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SpringerBriefs in physics

Bell's Theorem and Quantum Realism

Douglas L. Hemmick, Asif M. Shakur

Published Sep 30, 2011• 52 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-23468-2

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Commonsense local realism refutes Bell’s theorem

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With Bell (1964) and his EPR-based mathematics contradicted by experiments, at least one step in his supposedly commonsense theorem must be false. Defining commonsense local realism as the fusion of local-causality (no causal influence propagates superluminally) and physical-realism (some physical properties change interactively), we eliminate all such contradictions and make EPR correlations intelligible by completing the quantum mechanical account in a classical way. Thus refuting the famous inequality at the heart of Bell's mathematics, we show that Bell's theorem is limited by Bell's use of naive realism. Validating the classical mantra that correlated tests on correlated things produce correlated results without mystery, we conclude that Bell's theorem and related experiments negate naive realism, not commonsense local realism.

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With Bell (1964) and his EPR-based mathematics contradicted by experiments, at least one step in his supposedly commonsense theorem must be false. Defining commonsense local realism as the fusion of local-causality (no causal influence propagates superluminally) and physical-realism (some physical properties change interactively), we eliminate all such contradictions and make EPR correlations intelligible by completing the quantum mechanical account in a classical way. Thus refuting the famous inequality at the heart of Bell's mathematics, we show that Bell's theorem is limited by Bell's use of naive realism. Validating the classical mantra that correlated tests on correlated things produce correlated results without mystery, we conclude that Bell's theorem and related experiments negate naive realism, not commonsense local realism.