Recently, Isalam and Biswas proposed a new group key agreement (GKA) protocol for imbalanced mobile networks. In this letter, we will show that Isalam et al.’s GKA protocol is not secure.
The use of bilinear pairings as a building block for cryptographic protocols, most notably in the construction of identity-based cryptosystems, is a very popular area of cryptographic research. In this thesis, we provide a novel classification of pairing-based group key agreement (GKA) from current literature. We propose a new framework for constructing secure and efficient computationally asymmetric authenticated GKA protocols from identity-based signcryption schemes and adapt this framework to construct a novel identity-based authenticated GKA protocol with perfect forward secrecy. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first that maintains perfect forward secrecy in the presence of auxiliary key agreement protocols. We formally prove the security of our protocols in the random oracle model and show that they are communication and computationally efficient in comparison to the pairing-based protocols from the literature.
ID-based group key agreement (GKA) has been increasingly researched with the advantage of simple public key management. However, identities of group members can be exposed in the ID-based GKA protocol, so eavesdroppers can easily learn who belongs to the specific group. Recently, Wan et al. proposed a solution for this problem, an anonymous ID-based GKA protocol, which can keep group memberspsila anonymity to outside eavesdroppers; nevertheless, the protocol has some security flaws. This paper shows that Wan et al.psilas GKA is insecure against colluding attack and their joining/leaving protocols do not guarantee forward and backward secrecy. We also propose a new forward secure ID-based GKA with anonymity from enhancing Wan et al.psilas joining/leaving protocols. Our scheme provides forward and backward secrecy and is essentially just efficient as Wan et al.psilas scheme.
Group key agreement (GKA) is a cryptographic primitive allowing two or more users to negotiate a shared session key over public networks.Wu et al. recently introduced the concept of asymmetric GKA that allows a group of users to negotiate a common public key, while each user only needs to hold his/her respective private key.However, Wu et al.'s protocol can not resist active attacks, such as fabrication.To solve this problem, Zhang et al. proposed an authenticated asymmetric GKA protocol, where each user is authenticated during the negotiation process, so it can resist active attacks.Whereas, Zhang et al.'s protocol needs a partially trusted certificate authority to issue certificates, which brings a heavy certificate management burden.To eliminate such cost, Zhang et al. constructed another protocol in identity-based setting.Unfortunately, it suffers from the so-called key escrow problem.In this paper, we propose the certificateless authenticated asymmetric group key agreement protocol which does not have certificate management burden and key escrow problem.Besides, our protocol achieves known-key security, unknown key-share security, key-compromise impersonation security, and key control security.Our simulation based on the pairing-based cryptography (PBC) library shows that this protocol is efficient and practical.