Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

De Gruyter eBooks

On the Metaphysical Principles of Quantum Theory

Hernán Bruno Pringe

Published Oct 15, 2013• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1515/9783110246490.4057

Related papers

The metaphysics of quantum theory

Tim Maudlin

Belgrade Philosophical Annual•Jan 1, 2016•2 citations

For and Against Metaphysics in the Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechancis

Christian DE RONDE

In this paper we discuss the relation of quantum theory to the problem of metaphysics.Based on metaphysical and anti-metaphysical stances, we put forward an 'interpretational map' of quantum mechanics in general and of the modal interpretation in particular.Thus, within the modal interpretation, we distinguish between: Modal Interpretations (which start from) the Mathematical Formalism (MIMF) and Modal Interpretations (which start from) Metaphysical Principles (MIMP).Finally, we argue for a middle path in between metaphysical principles and the formal conditions imposed on quantum mechanics.

Philosophica•Jan 2, 2010•0 citations

Metaphysical implications of the quantum theory

Neal Grossman

Synthese•Jan 1, 1997•1 citation

Modal Metaphysics and the Everett Interpretation

Alastair Wilson

Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.

•Jan 1, 2006•3 citations

Metaphysical Implications of the Quantum Theory

Neal Grossman

Springer eBooks•Jan 1, 1977•1 citation

Incomplete yet existent objects: a Nuclear Meinongian approach to quantum metaphysical indeterminacy

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Renato Semaniuc Valvassori

This article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons’ Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons’ theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons’ framework, leads to what we term the “Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle” (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences.

arXiv:2510.18111•Principia an international journal of epistemology•Dec 17, 2025•0 citations
In this paper we discuss the relation of quantum theory to the problem of metaphysics.Based on metaphysical and anti-metaphysical stances, we put forward an 'interpretational map' of quantum mechanics in general and of the modal interpretation in particular.Thus, within the modal interpretation, we distinguish between: Modal Interpretations (which start from) the Mathematical Formalism (MIMF) and Modal Interpretations (which start from) Metaphysical Principles (MIMP).Finally, we argue for a middle path in between metaphysical principles and the formal conditions imposed on quantum mechanics.
Recent work on probability in the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics yields a decision-theoretic derivation of David Lewis’ Principal Principle, and hence a general metaphysical theory of probability; part 1 is a discussion of this remarkable result. I defend the claim that the ‘subjective uncertainty’ principle is required for the derivation to succeed, arguing that it amounts to a theoretical identification of chance. In part 2, I generalize this account, and suggest that the Everett interpretation, in combination with a plausible view of natural laws, has the potential to provide a reductive theory of metaphysical modality. I defend the resulting naturalistic modal realism, and outline some of its implications for other parts of metaphysics.
This article proposes a reading of quantum metaphysical indeterminacy from the perspective of Parsons’ Nuclear Meinongianism. In doing so, we identify a fundamental incompatibility between a key feature of Parsons’ theory and standard quantum mechanics. Our approach interprets quantum indeterminacy as property incompleteness. However, this move, when combined with Parsons’ framework, leads to what we term the “Incompleteness-Entails-Nonexistence Principle” (IENP), which implausibly entails the nonexistence of quantum objects. For Meinongianism to be a suitable tool for the metaphysics of quantum mechanics, this principle must be addressed. We argue for dropping the IENP and discuss the resulting metaphysical and metametaphysical consequences.