence on scientific discovery.
In his article entitled Weimar Culture; Causality and Quantum Theory, 1918- 1927: Adaptation by German Physicists to a Hostile Intellectual Environment, Paul Forman intended to depict a history of the old quantum mechanics according to which contemporary cultural influence turned out to be decisive in the introduction, acceptance and assimilation of acausality within the theory? These statements known as the Forman thesis are placed in historiographic perspective; i.e. their importance is shown using the framework provided by the characteristic tensions of historiography and philosophy of science. It is argued that the dilemma of determinism is essential in this discussion. Finally, a brief critical review of the Forman thesis is offered emphasizing some of its major weaknesses not previously discussed in the literature
What does not satisfy me in that theory [quantum mechanics], from the standpoint of principle, is its attitude towards that which appears to me to be the programmatic aim of all physics: the complete description of any (individual) real situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or substantiation). Albert Einstein, Reply to Criticisms [This] implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena appear . In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its proper expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement introducing new possibilities of interaction between objects and measuring instruments which in principle cannot be controlled. Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the objects. Indeed the finite interaction between object and measuring agencies conditioned by the very existence of the quantum of action entails – because of the impossibility of controlling the reaction of the object on the measuring instruments, if these are to serve their purpose – the necessity of a final renunciation of the classical idea of causality and a radical revision of our attitude towards the problem of physical reality. […]