WHAT TO LOOK FOR Although the classical theory developed in Chapter 2 can be used to describe a great many phenomena in the real world, there is little doubt that the proper description of the world is quantum. To a large measure we perceive the world classically and we must find ways to uncover the underlying quantum theory. The process of “quantization” normally consists of turning a classical theory into a corresponding quantum theory. In turn, the “classical limit” is the process by which a quantum theory is brought to its associated classical theory. The parameter ħ = 1.0545 × 10 −27 (≃ 10 −27 ) erg-seconds (cgs units), referred to as Planck's constant, sets the scale of quantum phenomena. In many applications it will prove useful to use “natural” units in which ħ = 1 just so that formulas are less cumbersome. For most typical formulations of quantum mechanics the classical limit means the limit that ħ → 0, and in this text we shall have many occasions to use this definition as well. In addition, we shall also learn to speak about the classical and quantum theories simultaneously coexisting – as they do in the real world – without the need to take the limit ħ → 0. There are three generally accepted “royal” routes to quantization, due principally to Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and Feynman, respectively, and we shall exploit them all. In each case we begin with a single degree of freedom ( N = 1).
WHAT TO LOOK FOR Although the classical theory developed in Chapter 2 can be used to describe a great many phenomena in the real world, there is little doubt that the proper description of the world is quantum. To a large measure we perceive the world classically and we must find ways to uncover the underlying quantum theory. The process of “quantization” normally consists of turning a classical theory into a corresponding quantum theory. In turn, the “classical limit” is the process by which a quantum theory is brought to its associated classical theory. The parameter ħ = 1.0545 × 10 −27 (≃ 10 −27 ) erg-seconds (cgs units), referred to as Planck's constant, sets the scale of quantum phenomena. In many applications it will prove useful to use “natural” units in which ħ = 1 just so that formulas are less cumbersome. For most typical formulations of quantum mechanics the classical limit means the limit that ħ → 0, and in this text we shall have many occasions to use this definition as well. In addition, we shall also learn to speak about the classical and quantum theories simultaneously coexisting – as they do in the real world – without the need to take the limit ħ → 0. There are three generally accepted “royal” routes to quantization, due principally to Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and Feynman, respectively, and we shall exploit them all. In each case we begin with a single degree of freedom ( N = 1).
In this chapter we discuss theories which are rigorous in their formulation but which in order to be useful need to be modified by introducing approximations of some kind. The approximations we are interested in are those which involve introduction of classical mechanical concepts, that is, the classical picture and/or classical mechanical equations of motion in part of the system. At this point, we wish to distinguish between “the classical picture,” which is obtained by taking the classical limit ħ → 0 and the appearance of “classical equations of motion.” The latter may be extracted from the quantum mechanical formulation without taking the classical limit—but, as we shall see later by introducing a certain parametrization of quantum mechanics. Thus there are two ways of introducing classical mechanical concepts in quantum mechanics. In the first method, the classical limit is defined by taking the limit ħ → 0 either in all degrees of freedom (complete classical limit) or in some degrees of freedom (semi-classical theories). We note in passing that the word semi-classical has been used to cover a wide variety of approaches which have also been referred to as classical S-matrix theories, quantum-classical theories, classical path theory, hemi-quantal theory, Wentzel Kramer-Brillouin (WKB) theories, and so on. It is not the purpose of this book to define precisely what is behind these various acronyms. We shall rather focus on methods which we think have been successful as far as practical applications are concerned and discuss the approximations and philosophy behind these. In the other approach, the ħ-limit is not taken—at least not explicitly— but here one introduces “classical” quantities, such as, trajectories and momenta as parameters, and derives equations of motion for these parameters. The latter method is therefore one particular way of parameterizing quantum mechanics. We discuss both of these approaches in this chapter. The Feynman path-integral formulation is one way of formulating quantum mechanics such that the classical limit is immediately visible [3]. Formally, the approach involves the introduction of a quantity S, which has a definition resembling that of an action integral [101].
Although classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are separate disciplines, we live in a world where Planck’s constant ℏ > 0, meaning that the classical and quantum world views must actually coexist . Traditionally, canonical quantization procedures postulate a direct linking of various c -number and q -number quantities that lie in disjoint realms, along with the quite distinct interpretations given to each realm. In this paper we propose a different association of classical and quantum quantities that renders classical theory a natural subset of quantum theory letting them coexist as required. This proposal also shines light on alternative linking assignments of classical and quantum quantities that offer different perspectives on the very meaning of quantization. In this paper we focus on elaborating the general principles, while elsewhere we have published several examples of what this alternative viewpoint can achieve; these examples include removal of singularities in classical solutions to certain models, and an alternative quantization of several field theory models that are trivial when quantized by traditional methods but become well defined and nontrivial when viewed from the new viewpoint.
