A GEOMETRIC FRAMEWORK FOR DECIDING THE FEASIBILITY AND COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY OF SECURE TWO-PARTY COMPUTATION
Hamidreza Amini Khorasgani
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables mutually distrusting parties to compute functions over private inputs without revealing additional information. A general MPC protocol is the one that can be used to securely compute any function. General MPC requires either an honest majority or oblivious transfer, which can be provided via computational assumptions, a black-box hybrid, or trusted hardware. However, in the setting of dishonest majority, there are still many tasks that can be computed securely in the information-theoretic plain model without relying on oblivious transfer or any other computational hardness assumptions. Such protocols are perfectly secure, fast, and do not require any setup or preprocessing.This thesis investigates the feasibility and complexity of secure two-party computation, which inherently falls under the dishonest majority setting, with randomized output in the information-theoretic plain model against honest-but-curious adversaries. For deterministic output functions, seminal work by Chor, Kushilevitz, and Beaver provided a complete characterization of which computations admit secure protocols. In contrast, randomized functionalities give rise to a substantially richer landscape, where questions of round complexity, communication complexity, and even decidability have remained unresolved for decades.The thesis develops a geometric framework for analyzing secure computation by encoding candidate private-coin secure protocols for a given functionality as points in high-dimensional spaces. Within this representation, the space of all secure protocols forms recursively defined geometric sets whose structure can be studied using tools from real algebraic geometry and convex analysis. This perspective enables feasibility, search, and optimization problems in secure computation to be reduced to structural properties of these sets.Using this framework, the thesis establishes that determining whether a given two-party functionality with randomized output admits a secure protocol is decidable. A finite procedure is provided that either constructs a secure protocol with optimal round and communication complexity or identifies a geometric obstruction to security, resolving a foundational open problem in secure computation and information complexity. These results rely on showing that certain lamination hulls arising in the analysis are semi-algebraic, which is achieved by reducing the problem to solving systems of linear inequalities over convex sets. To this end, the thesis introduces a Gaussian-elimination-inspired algorithm and a new set operator, the positive geometric join, leading to a class of algebraically well-behaved geometric objects called hemihedra.The thesis also studies the round and communication complexity of secure computation with randomized output and disproves a longstanding folklore conjecture asserting that round complexity depends only on the cardinalities of the input and output domains. Explicit constructions demonstrate the existence of securely realizable functions with arbitrarily high round complexity, even for fixed size inputs and outputs, while matching upper bounds are proved for small output alphabets. These results reveal a close connection between secure computation and lamination hulls originally studied in hydrodynamics, highlighting unexpected geometric structure underlying information-theoretic security.
•Mar 9, 2026•0 citations