A Two-Party Identity-Based Key Agreement Protocol with Explicit Authentication
Haomin Yang, Yaoxue Zhang, Yuezhi Zhou
A two-message two-party key agreement protocol with explicit authentication provides perfect forward secrecy. Digital signatures can usually be used as providing explicit authentication for a key agreement protocol. Shim proposed an efficient identity-based signature scheme using bilinear pairings; however, he did not give a formal security proof for it. In this paper, we present a formal security proof for Shim's signature scheme. Using Shim's signature scheme as building blocks, we propose a new two-party identity-based key agreement protocol with explicit authentication. The proposed protocol satisfies a set of desirable security properties. Compared with the related protocols, the proposed protocol has distinct advantages in terms of security and computational efficiency.
International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing•Sep 1, 2012•0 citations