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Resolving the Three-Box Paradox

R. E. Kastner

Published Jul 14, 1998• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

An apparent paradox proposed by Aharonov and Vaidman in which a single particle can be found with certainty in two (or more) boxes is analyzed. It is found that the paradox arises from a counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule. The paradox is resolved by observing that the counterfactual usage of the rule is, in general, not valid. 1. Background. The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule is a well-known formula for calculating the probabilities of the possible outcomes of observables measured at an intermediate time t between pre- and post-selection measurements at times t1 and t2, respectively [Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz, 1964]. If an intermediate measurement of nondegenerate observable C with eigenvalues {ci} is performed at time t, the ABL rule states that the probability of outcome cj in the case of a preselection for the state |ψ1 〉 and a post-selection for the state |ψ2 〉 is given by: 1 PABL(cj|ψ1, ψ2) = |〈ψ2|cj〉 | 2 |〈cj||ψ1〉 | 2 i |〈ψ2|ci〉 | 2 |〈ci||ψ1〉 | 2 (1) It has recently been shown 2 that the ABL rule cannot be used in a counterfactual sense: i.e., in general, it cannot be used to calculate the probabilities of possible outcomes of observables that have not actually been measured at time t. 2. The three-box example.

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Comment on “What quantum mechanics is trying to tell us,” by Ulrich Mohrhoff [Am. J. Phys. 68 (8), 728–745 (2000)]

Ruth E. Kastner

Mohrhoff proposes using the Aharonov–Bergmann–Lebowitz (ABL) rule for time-symmetric “objective” (meaning nonepistemic) probabilities corresponding to the possible outcomes of not-actually-performed measurements between specified pre- and post-selection measurement outcomes. It is emphasized that the ABL rule was formulated on the assumption that such intervening measurements are actually made and that it does not necessarily apply to counterfactual situations. The exact nature of the application of the ABL rule considered by Mohrhoff is made explicit and is shown to fall short of his stated counterfactual claim.

American Journal of Physics•Aug 1, 2001•5 citations
An apparent paradox proposed by Aharonov and Vaidman in which a single particle can be found with certainty in two (or more) boxes is analyzed. It is found that the paradox arises from a counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule. The paradox is resolved by observing that the counterfactual usage of the rule is, in general, not valid. 1. Background. The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule is a well-known formula for calculating the probabilities of the possible outcomes of observables measured at an intermediate time t between pre- and post-selection measurements at times t1 and t2, respectively [Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz, 1964]. If an intermediate measurement of nondegenerate observable C with eigenvalues {ci} is performed at time t, the ABL rule states that the probability of outcome cj in the case of a preselection for the state |ψ1 〉 and a post-selection for the state |ψ2 〉 is given by: 1 PABL(cj|ψ1, ψ2) = |〈ψ2|cj〉 | 2 |〈cj||ψ1〉 | 2 i |〈ψ2|ci〉 | 2 |〈ci||ψ1〉 | 2 (1) It has recently been shown 2 that the ABL rule cannot be used in a counterfactual sense: i.e., in general, it cannot be used to calculate the probabilities of possible outcomes of observables that have not actually been measured at time t. 2. The three-box example.
A currently discussed interpretation of quantum theory, Time-Symmetrized Quantum Theory, makes certain claims about the properties of systems between pre- and post- selection measurements. These claims are based on a counterfactual usage of the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule for calculating the probabilities of measurement outcomes between such measurements. It has been argued by several authors that the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule is, in general, incorrect. This paper examines what might appear to be a loophole in those arguments and shows that this apparent loophole cannot be used to support a counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule. It is noted that the invalidity of the counterfactual usage of the ABL rule implies that the characterization of those outcomes receiving probability 1 in a counterfactual application of the rule as `elements of reality' is, in general, unfounded.
The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule assigns probabilities to quantum measurement results at time t on the condition that the system is prepared in a given way at t_1 < t and found in a given state at t_2 > t. The question whether the rule can also be applied counterfactually to the case where no measurement is performed at the intermediate time t has recently been the subject of controversy. I argue that the counterfactual meaning may be understood in terms of the true value of an observable at t. Such a value cannot be empirically determined for, by stipulation, the measurement that would yield it is not performed. Nevertheless, it may or may not be well-defined depending on one's proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics. Various examples are discussed illustrating what can be asserted at the intermediate time without running into contradictions.
In 1964, Aharonov, Bergmann, and Lebowitz introduced their well-known ABL rule with the intention of providing a time-symmetric formalism for computing novel kinds of conditional probabilities in quantum theory. Later papers attached additional significance to the ABL rule, including assertions that it supported violations of the uncertainty principle. The present work challenges these claims, as well as subsequent attempts to salvage the original interpretation of the ABL rule. Taking a broader view, this paper identifies a subtle category error at the heart of the ABL rule that consists of confusing observables that belong to a single system with emergent observables that arise only for physical ensembles. Along the way, this paper points out other problems and fallacious reasoning in the research literature surrounding the ABL rule, including the misuse of post-selection, a reliance on pattern matching to classical formulas, and a posture of measurementism that takes experimental data as providing answers to interpretational questions.
Mohrhoff proposes using the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule for time-symmetric ``objective'' (meaning non-epistemic) probabilities corresponding to the possible outcomes of not-actually-performed measurements between specified pre- and post-selection measurement outcomes. It is emphasized that the ABL rule was formulated on the assumption that such intervening measurements are actually made and that it does not necessarily apply to counterfactual situations. The exact nature of the application of the ABL rule considered by Mohrhoff is made explicit and is shown to fall short of his stated counterfactual claim.
Coherence as a resource for NNN-box and quantum pigeonhole paradoxes
Pre- and post-selection (PPS) paradoxes are striking demonstrations of quantum nonclassicality. Logical PPS paradoxes, where inferences made with the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule are exactly 0 or 1, are linked to contextuality. Non-logical paradoxes lack this strong signature. In this work, we analyse more general, non-logical PPS scenarios involving mixed pre- and post-selected states. We show that two such scenarios, the NNN-box and quantum pigeonhole paradoxes, require coherence of both pre- and post-selected states in the basis of the intermediate measurement. This is done by showing each paradox holds if and only if there is weak-value anomaly for a single, paradox-specific operator, together with the fact that weak-value anomaly requires coherence. This clarifies the role of different notions of nonclassicality in these scenarios, highlighting the required quantitative departures from (strictly) classical explanations provided by incoherent sub-theories of quantum theory.
Mohrhoff proposes using the Aharonov–Bergmann–Lebowitz (ABL) rule for time-symmetric “objective” (meaning nonepistemic) probabilities corresponding to the possible outcomes of not-actually-performed measurements between specified pre- and post-selection measurement outcomes. It is emphasized that the ABL rule was formulated on the assumption that such intervening measurements are actually made and that it does not necessarily apply to counterfactual situations. The exact nature of the application of the ABL rule considered by Mohrhoff is made explicit and is shown to fall short of his stated counterfactual claim.