Introduction Quantum mechanics is based on the intuition that the essential difference between atomic physics and classical physics is the occurrence of discontinuities (see in particular [1,4,58–63]). Quantum mechanics should thus be considered a direct continuation of the quantum theory founded by Planck, Einstein and Bohr. Bohr in particular stressed repeatedly, already before the birth of quantum mechanics, that the discontinuities must lead to the introduction of new kinematical and mechanical concepts, so that indeed classical mechanics and its corresponding conceptual scheme should be abandoned [1,4]. Quantum mechanics tries to introduce the new concepts through a precise analysis of what is ‘observable in principle’. In fact, this does not mean setting up the principle that a sharp division between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities is possible and necessary. As soon as a conceptual scheme is given, one can infer from the observations to other facts that are actually not observable directly, and the boundary between ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’ quantities becomes altogether indeterminate. But if the conceptual scheme itself is still unknown, it will be expedient to enquire only about the observations themselves, without drawing conclusions from them, because otherwise wrong concepts and prejudices taken over from before will block the way to recognising the physical relationships [Zusammenhänge].
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Despite its successes, quantum mechanics (QM) has remained mysterious to all who have encountered it. Starting with Bohr and progressing into the present, the departure from intuitive, physical reality has widened. The connection between QM and reality is more than just a “philosophical” issue. It reveals that QM is not a correct or complete theory of the physical world and that inescapable internal inconsistencies and incongruities arise when attempts are made to treat it as physical as opposed to a purely mathematical “tool.” Some of these issues are discussed in a review by F. Laloe [Am. J. Phys. 69, 655 (2001)]. In an attempt to provide some physical insight into atomic problems and starting with the same essential physics as Bohr of e moving in the Coulombic field of the proton and the wave equation as modified by Schrodinger, a classical approach is explored that yields a remarkably accurate model and provides insight into physics on the atomic level. The proverbial view, deeply seated in the wave-particle duality notion, that there is no large-scale physical counterpart to the nature of the electron may not be correct. Physical laws and intuition may be restored when dealing with the wave equation and quantummechanical problems. Specifically, a theory of classical quantum mechanics (CQM) is derived from first principles that successfully applies physical laws on all scales. Rather than using the postulated Schrodinger boundary condition “Ψ → 0 as r → ∞,” which leads to a purely mathematical model of the electron, the constraint is based on experimental observation. Using Maxwell’s equations, the classical wave equation is solved with the constraint that the bound (n = 1)state electron cannot radiate energy. By further application of Maxwell’s equations to electromagnetic and gravitational fields at particle production, the Schwarzschild metric is derived from the classical wave equation, which modifies general relativity to include conservation of spacetime in addition to momentum and matter/energy. The result gives a natural relationship among Maxwell’s equations, special relativity, and general relativity. CQM holds over a scale of spacetime of 85 orders of magnitude — it correctly predicts the nature of the universe from the scale of the quarks to that of the cosmos. A review is given by G. Landvogt [Internat. J. Hydrogen Energy 28, 1155 (2003)].
Scope of this book Quantum mechanics is a difficult subject, and this book is intended to help the reader overcome the main difficulties in the way to understanding it. The first part of the book, Chs. 2–16, contains a systematic presentation of the basic principles of quantum theory, along with a number of examples which illustrate how these principles apply to particular quantum systems. The applications are, for the most part, limited to toy models whose simple structure allows one to see what is going on without using complicated mathematics or lengthy formulas. The principles themselves, however, are formulated in such a way that they can be applied to (almost) any nonrelativistic quantum system. In the second part of the book, Chs. 17–25, these principles are applied to quantum measurements and various quantum paradoxes, subjects which give rise to serious conceptual problems when they are not treated in a fully consistent manner. The final chapters are of a somewhat different character. Chapter 26 on decoherence and the classical limit of quantum theory is a very sketchy introduction to these important topics along with some indication as to how the basic principles presented in the first part of the book can be used for understanding them. Chapter 27 on quantum theory and reality belongs to the interface between physics and philosophy and indicates why quantum theory is compatible with a real world whose existence is not dependent on what scientists think and believe, or the experiments they choose to carry out. The Bibliography contains references for those interested in further reading or in tracing the origin of some of the ideas presented in earlier chapters.