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Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

An Information-Theoretic Approach for Secure Protocol Composition

Yi-Ting Chiang, Tsan‐sheng Hsu, Churn‐Jung Liau, Yun-Ching Liu, Chih-Hao Shen, Dawei Wang, Justin Z. Zhan

Published Jan 1, 2015• 3 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-23829-6_28

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