Metaphysical Interpretations of the Atomic World.

Peter J. Lewis

Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.

Edward M. MacKinnon

Vladislav Terekhovich

The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental con­cepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by exam­ples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scien­tific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of main­stream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the on­tologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.

J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon

Anonymous

William Seager

Abstract Quantum mechanics is notoriously difficult to interpret. What does the theory say our world is really like? And what is it to ‘interpret’ a theory in the first place? Here I argue that the goal of interpretation is intelligibility, a goal which has always accompanied basic scientific pursuits. Intelligibility aims to show how that the world – as a theory pictures it – can be made intuitively clear. Quantum mechanics seems incapable of supporting this feature of intelligibility. But there are distinct kinds of intelligibility. I identify three kinds: mundane, mathematical and metaphysical. Theories can meet the demands of intelligibility to a greater or lesser extent across all three kinds. Quantum theory grades very high in terms of mathematical intelligibility but very low on mundane intelligibility. This mismatch motivates the search for ‘interpretations’ of quantum mechanics. These are efforts to provide metaphysical intelligibility. Various examples are considered and I investigate David Bohm’s approach as a case of a radical metaphysics whose motivations are somewhat akin to those of Leibniz.